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This thesis is a collection of four papers related to financial economics that appear as separate 
chapters: Paper one focuses on implied volatility estimation and investigates the volatility 
smile in a South African context with fourteen stocks listed on JSE Limited and fifty-nine 
options on these underlying stocks for the period between April 4, 2002 and November 8, 
2008. Evidence of the existence of a South African volatility smile is shown. A possible 
reason for the existence of the smile could be the nonconstant variance of the underlying 
asset, which violates one of the assumptions of the Black-Scholes model. Furthermore, Value 
at Risk (hereafter referred to as VaR) is proposed to examine underlying stock volatilities and 
their forecasts. In this section, two different methods are used to calculate VaR: Historical 
simulation and Monte Carlo simulation, as well as conditional VaR. In the forecasting of 
volatility, these VaR approaches are found to be a significant forecasting tool for future 
underlying stocks’ volatility; and therefore their significance could be confirmed for implied 
volatility forecasting. 
 
Paper 2 uses an empirical approach, based on the CAPM model, to study the risk and return 
relationships of A shares (available for domestic investors) and B shares (available for foreign 
investors) in the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE). I utilize CAPM models to directly estimate 
the betas of A and B shares listed on SEE for the period between May 1, 1998 and May 1, 
2008. Findings were that domestic and foreign investors do not price A shares and B shares 













implied by CAPM models comply with A shares and therefore, domestic investors price asset 
risk as predicted by CAPM models in China. However, the study also revealed that the 
standard risk and return relationships implied by CAPM models also comply with B shares 
and foreign investors price asset risk as predicted by CAPM models in the US. Thus, price 
differences between domestic A shares and foreign B shares for the same company could be 
explained by the different systematic risks in China and the US. The investment opportunities 
and market portfolios are different for Chinese and foreign investors. Hence, A and B shares 
will be valued differently by these two segmented groups of investors.     
 
Paper 3 takes an empirical approach to examine and compare three different methods for 
measuring the trade-off between the risk and the return of trading stocks in both South Africa 
and China. This work is organized into two main parts: the first compares the performance of 
two different methods, the Market price of risk and the Sharpe ratio, for measuring the risk 
and return of trading stocks on the JSE during 2006 and 2007, and the second investigates 
whether the Chinese A and B shares listed on the SSE have a different market price of risk. In 
South Africa the study finds the Sharpe ratio is as efficient a measure as the market price of 
risk. However, in China findings are that the A to B share price premium can be explained by 
the higher volatility of the A shares. Here the market price of risk for A shares and B shares is 
almost identical. 
 
Paper 4 suggests an empirical framework as a possible mechanism to describe asset-price 
bubbles. The relationship between stock market value based on market fundamentals and the 
stock market price are analyzed in the context of rational speculative bubble theory.  
 
The theory of speculative bubbles predicts that stock market prices fluctuate around a 
fundamental value path and price bubbles develop as a series of small persistent steps away 
from their path. Any sudden movement back to the fundamental path is the bursting of the 
bubble. This theory is tested by attempting to capture these characteristics through employing 
different VaR techniques. The Monte Carlo simulation model and historical simulation 













Share Index for the period between July10, 1995 and March10, 2009 and the NASDAQ-100 
Index for the period July10, 1994 to July10, 2009. A bubble burst is defended as a violation 
of VaR. We found VaR has successfully detected all crashes that occurred in the NASDAQ 
and JSE markets during the period covered by our data, which include the dot-com bubble 
burst.   
 
The conclusion of this study is that the “predictability” of long horizon stock returns is likely 
driven by the economic agent’s rational asset pricing behaviour which requires compensation 
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1.1: Research Background and Aims 
 
This dissertation consists of four papers in financial economics that appear as separate 
chapters. The first chapter is entitled “The volatility smile of South African stock options: 
estimations and tests”. In this chapter, I study the volatility smile derived from options traded 
on the JSE and the possibility of forecast this volatility using different Value at Risk (VaR) 
approaches. 
 
Since Black and Scholes (1973) published their seminal article on option pricing, numerous 
empirical studies have found that this famous model results in systematic biases across 
moneyness and maturity. It is well known that since the October 1987 crash, the implied 
volatility computed from options on the stock index in the US market inferred by the Black-
Scholes model appears to be different across exercise prices. This is the so-called “volatility 
smile”. Given the Black-Scholes assumptions, all option prices on the same underlying 
security with the same expiration date but different exercise should have the same implied 
volatility. However, the “volatility smile” pattern suggests that the Black-Scholes model 
tends to misprice deep-in-the-money (ITM) and deep out-of-money (OTM) options. 
 
In the last two decades, option pricing has experienced an explosion of new models that relax 
some of the restrictive Black-Scholes assumptions. Hull and White (1987), Johnson and 
Shanno (1987), Scott (1987), Wiggins (1987), Melino and Turnbull (1990, 1995), Stein and 
Stein (1991) and Heston (1993) suggest a continuous-time stochastic volatility model. Merton 













and Heston and Nandi (2000) develop an option pricing model based on the GARCH process. 
Recently, Madan et al. (1998) used a three-parameter stochastic process, termed the variance 
gamma process, as an alternative model for the dynamics of log stock prices. 
 
Numerical empirical results, however, show that most of the above mentioned alternative 
models perform worse than the Black-Scholes Model (e.g. Jackwerth, 1999; Alexander and 
Nogueira, 2004). Hybrid models are rich, but they are difficult to implement in reality.   
 
Although efforts have been devoted to explaining the volatility smile or skew phenomenon 
and to seek alternative models, currently there is no overwhelming consensus on a suitable 
alternative model to the Black-Scholes model.  So far, the existing literature has not been 
conclusive either on whether the Black-Scholes model is ineffective, or the option market is 
inefficient. Indeed, there is no evidence that the persistent pricing biases represent risk-free 
arbitrage opportunity.  
 
To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, the volatility smile has not been studied in the 
South African context. Whether there is a South African volatility smile remains an empirical 
question. If the smile exists, the possibility of predicting this smile becomes an important area 
of interest.  
 
The first objective in this chapter is to provide evidence of a South African volatility smile 
and confirm the mis-pricing of the Black-Scholes (1973) model in this market. The second 
objective of this chapter is to attempt to use different VaR approaches to predict the 
movement in the underlying stocks, and accordingly predict if the underlying stock’s 
volatility exhibits a smile or skew effect.  In this section, two different methods are applied to 
calculate VaR: Historical simulation and Monte Carlo simulation as well as conditional VaR. 
 
The second chapter is entitled “Market segmentation, relative supply of shares and share 
price premium: evidence from the Chinese market”. In this chapter, I study the risk and return 













The establishment of the Shanghai (1990) and Shenzhen (1990) stock exchanges marked an 
important step towards building a functioning capital market in the history of economic 
reforms started in 1978 in China. Like other newly established emerging capital markets, 
China’s security markets exhibit many unique and constraining institutional features that 
have no counterparts in developed nations. Attracting foreign capital is one of the priorities 
for many emerging economies which open their security markets to foreign investors (with 
different forms of restrictions on foreign share ownership). But do foreign and domestic 
investors price assets in these markets the same way? In such an environment with more 
instability and unique institutional constraints, can we still expect the same risk and return 
relationships predicted by standard CAPM models? These are the questions addressed in this 
chapter. Focusing on the shares listed on the SSE.  
 
The third chapter is entitled “Incorporating the Sharpe ratio and the market price of risk into 
asset allocation”. In this chapter, I empirically examine and compare the performance of three 
different methods of measuring the trade-off between the risk and the return of trading stocks 
in both South Africa and China.  
 
In portfolio theory, it is assumed that investors always prefer higher returns to lower returns 
for a given level of risk; likewise for a given level of return, one prefers a lower risk to a 
higher risk. As return and risk are two important entities in measuring the performance of an 
investment, it is crucial to consider both return and risk in the selection of assets. The Sharpe 
Ratio is one of the most popular performance measures. It is defined as the ratio of the 
expected return to the standard deviation of the returns. It captures both return and risk. By 
the generalized Sharpe rule, a new asset with a higher Sharpe ratio has a higher probability of 
being selected (e.g. Sharpe, 1966, 1975, 1994; Dowd, 1999, 2000; Hodges, 1998 and Amin 
and Kat, 2002).  
 
This chapter is organized into two main parts: the first comparing the performance of the 
Market price of risk and the Sharpe ratio of trading stocks on the JSE. In obtaining the market 













Motion (GBM). Firstly, the constant drift and the volatility is estimated; then the drift term is 
decomposed into a risk-free rate and the market price of risk-multiplying volatility. The 
market price of risk is assumed to be constant and independent of time. The Maximum 
Likelihood Method is adopted to estimate the parameters. However, in obtaining the Sharpe 
ratio, the Maximum Likelihood Estimation Method is adopted to estimate the parameters in 
the Sharpe ratio equation developed by Sharpe in 1966. In this way the Sharpe Ratio becomes 
a forward-looking risk measurement tool instead of a backward-looking risk measurement 
tool. By this method a basis is found from which to compare the two risk measurements, as 
both of them are forward-looking risk-measurement tools. t-statistics are provided to show 
the significance of the difference between the market price of risk and the Sharpe ratio.  
 
The second part of the chapter investigates whether Chinese domestic and foreign shares 
listed on the SSE have a different market price of risk. We know that market price of risk 
measures the trade-off between risk and return of an asset, that is, the increase of expected 
returns demanded per additional unit of risk. Basak (2005) argues that investors holding 
heterogeneous beliefs will have different market price of risk even for the same investment. 
Since Chinese domestic shares and foreign shares have the same payoff streams but are held 
by different investors, we can test their market price of risk to see whether an investor’s 
belief matters for the price difference.  
 
Domestic and foreign shares are issued by the same company and have virtually the same 
voting rights and dividends. The difference that exists may be caused by different risk-free 
rates or different volatilities. In other words, this study aims to test whether they have the 
same market price of risk. The procedure in this test is exactly as it is in the first part of this 
chapter. However, the data we use for this test are the daily closing prices of domestic and 
foreign shares of the companies who issue both classes of shares listed on the SSE. The 
theory behind the analysis is straightforward since the corresponding domestic and foreign 
shares are issued by the same company and have identical voting policies and dividend rights, 
if we take the company-specific fundamentals as given and assume that the prices of the 













market price of risk should be identical since they share the same company-specific risk. If 
investors view the firm-specific risk as the only risk they bear, then they should have the 
same market price of risk. 
 
On the other hand, if the market price of risk is different, this indicates that although sharing 
the same firm-specific risk, domestic and foreign shares are considered to be at different 
market-risk levels and thus are expected to have different excess returns for investors. 
Furthermore, besides the comparison of the market price of risks for individual domestic and 
foreign shares, we can also stack all domestic shares or foreign shares’ returns and test the 
average market price of the risks for the two groups. This test is reliable insofar as it relates to 
the individual results since it takes the average of the individual estimators and thus provides 
one with more intuitive results for domestic and foreign shares as a whole. Nevertheless, this 
chapter also estimates and compares the Sharpe ratios of domestic shares and foreign shares 
based historical-return data. 
 
The fourth chapter, entitled “Bubbles: econometric analysis and empirical evidence”, 
examines the presence of rational speculative bubbles in the NASDAQ and JSE stock 
markets. This chapter attempts to develop an empirical framework on a possible mechanism 
to describe asset-price bubbles. 
 
“Bubble” is not a word specific to the stock market. Initial opinions about so-called price 
bubbles referred to various kinds of assets, such as foreign exchange, gold, real estate, and 
stock. Bubbles have been concerned with driving up all these asset prices and causing them to 
grow rapidly.  Following Blanchard and Watson (1982) who stated that bubbles are more 
likely to exist in the price of an asset with difficult to understand fundamental values, it is 
expected that bubbles hardly exist if the fundamental value of an asset is easily identified. 
With this idea in mind, it is expected that the research of bubbles is best conducted in stock 














In this chapter the relationship between stock market value based on market fundamentals 
and the stock market price will be analyzed in the context of rational speculative bubble 
theory. The theory of speculative bubbles predicts that stock market prices fluctuate around a 
fundamental value path and price bubbles develop as a series of small persistent steps away 
from their path. Any sudden movement back to the fundamental path is the bursting of the 
bubble. I test this theory by attempting to capture these characteristics by employing different 
VaR techniques.  
 
This work follows rational bubbles studies and stems from two basic opinions: firstly, 
bubbles persist in stock markets since they result from optimistic beliefs and speculative 
behaviours which dominate the market always. Accordingly, this work follows Fukuta (1998) 
which presents a class of rational bubbles named “incompletely bursting bubbles”, which has 
three states: a large bubble state, a small bubble state and an incomplete burst state. Only in 
the incomplete burst state is the expected bubble tomorrow less than the bubble today. 
Secondly, we can detect the incomplete burst bubble state where the expected bubble 
tomorrow is less than the bubble today using di ferent VaR approaches as long as VaR can be 
used to estimate the potential loss from adverse price movements. Thus, we can use VaR to 
detect the downside (burst) of the bubble.  
 
In this work VaR is used as a benchmark for a bubble. We will recognize any violation to this 
benchmark as result of bubble burst. The data used in this chapter is from two different 
markets, namely the NASAQ and JSE.   
 


















1.2: Published Work 
Some original work that I present in this thesis has been presented at conferences and 
published. These are  
 
[1] Endi,  A (2006): “New Approaches to Risk Management in Financial Optimization” 
Quantitative Methods in Finance 2006 Conference, Sydney. 
 
[2]  Endi, A (2009): “An examination of the value-at-risk volatility relationship in the options 
market: New evidence on mispricing in the Black-Scholes model”, Studies in Economics and 






























Chapter 2   
Literature Overview 
 
2.1: Introduction  
 
The work of Black and Scholes (1973) on the valuation of options on assets resulted in a 
formula which calculates the price of a stock option based on the price and volatility of the 
stock, the time horizon of the option and the current risk-free interest rate. Within the Black-
Scholes formula all the independent variables are observable with the exception of the stock’s 
volatility. However, it is possible to observe the market price of the stock options, invert the 
option pricing formula and solve for the volatility (Latane and Rendleman, 1976). The 
resulting number is known as the implied volatility of the option, so called because it refers to 
the volatility implied by the Black-Scholes option pricing model. 
 
The implied volatility is regularly used by option traders as an index of how the market is 
pricing an option. Traders observe the implied volatility, modify the volatility estimate with 
their own forecast and re-calculate the Black-Scholes prices to determine appropriate buy and 
sell actions (Figlewski, 1989).  However, using the Black-Scholes formula for calculating the 
implied volatility is problematic. The Black-Scholes model has been confirmed by extensive 
empirical testing to be consistent with market prices for at-the-money call options, however, 
it has been empirically demonstrated to have systematic biases for options which are in-the-
money, out-of-the-money and with differing term structures (time to expiration) (MacBeth 
and Merville, 1979). 
 
In this chapter, we summarize the major developments in the field of option valuation in the 
past three decades. The first section in this chapter is a survey of the literature on option 













pricing model. Hence it is most helpful to start this chapter by considering the Black-Scholes 
model in the context of a family tree of option pricing models. Using this family tree analogy, 
it is possible to identify three major branches within the family of option pricing models; 
analytical, numerical and analytic approximation.  
 
The analytical branch can itself be divided into three distinct lineages; precursors to the 
Black-Scholes model, generalisations of the Black-Scholes model, and extensions of the 
Black-Scholes model. However, within the branch of numerical models, there are three 
lineages. The best known of the three is the binomial model line; the others are the trinomial 
model and the Monte Carlo simulation. The analytic approximation models branch represents 
a reunification of the other two branches. A full detail of the family tree of option pricing 
models which is developed here is presented in flowchart 2.1. The flowchart is designed to 
provide a comprehensive picture of the option pricing models on a single page.  
 
This chapter also focuses on implied volatility estimation and on the well known volatility 
smile phenomenon. Numerous explanations for the volatility smile phenomenon and 
extensions as well as alternatives to the Black-Scholes model will be offered in this literature. 
In the second section, however, the focus is on volatility forecasting and capturing the 
skewness and kurtosis of underlying risk factors by using the VaR framework. VaR models 
predict tail fatness and negative autocorrelation of large returns and thus can predict an option 
implied volatility smile. 
 
The layout of this chapter is as follows: Section 2.3 provides option pricing models prior to 
that of Black-Scholes. Section 2.4 demonstrates the Black Scholes model. Section 2.5 
provides alternative option pricing models and volatility models. Section 2.6 demonstrates 
the Greeks under the Black-Scholes model and provides an overview of developments, 
methodologies, and applications of VaR. Various key methodologies of VaR estimation and 
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1b: Extensions to the Black-Scholes Model 
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2: Numerical solution 
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equation 
Flowchart 2.1: The major developments in the field of option valuation throughout the past three decades 
 
Expected rate of return on an option is different than the return expected on 
the underlying asset, therefore the discount rate used by Bones is incorrect 
Extend the model 
Relaxes the assumptions 
1: Numerical Models 













2.2: Finance Background  
 
We begin by presenting a brief overview of the financial terminology used throughout the 
dissertation. A derivative security is a financial asset whose value is derived in part from the 
value and characteristics of an underlying asset(s). Common types of derivative securities are 
options, forwards, futures, and interest rate swaps. This dissertation focuses on options. 
 
A stock option is a derivative which gives its holder the right, but not the obligation, to 
engage in some future transaction involving the underlying stock. A call (put) option gives its 
holder the option to purchase (sell) a share of the underlying stock for a pre-specified price, 
known as the strike price. Option contracts also have an expiration date. The holder of a 
European option has the right to exercise the option only on the option’s expiration date. The 
holder of an American option has the right to exercise the option on or at any time before the 
expiration date. Of course, rather than exercising an option, the holder may instead choose to 
simply sell the option at any time before its expiration date. 
 
The value of an option contract depends on several parameters including the value of shares 
of the underlying stock, the strike price of the option, and the amount of time remaining until 
expiration. An option’s value also depends on characteristics of the underlying asset price 
dynamic, including the volatility and the risk-free interest rate. A rational pricing theory 
dictates that the value of a call (put) option increases as the value of the underlying asset 
increases (decreases). The value of a call (put) option decreases as the strike price increases 
(decreases). For non-dividend paying stocks, the value of all call options increase as the 
amount of time to expiration increases. The value of a European put as a function of time 
remaining until expiration increases from zero to a time corresponding to a maximum value 
and then decreases beyond this time. The value of any option increases as the volatility of the 
underlying asset increases. The value of a call (put) option increases (decreases) as the risk-
free interest rate increases. We relate changes in the values of options to changes in these 













2.3: Option Pricing Models Prior to Black-Scholes 
 
The valuation of option pricing has a long and renowned history, dating back to the late 
nineteenth century. Most of the early literature on the valuation of options is concerned with 
warrants. However more issues were introduced when the valuation of options underwent 
revolutionary changes in the 1970’s. The first contribution to the theory of option pricing was 
from Castelli (1877). Castelli presented the public with the hedging and speculation features 
of options. His work did not, however, provide any major theoretical basis for the valuation 
of options. Bacheleir (1900) offered the first significant literature on option valuations in his 
dissertation “Theorie de la Speculation”.  
 
2.3.1:  Bachelier -1900 
 
The first attempt at creating a model for the pricing of options that can be found in today’s 
finance literature was provided by Louis Bachelier, in 1900. 
 
The central assumption in deriving a theoretical model for the pricing of options concerns the 
statistical process which describes the behaviour of the underlying asset over time1. Bachelier 
believed that transactions in the stock market are a result of buyers and sellers having 
different expectations of the future stock price, and that it would be unreasonable to presume 
that, on average, one or the other could consistently make better predictions. From these 
postulations, he conjectured that at any moment, the market as a whole cannot be expected to 
go either up or down.  Positive and negative expectations cancel each other out when one 
considers the aggregate of market participants at any moment in time.  On average then, the 
expected price change per unit of time is assumed to be zero (Bernstein, 1992:20)2.  
                                                             
1 The underlying asset in the models described in this section is a share of common stock. 
 
2 It should be clear that Bachelier did not ignore the fact that what motivates investors towards buying stocks is the 
expectation of gain from future appreciation in the price of the stocks. He simply states that the reason for people to be able 
to do so, it that others believe such appreciation will not materialize, otherwise prices would keep rising indefinitely. The net 
effect of buying and selling at the time, having these different views of the likely future behaviour of prices is, according to 
Bachelier, that the expected change in the stock price will, on average, be equal to zero. (Unless buyers and sellers 













Bachelier also noted that stock price volatility increases as the time horizon over which the 
volatility is measured is increased.  This led him to investigate the mathematical properties of 
the behaviour of particles subject to random shocks as they move in space, known in physics 
as the Brownian motion3; Bachelier showed that the standard deviation of stock prices 
increases in proportion to the squared root of time.  
 
He then assumed that the movement of stock prices over time follows arithmetic Brownian 
motion4 without drift, and with variance of 2  per unit of time.  (If the statistical process that 
describes the movement of the stock price over time has no drift, then on average the stock 
price will not tend to move either up and down.)  This assumption implies that the stock price 
is a normally distributed random variable, generated by a statistical process comparable to 
successive flips of a fair coin, and there is an equal probability of getting either outcome, and 
each outcome is independent of the previous outcome.  But more specifically, if the stock 
price follows arithmetic Brownian motion without drift, the probability of the price rising or 
falling by one absolute unit, (e.g. one Rand) is equal, irrespective of the price level (Smith, 
1976:15). Bachelier also assumed the expected return on a call option to be equal to the 
expected change in the value of the underlying asset, which, as stated previously, was 
assumed to be equal to zero. 
 
Arithmetic Brownian motion is not an adequate representation of the statistical process 
followed by stock prices.  First, investors are concerned with the proportional, not absolute 
change in price. Second, the assumption of arithmetic Brownian motion and normally 
distributed prices ignores the fact that stocks represent shares of the equity of public 
companies, the owners of which cannot be held liable for more than the value of their 
shareholdings.  The value of such stocks cannot be negative. The distribution of the stock 
prices cannot therefore be symmetrical, although in theory they can rise by any percentage, 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
 
3 The mathematical representation of Brownian Motion, for a long time credited to the physicist Albert Einstein, was 
apparently first discovered by Bachelier as he investigated the behaviour of stock prices (Bernstein, 1992:18-122 and 
Ingersoll, 1989:202). 
 













stock prices cannot fall by more than 100%. The assumption of arithmetic Brownian motion 
and normally distributed prices implies that stock prices can become negative. 
 
Assuming a mean expected change in stock prices of zero implies that economic agents are 
risk-neutral, and ignores the time value of money (the expected terminal value of the option 
was not discounted to obtain the present value). If interest rates are positive and investors are 
risk-averse (that is, they prefer a certain outcome to an unexpected outcome), stocks will be 
expected, at any moment and on average, to yield a return at least equal to the rate of interest 
on a bond with no probability of default (the risk-free rate). Also, differences in the 
variability of the price of an option and the underlying stock were not investigated. 
 
Despite what is today acknowledged as an enormous contribution to the fields of financial 
economics and mathematical statistics, Bachelier’s work went unnoticed for more than half 
acentury until it was accidentally found in the University of Chicago’s library and circulated 
among established economists. Clearly rooted in Bachelier’s work, the next important option-
pricing model formulated within a probabilistic framework is that of Sprenkle, published in 
1964.   
 
2.3.2:  Sprenkle -1964 
 
Sprenkle in 1964 noted that it is the percentage and not absolute change in the stock price that 
matters. Sprenkle assumes that stock prices follow geometric Brownian motion with positive 
drift5. This means that the probability of a one percent increase in the stock price equals the 
probability of one percent decrease, irrespective of the stock price level (Smith, 1976:15). 
Positive drift means that the random walk followed by the stock price has an upward trend. 
The drift factor can be interpreted as the mean rate of return on the stock. The mean rate of 
return and the variance of the stock price are assumed to be constant. The model thus allows 
for the existence of positive interest rates and risk-averse behaviour.   
                                                             
5 Although the technical aspects of this process are beyond the scope of this thesis, geometric Brownian motion is looked at 














The assumption of a stock price generated by geometric Brownian motion is consistent with a 
log-normal distribution of the possible stock price, at the end of a finite time interval, such as 
the life of an option (Sprenkle, 1964: 428). It is the natural logarithm of the stock price, and 
not the stock price itself, which can be assumed to be normally distributed. The log-normal 
distribution, unlike the normal distribution which is bell-shaped, is skewed to the right, that 
is, the right rail is fatter than the tail on the left-hand side of the distribution. It serves as a 
better approximation of the actual distribution of stock prices, reflecting the fact that while 
stock prices can increase by any amount, they cannot become negative (note that natural logs 
are always positive). This seems to be about as far as Sprenkle’s model differs from 
Bachelier’s. Sprenkle ignores the time value of money in his model, despite the assumption 
of a positive drift in the stochastic process.  
 
2.3.3:  Boness -1964 
 
Boness’s model is very similar to Sprenkle’s. The crucial difference is that Boness does not 
ignore the time value of money. He also recognizes the importance of risk, but assumes that 
all stocks on which options are traded have the same risk profile, and, for simplicity, that 
investors are risk-neutral. Accordingly, no distinction is made between the expected rates of 
return or risk levels of options and the underlying stocks. The expected return on the stock is 
used as the discount rate in calculating the present value of the expected terminal value of the 
option (Ingersoll, 1989:203, and Smith, 1976:17).  
 
2.3.4:  Samuelson-1965 
 
Samuelson (1965) provided a rigorous review of option valuation theory and pointed out that 
an option may have a different level of risk when compared with a stock, and therefore the 
discount rate used by Boness (1964) is incorrect. Samuelson assumes, as Sprenkle and 













geometric Brownian motion with positive drift (Smith, 1976:18).  The value of a call option 
is posited as given by the expected value of the option at maturity, discounted by the 
expected rate of return on the option. Samuelson does not suggest a procedure for estimating 
the expected rate of return on the option and admits this to be a weakness of the model 
(Smith, 1976:20). 
 
It is clear that not only the expected rate of return on an option differs from the return 
expected on the underlying asset, as explicitly recognized in Samuelson’s model6, but also, 
the volatility (and therefore expected return if investors are risk-averse) of an option varies as 
the stock price changes, if it follows a random walk. Especially, “the higher the stock prices 
relative to the exercise price, the safer the option, although the option is always riskier than 
the stock. The option’s risk changes every time the stock price changes” (Brealey and Myers, 
1996:573).  
 
Recognizing the fact that the expected return (or riskiness) of an option is not constant puts a 
severe limitation on the theoretical validity of any model derived by simply estimating the 
expected value of the option at maturity (in itself not likely to be an easy task), and using the 
expected return on the option to discount this expectation to the present. The procedure 
would only be satisfactory if it were possible to specify one expected rate of return on the 
option that could serve as an appropriate discounting factor, that is, if the option’s risk could 
be assumed to be constant. 
 
Finally in 1973, Black and Scholes developed the basic framework for the currently well-
accepted Black-Scholes option-pricing model. The only difference between the Black-
Scholes model and the model derived by Boness (1964) is the use of the risk-free rate as the 
rate of return on the option instead of the rate of return on the underlying asset. “If Boness 
had carried his assumption that investors are indifferent to risk to its logical conclusion (that 
the expected rate of return on the stock is equal to the risk-free rate), he would have derived 
                                                             
6
 In 1955 Professor Paul Samuelson, wrote an unpublished paper entitled “Brownian Motion in the Stock Market”, during 
that same year, Richard Kruizenga, one of Samuelson’s students, cited Bachelier’s work in his dissertation entitled “Put and 













the Black-Scholes equation” (Ingersoll, 1989:204). However, it is clear that the derivation of 
the two models differs substantially. Boness did not formulate his model within the context of 
capital equilibrium. He failed to demonstrate that a risk-free portfolio could be constructed. 
This would result in risk neutrality being acceptable as a basis to calculate the price of an 
option. Furthermore, although the Black-Scholes formula was obtained within a risk neutral 
environment, it is never assumed that investors are risk neutral. The formula is valid 
irrespective of risk preferences. 
 
The following section is a review of the literature concerning implied volatility and volatility 
smile from the development of the Black and Scholes model (1973) to the present day.  
 
2.4: The Black-Scholes Model 
 
In deriving their valuation model for a European call option on an underlying stock with no 
dividend, Black and Scholes (1973) assume that the variance of stock return is constant over 
the life of the option, and known by market participants. They also assume the short term 
interest rate is known and constant throughout the life of the option and that this rate is the 
borrowing and lending rate for market participants. Other assumptions made in the model are 
that the underlying stock price follows a geometric Brownian motion with constant volatility, 
and that capital markets are frictionless in the sense that there are no transaction costs, no 
limitations on the use of short selling proceeds, and unlimited borrowing and lending (After 
the development of their model, there was a wave of option models that relaxed many of the 
simplifying assumptions made by Black and Scholes, and these models are shown in 
flowchart 2.1).  
 
Given these assumptions, the value of an option is only a function of the underlying stock 
price and time. This means that the option and its underlying stock have a common stochastic 
diffusion component, and option traders can construct a riskless hedge portfolio by 













(bought). The appropriate position in the underlying stock in the hedge portfolio is 
determined by the first partial derivative of the Black and Scholes option pricing model with 
respect to the asset price. It should be noted that the portfolio is riskless only for an 
infinitesimally short period of time. As the price of the underlying stock and time to maturity 
change, the first partial derivative of the Black-Scholes option pricing model also changes. 
To keep the portfolio riskless, it is therefore necessary for option traders to continuously 
rebalance the relative proportions of the derivative and the stock in the hedge portfolio. In 
other words, if an option were to become mispriced, a riskless arbitrage situation would exist 
causing an immediate return to the correct value. In an ideal market, if the option’s price were 
to differ from the correct price as indicated by the Black-Scholes formula, an arbitrageur 
would trade stock options against the actual stock and produce a riskless profit situation. As a 
result, the price of the option would immediately change to reflect the profit neutral arbitrage 
position.  
 
Their model generates the theoretically correct value of an option based on the following 
independent variables: 
1) The price of the underlying stock 
2) The time until expiration 
3) The difference between strike and market price 
4) The stock’s volatility 
5) The risk-free rate of return 
The variable that is the hardest to estimate is the stock’s volatility as it is the only variable 
that cannot be directly observed. Likewise, it is the variable of most interest to purchasers of 
options (Feinstein, 1989). Historical stock volatility was used for this variable by Black and 
Scholes (1972) in an empirical study of their model7, as well as by other early empirical 
studies of option pricing models8. The simplest method to obtain the historical stock volatility 
is to calculate the conventional standard deviation of the rate of return on the underlying 
                                                             
7 Black and Scholes's seminal paper was published in 1973. Their test of the model was published before the model itself. 
The original theoretical paper had however been submitted for publication before the empirical study, but it was not accepted 
and had to be re-submitted, after the intervention of more well known economists (Bernstein, 1992). 
 













stock, using historical stock price data. However, an historical measure of volatility may fail 
to reflect the market’s view, at a point in time, of the future volatility of the stock. We can 
expect this to be the case wherever a shock hits the stock market. Since the market’s 
assessment of future volatility will determine the volatility input when options are valued, a 
model that uses only past data to estimate this parameter will fail to price them correctly 
(Schmalensee and Trippi, 1978). 
 
To understand the important relationship between the volatility and the pricing of the option, 
an example of two stocks having the same price of R90 but different volatilities is considered. 
It is possible to buy both a call and a put on the same stock, taking the position that if the 
stock moves sufficiently from its current price, the position will be profitable. In this case, if 
the stock moves either above R100 or below R80 the holder of the position will make money. 
On the other hand, if the stock price stays within the range of R80-R100 then the position will 
not make money and the put and call will expire worthless. Clearly, options on stock 1 with 
the greater volatility should have the higher price because its volatility will drive the stock 
into the profitable range. Interestingly, profitability doesn’t depend on whether the stock 
moves up or down in price. It is the volatility that drives the price of the option.  
 
As shown by Black and Scholes (1973), if an investor were able to perfectly forecast 
volatility, large profits could be made. As in the example shown above, knowing the exact 
volatility would enable an investor to purchase only those options that would be profitable 
and avoid those that would be unprofitable. Using the correct volatility estimate is the key to 
accurate Black-Scholes option pricing. 
 
The Black-Scholes model has been confirmed by extensive empirical testing to be consistent 
with market prices for at-the-money call options. However, Black (1975) noted and the 
model has been shown to differ systematically from market prices for in-the-money, out-the-
money and for differing time to expiration (term structures) of call options (MacBeth and 














One of the causes of this problem is the distinction between model price and market price 
(Figlewski, 1989). The model price assumes an ideal market while the market price is the 
result of supply and demand pressures of investors and the market environment. Investors 
may have irrational expectations and be willing to pay for these expectations. The market 
environment includes many variables such as hours open for trading, transaction costs, taxes 
and economic conditions. None of these variables are included in the model but can have a 
potentially significant impact on the pricing of an option.  
 
In the case of transactions costs, investors would only be expected to execute the arbitrage 
whenever the expected profit exceeds the transaction costs. However, these upper and lower 
bounds can be very large. Figlewski (1989) simulated the riskless arbitrage position including 
transaction costs and found the impact of these costs to be significant. The price of an at-the-
money call option with a one month expiration date and a Black-Scholes value of $2.05 for 
example, would have to be outside the bounds of $1.74 to $2.35 to generate a riskless 
arbitrage situation including transaction costs (Figlewski, 1989). 
 
2.5: Implied Volatility 
 
Each of the six variables in the Black-Scholes formula (stock price, exercise price, time to 
expiration, volatility, dividend, and risk-free rate) are observable, except for the volatility of 
the underlying stock. Latane and Rendleman (1976) demonstrated that the Black-Scholes 
formula can be inverted, using numerical techniques, to cater for volatility. The resulting 
value has been termed Black-Scholes implied volatility. Given that the implied volatility is 
the only unobservable variable in the Black-Scholes formula and given the accuracy of the 
Black-Scholes model, the implied volatility should be the market’s expectation of the future 
volatility of the underlying stock. 
  
Because the model values options in an ideal market and the market prices options according 













model generated values and the actual prices. Because of these additional market factors 
which are not part of the Black-Scholes formula, the implied volatility produced by inverting 
the formula may include more information than merely the implied volatility. In particular, 
because the implied volatility is the only unobservable variable in the formula it includes the 
implied volatility and all other information such as the effect of transaction costs, and other 
market environment factors of supply/demand and irrational investors.  
 
If the Black-Scholes model were precisely accurate, all of the implied volatilities on the same 
underlying stock would be the same. Empirically, however, it has been demonstrated that 
implied volatilities are systematically biased across strike prices and across expiration 
(Rubenstein, 1985). 
 
 MacBeth and Merville (1979), for example, find that implied volatility recovered from the 
Black-Scholes model higher (lower) for in-the-money (out-of-the-money) options than at-the-
money options. This was a dominant pattern before the October 1987 market crash. After the 
crash, the implied volatility decreases monotonically as the options are out-of-the-money 
(Dumas, Fleming, and Whaley, 1998). Option professionals often refer to this effect as a 
volatility “smile” or “skew.”    
 
2.5.1: Volatility Smiles 
 
The volatility smile is the term used to describe the systematic bias in the Black-Scholes 
formula for options that are in-the-money or out-of-the-money. The term is derived from the 
empirical evidence showing that the option price (and implied volatility) tends to be higher 
than the Black-Scholes value when the option is deep-in-the-money or deep-out-of-the-
money (Hull and White, 1987). When charted, the resulting graph of implied volatilities 
across strike prices has the look of a smile. Figure 2.1 is typical volatility smile for the March 













632. The smile illustrates the systematic bias in the Black-Scholes formula for options that 




Figure 2.1: Volatility Smile Graph9. 
 
The literature is consistent in the finding that there exists significant bias in the Black-Scholes 
formula (Ncube and Satchell, 1997). However, the direction of the bias has not been so 
consistently reported.  
 
Black (1975) reported that the Black-Scholes model systematically underprices deep out-of-
the-money calls and overprices deep in-the-money calls. Merton (1976) suggested that 
practitioners observe Black-Scholes model prices to be less than market prices for deep in-
the-money as well as deep out-of-the-money options.  MacBeth and Merville (1979) report 
the striking price bias, but the direction is opposite to that reported by Black (1975) and 
Merton (1976). Galai (1983) confirmed this work and reported that the Black-Scholes model 
undervalues in-the-money and overvalues out-of-the-money options. Rubinstein (1985) found 
both directions of bias depending on the period of the sample. Sheikh (1991) documented the 
                                                             
























smile effect on call options using transaction data between 1983 and 1987 and concluded that 
the Black-Scholes model was unable to correct for these systematic biases.  
 
The persistence of the volatility smile or skew phenomenon has led several scholars to offer 
alternative models to the Black-Scholes model. Most alternative models fall into one of the 
following four categories:  first, jump-diffusion models which augment the Black-Scholes 
returns distribution with a Poisson driven jump process (Jarrow and Rosefeld,1984;  Ball and 
Torous,1985;  Ahn,1992;  Amin,1993; Bates,1991,1996; Das and Foresi,1996);  second, 
stochastic volatility models which extend the Black-Scholes model by allowing the volatility 
of the return process to evolve randomly over time (Merton,1976; Hull and White,1987; 
Melino and Turnbull,1990; Stein and Stein,1991; Amin and Ng,1993; Heston,1993; 
Nabdi,1998); third, local volatility models, also called deterministic volatility function 
models or implied tree models, which assume that future volatility is a deterministic function 
of the underlying stock value and time, and this function is implied by the current volatility 
smile and can be fully reflected in a suitably calibrated binomial or trinomial tree 
(Dupire,1994; Derman and Kani,1994; and Rubinstein,1994); fourth, mixed distribution 
models which model the underlying stock value with a mixture of distributions (Brigo and 
Mercurio, 2000). Other models are hybrids and combine aspects of those described above 
(Bates, 1996; Britten-Jones and Neuberger, 2000). Numerical empirical results, however, 
show that most of the above mentioned alternative models do not fit the observed option 
prices either, and some even perform worse than the Black-Scholes Model (Jackwerth, 1999; 
Alexander and Nogueira, 2004). Hybrid models are rich, but they are difficult to implement 
in reality.   
 
Although efforts have been devoted to explaining the volatility smile or skew phenomenon 
and to seek alternative models, currently there is no overwhelming consensus on a suitable 
alternative model to the Black-Scholes model. So far, the existing literature has not been 
conclusive either on whether the Black-Scholes model is ineffective, or the options market is 















The bottom line is that although there are multiple options written on a given stock, by 
definition there is only one volatility for a given underlying stock. A natural question arises in 
the presence of the volatility smile phenomenon: which implied volatility or combination of 
implied volatilities provides the best measure of the volatility of the underlying stock over the 
remaining life of the options? A possible answer to this question is the idea of using a single, 
uniform measure of market risk, such as VaR, in predicting the changes in the underlying 
stock prices and their expected volatility due to price changes of the underlying stocks. The 
rest of this literature review attempts to find out more about how the criteria and testing 
procedures developed for evaluating VaR models can also be adopted for evaluating option 
pricing models and predicting volatility smiles or skew phenomena. 
 
2.6: Volatility Smiles and Risk Management 
 
In the derivation of the Black-Scholes equation, the elimination of the randomness in the 
option pricing process is employed to derive the deterministic Black-Scholes equation. The 
quantity that eliminates the main contribution to randomness in this model,   
  
  
  is one of 
the important parameters in option pricing. It is the rate of change of the option price with 
respect to the price of the underlying asset. It indicates the number of stocks that should be 
kept with each option issued in order to cope with a loss in the case of exercise. 
 
Another important parameter is called  . It is defined by the rate of change of the portfolio’s 
  with respect of the price of the underlying asset.   is an indication of the sensitivity of  . 
If   is low, it is sometimes necessary to change the portfolio. If it is high, the portfolio under 
consideration represents, for a very short period of time, a risk-less scenario. These 
parameters are known as the Greeks (because they are often denoted by Greek letters such as 














Professionals use the Option Greeks to measure exactly how much they need to hedge their 
portfolio and to remove specific risk factors from their portfolio. The Option Greeks also 
enable the measurement of how much risk the portfolio is exposed to, and where that risk lies 
(for example, with movements in interest rates or volatility). However, due to the fact that the 
Greeks rely on assumptions made in the classical Black-Scholes formulas, which usually 
suggest that asset returns have a lognormal distribution and financial time series follow a 
stochastic process of a geometric Brownian motion. Those assumptions are questionable and 
overwhelmingly rejected by empirical evidence as shown in this literature overview which 
can be summarized by the following points.  
 
1) The Black-Scholes Model and its Greeks show trends based on past performance. 
However, it is not guaranteed that the future performance of the stock will behave 
according to the historical numbers. These trends can change drastically based on new 
stock performance.  
2) The Black-Scholes Model assumes that the risk-free rate and the stock’s volatility are 
constant. Furthermore, the model assumes that stock prices are continuous and that large 
changes (such as the October 1987 market crash) don’t occur.  
3) With the model analysts can only estimate a stock’s volatility instead of directly 
observing it, as they can for the other inputs.  
4) The Black-Scholes Model tends to overvalue deep out-of-the-money calls and 
undervalue deep in-the-money calls, which leads to arbitrage possibilities opposite to the 
Black-Scholes assumption of no arbitrage possibilities.  
 
This work has to therefore eliminate the use of the Greeks in predicted risks associated with 
the volatility smile in the empirical work in the next chapter. VaR is a single, uniform 
measure of market risk and is also a category of risk measures. However, unlike market risk 
metrics such as the Greeks, duration and convexity, or beta, which are applicable only to 
certain asset categories or certain sources of market risk, VaR can be applied to all asset 
categories and can cover all sources of market risk. Thus, VaR could have the ability to 













2.6.1: Value-at-Risk  
 
The field of risk management has developed enormously in the last two and a half decades, 
both in theory and practice (Dowd 1998:4). In theory, risk management analysis focuses on 
the extreme values related to the tail of the underlying distribution. This is desirable since 
many studies suggest that most financial time series have fat-tailed and asymmetric 
distributions. One definition of fat-tailness (heavy-tailness), given by Gencay and Selcuk 
(2004), is that a distribution is fat-tailed if a power decay of the density function is observed 
in the tail. In practice, the development of VaR opens up a radically new approach to firm-
wide risk management (Fletcher, 1981). VaR  is defined as the maximum expected loss over 
a given horizon period, at a given level of confidence. The concept of VaR involves two 
arbitrarily chosen parameters: the horizon period, which might be daily, weekly, monthly, or 
other time frequencies, and the level of confidence, usually 95% or above. Summarizing the 
overall market risk in a single number, VaR has become a way of quantifying market risk, 
assessing the risk of investment, and reporting the level of risk to investors. 
 
Supporters of this methodology argue that VaR is sound as a risk measure for several 
reasons: it represents a summary measure of aggregated portfolio risk expressed in a currency 
unit, combined with a probability statement. VaR is much broader than any single measure of 
sensitivity, because it comprises many sources of risk (for example volatility, interest rate, 
transactions cost.) and also accounts for correlations and leverage, which becomes very 
important when dealing with large portfolios. 
 
VaR is also important in portfolio management. Traditional, active portfolio management 
involved attempts to outperform benchmarks by a given percentage subject to a limit on 
tracking error volatility (TEV)
 10. As this practice resulted in selecting inefficient portfolios, 
alternative methods have been proposed, such as mean VaR optimization, which was spurred 
on by the early studies on shortfall constraints (Roy, 1952; Telser, 1956 and Kataoka, 1963). 
                                                             













More recently, studies such as those of Basak and Shapiro (2001) or Alexander and Baptista 
(2002, 2004) address the use of VaR in the context of portfolio optimization.  
 
2.6.1.1: VaR Models Comparison 
 
In its most general form, VaR11 can be computed from the probability distribution of the 
future portfolio value   : 





                                                         (2.1) 
 
Where    is the probability density function of portfolio returns and VaR is the worst possible 
return realized with   percent probability of being exceeded. For example, if     percent 
VaR is the cutoff quantile that will only be exceeded in 5 percent of the cases as shown in 













                                                             
11 Although VaR is ultimately expressed in a absolute currency for example Rand  terms in a statement such as “Tomorrow’s 
Value-at-Risk for the entire portfolio is 100 million Rand”, VaR is technically a rate of return forecast. More specifically, a 
negative rate of return.  
 
If the tail area is Ѳ then 
the cut-off point is VaR  
 














Conversely, VaR can be computed as  
 
                     
Pr ( )
VaR
r tf dr ob r VaR

                             (2.2) 
For full details refer to Jorion (2000). 
 
Overall, three classes of models are used to estimate VaR: parametric (GARCH, RiskMetrics, 
and higher-order moments), nonparametric (historical simulation, Monte Carlo simulation 
and the hybrid approach), and semiparametric (Extreme Value Theory, Conditional Value-at-
Risk and Quasi-Maximum Likelihood GARCH). Thus far, the focus in VaR research has 
been model development rather than model testing, despite plenty of evidence suggesting 
results differing by a factor as large as 14 when using different VaR methods (Beder, 1995).  
 
All VaR methods have advantages and disadvantages. Most of the shortcoming of parametric 
VaR methods arise from the assumption that stock returns are normally distributed, which is 
different from the empirical reality. To overcome this drawback, conditional normality is 
used extensively. RiskMetrics, for example, computes the variance conditional on the most 
recent information, using an exponentially-weighted approach. ARCH (Autoregressive 
Conditional Heteroskedasticity) and GARCH (Generalized Autoregressive Conditional 
Heteroskedasticity) methods, introduced by Engle (1982) and Bollerslev (1986), 
conditionally model the variance as a function of past squared and variances. Both 
RiskMetrics and GARCH have been found to underestimate VaR (Engle and Manganelli, 
2001). Since the VaR is based on the tails behaviour of the financial returns, specifically on 
the left hand side, it is obvious that the issue of fat tails is become basic to our investigation. 
 
There has been a significant amount of empirical research on this topic in the last twenty-five 
years. However it is only recently, since the introduction of VaR as a market risk measure, 
that important contributions are being made, not only at a theoretical level, but also in terms 













the traditional empirical studies which confirm the proven aspects of the original studies by 
Mandelbrot (1963) and Fama (1965) about the non-normal features of financial returns (fat 
tails and excess kurtosis; asymmetry, volatility smile). Among the empirical studies that have 
proven that the returns have the aforementioned characteristics and not exactly those of a 
normal distribution, it is necessary to refer to: Praetz (1972), Blattburg and Gonedes (1974), 
Kon (1984), Jorion (1988), Jansen and de Vries (1991), Tucker (1992), Kim and Kon (1994); 
Danielsson and de Vries (1997b), Klupelberg et al. (1998), McNell (1998) and Huisman et al. 
(1998) for stock prices.  
 
The above are the most recent studies on the subject of fat tails and VaR estimation for stock 
prices. These studies identify how estimates of VaR based on an assumed normal distribution 
of portfolio returns could underestimate (and overestimate) “true” VaR, and therefore, the 
capital required to cover the losses derived from market risk, leading to massive financial 
losses. This has led many authors to propose (in order to describe the behaviour of returns) 
other distributions with fatter tails than the normal distribution (for example, Pareto’s stable 
distribution, student’s t distribution, the normal mixture approach, or the generalised error 
distribution); thereby accommodating the modelling of the biggest movements in order to 
avoid erroneous VaR estimates. Even the most recent studies propose distributions that do not 
describe all returns behaviour but outline only the behaviour of the extreme returns, that is to 
say, those based on the Extreme Value Theory. 
 
However, due to the complexity of estimating the VaR for non-linear positions, some authors 
choose to value such positions in a partial way, through the Taylor Theorem (delta or delta-
gamma valuation). Nevertheless, Estrella (1996) warns about the necessity of applying 
Taylor approximations in the case of the options valuation with some caution. Estrella shows 
how a Taylor approximation, applied to the Black-Scholes options valuation model in terms 
of prices regarding the underlying stock, changes as a function of such prices. On the other 















According to Estrella (1996: 375): “In risk management applications involving a 
preponderance of relatively small moves, it may be feasible though sometimes risky to use 
Taylor approximations. For moves no larger than one standard deviation, the accuracy of 
gamma approximations seems generally adequate. Problems may arise however, if attention 
is focused on the tails of the distribution as is often the case in risk management applications. 
Special care should be used when approximating the values of highly nonlinear options, such 
as near-the-money short maturity options”. 
 
All things considered, the problem is what to do when returns are non-linear functions of the 
risk factors (as is the case with options) or when the risk variables themselves are non-
normal. This is precisely the point of our focus here. According to Minnich (1998:41), “One 
of the most difficult aspects of calculating VaR is selecting among the many types of VaR 
methodologies and their associated assumptions”. 
 
Nonparametric methods, such as Historical simulation, Monte Carlo simulation and the 
hybrid approach (Boudoukh, Richardson and Whitelaw, 1998), totally drop any assumption 
about the distribution shape. These methods compute VaR directly from the empirical 
distribution of returns, and consequently, exclude the necessity of establishing 
approximations (such as those based on Taylor), which produce inaccuracy in calculations. 
Thus, they can be applied to all kinds of instruments, both linear and non-linear. Furthermore, 
these methods allow capturing fat tails; this is not the case in the variance-covariance matrix 
approach and Black-Scholes’s Greeks.  
 
Lastly, semiparametric methods cover Conditional VaR (C-VaR), Quasi Maximum 
Likelihood (QML) GARCH, and Extreme Value Theory based models. These approaches are 
not fully “parametric” in that they do not attempt to parameterize the entire return distribution 
(Manganelli and Engle, 2001). C-VaR attempts to model directly the evolution of the quantile 
of interest over time, using a special type of autoregressive process (Engle and Manganelli: 
1999, 2001, 2004). QML GARCH derives VaR from the distribution of the standardized 













who found that, for appropriately normalized maxima, the distribution of the tails can have 
one of three forms: Gumbell, Frechet, or Weibull. Unfortunately, EVT seems to work best 
only for low probability levels, and only asymptotically. The extensions that have been 
proposed by Leadbetter, Lindgren, and Rootzen (1983), among others, rule out important 




This chapter summarized the major developments in the field of option valuation in the past 
three decades, up to the original contributions of Black and Scholes (1973), and Merton 
(1973). The chapter then focused on implied volatility estimation and on the well known 
volatility smile phenomenon. Numerous explanations for the volatility smile phenomenon 
and extensions as well as alternatives to the Black-Scholes model were offered in the chapter.  
 
This chapter also provided an overview of developments, methodologies, and applications of 
VaR.  Various key methodologies of VaR estimation and evaluation were discussed and 
compared. 
 
In conclusion, the nonparametric methods of VaR, such as Historical simulation, Monte 
Carlo simulation and hybrid approach totally drop any assumption about the distribution 
shape, these methods compute VaR directly from the empirical distribution of returns , and 
consequently, exclude the necessity of establishing approximations, which produce 
inaccuracy in calculations. Thus, they can be applied to all kinds of instruments, both linear 
and non-linear. Furthermore, these methods allow capturing fat tails; this is not the case in the 
variance-covariance matrix approach as well as Black-Scholes’s Greeks. Thus nonparametric 
methods seems to be perfect candidates to predicate options implied volatility smile. 
 
We close this second chapter with an outline of the next chapter. Chapter 3 will investigate 













and the possibility of forecast this volatility using different VaR approaches. My first 
objective in this chapter is to provide evidence of a South African volatility smile and thus 
confirm the mis-pricing of the Black-Scholes model in this market. The second objective, 
will use VaR to predict the movement in the underlying stocks, and accordingly predict if the 
underlying stock’s volatility exhibits a smile or skew effect. In this section, two different 
methods are applied to calculate VaR - Historical simulation and Monte Carlo simulation - as 































The Volatility Smile of South African Stock Options: 
Estimations and Tests12 
 
3.1: Introduction  
 
The implied volatility given by the Black-Scholes (1973) model is assumed to be constant. 
However, empirical studies on S&P 500 index options have shown that the implied volatility 
changes with the ratio of the strike price to the index price. When the implied volatility is 
plotted against the moneyness (ratio of the underlying asset spot price to the strike price) of 
the option, an upward sloping curve is observed. This known as the volatility smile. A 
possible reason for the existence of this smile is that the theoretical valuation model of Black-
Scholes cannot take into account imperfections in the marketplace caused by supply and 
demand. As a result, using the Black-Scholes formula for calculating implied volatility is 
problematic. In particular, the theoretical formula uses actual market values to calculate the 
implied volatility. Consequently, the resulting implied volatility includes not only the 
market’s expectation of future volatility, but also includes any error between the theoretical 
price and the actual price. In fact, every other variable that is not in the formula, but that is a 
causal variable in determining the market price of the option, is included in the resulting 
implied standard deviation. 
 
The present study is an attempt to empirically test the validity of the Black-Scholes formula 
for determining equity warrants
13
 listed on the JSE. However, if the results demonstrate any 
systematic biases towards options which are in-the-money, out-of-the-money or with 
                                                             
12 This chapter is a published paper: Endi, A (2009): “An examination of the value-at-risk volatility relationship in the options 
market: new evidence on mispricing in the Black-Scholes model”, Studies in Economics and Econometrics, 33(1), 85-103. 
 
13
In South Africa and Europe, a warrant is an instrument issued by a third party on an underlying share. The issuer does not call on 
the underlying company to issue more shares. Therefore, the shareholders’ funds are not diluted in the process. Thus, fundamentally 













differing term structures, then, there is clearly something wrong with the use of the Black-
Scholes model for this purpose. It follows that we should look at alternative methods of 
measuring risk. The second section will use VaR as a means of predicting any movement in 
the underlying stocks, and accordingly to predict whether the underlying stock’s volatility 
exhibits a smile or a skew effect. In this section, two different methods are used to calculate 
VaR - Historical simulation and Monte Carlo simulation - as well as conditional VaR and 
backtesting.  
 
The remaining part of the chapter is organized as follows: section 2 briefly reviews option 
pricing models being tested in this chapter. Section 3.3 provides a detailed description of VaR 
methodologies and related models. In section 3.4 the data used for this analysis are described. 
Section 3.5 outlines some empirical findings on evaluating the pricing performance of 
alternative models. Section 3.6 summarizes the results and reviews the conclusions. 
 
3.2: Black-Scholes Constant Volatility Model 
 
In deriving the valuation model for a European call option on an underlying stock with no 
dividend, Black and Scholes (1973) assumed that the variance of stock return is constant over 
the life of the option and is known by the market participants. They also assumed that the 
short-term interest rate is known and constant throughout the life of the option, and that this 
rate is the borrowing and lending rate for market participants. The underlying stock price 
follows a geometric Brownian motion; capital markets are frictionless, in the sense that there 
are no transaction costs; there are also no limitations on the use of short-selling proceeds, and 
there can be unlimited borrowing and lending. Given these assumptions, the value of an 
option is only a function of the underlying stock’s price and time. This means that the option 
and its underlying stock have a common stochastic diffusion component. Option traders can 
then construct a riskless hedge portfolio by establishing a long (or short) position on the 
underlying stock on which the option is written (bought). The appropriate position in the 













Black and Scholes option-pricing model with respect to the asset price. The Black-Scholes 
formula is given by: 
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N (.) is the cumulative probability distribution for a variable that is normally distributed with 
a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. In particular, 2( )N d  is the probability that the 
option will be exercised in a risk-neutral world so that 2( )XN d is the strike price times the 
probability that the strike price will be paid. The expression ( )
1( )
r T tSN d e   is the expected 
value equal to TS  if TS X  and zero otherwise in a risk-neutral world. This interpretation of 
the terms shows that the formula is consistent with risk-neutral valuation (Hull, 1997).  
 
The above equation also gives the value of an American call option that does not pay any 
dividends (Merton, 1973; Roll, 1977; Geske, 1979 and Whaley, 1981). 
 
However, equation 3.2 (above) implies that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the 
option price and the volatility. As a result, the implied volatility can be computed by solving 
for the volatility that equates the model price with the observed market price. Under the 
assumptions of the Black-Scholes model, implied volatilities should be the same for options 
on the same asset with different strikes. This assumption will be our measurement of the 















3.3: Measures of Extreme Risks: VaR and Expected Shortfall (ES) 
 
Two parameters are very important in VaR estimation; the confidence level and the length of 
the time horizon. If VaR is used to compare different markets (for example, equities, fixed 
income, commodities, currencies), the choice of the confidence level and time horizon does 
not matter much as long as consistency is maintained, as the goal is to compare risk across 
trading units. However, if VaR is used as a potential loss measure, risk aversion and the 
nature of the portfolio dictate the confidence level and the time horizon. Due to the liquid 
nature of and the rapid turnover in their portfolios, commercial banks report VaR on a daily 
basis. On the other hand, since pension funds generally make fewer liquid investments and 
adjust their risk profiles slowly, a longer horizon is more appropriate.  
 
The choice of these two parameters is most crucial when VaR is used to set capital 
requirements: in the case of erroneous estimates, losses exceeding the VaR could totally wipe 
out the equity, resulting in bankruptcy. Thus, selection of the time horizon should 
appropriately reflect the time needed for corrective action as losses start to build up, whereas 
selection of the confidence level should relate to the extent of risk aversion and the cost of 
loss exceeding VaR. A higher cost of exceeding the VaR and a higher degree of risk aversion 
imply a larger amount of capital needed to cover possible losses, which leads to employing a 
higher confidence level.  
 
Time horizon and the confidence level are also important for testing model validity, which 
involves comparing the estimated VaR with the subsequently realized loss. High confidence 
levels and longer horizons diminish the power of the tests14. For example, as opposed to a 95 
percent confidence level, where we should expect on average a loss exceeding the forecasted 
VaR in 1 day out of every 20 days, at 99 percent confidence we need on average of 100 days 
to test a model.  Also, using a two-week horizon VaR will result in only 26 independent 
                                                             
14 The power of a test is formally as 1-probability of a type II error, which is the probability of failing to reject the null 













observations per year, in contrast to a daily VaR which will result in a sample of 252 
independent observations over the same year.       
 
The focus of this chapter will be on the non- parametric model. This is because the non- 
parametric model includes the historical simulation and Monte Carlo approaches drop any 
assumption about the distribution shape, and compute VaR directly from the empirical 
distribution of returns, and consequently, exclude the necessity of establishing 
approximations (such as those based on the work of Taylor), which produce inaccuracy in 
calculations. For more details on different VaR modes refer to the previous chapter.   
 
All VaR measurement approaches use a similar scheme: (1) Selection of basic parameters 
(time horizon, confidence level, time of measurement); (2) Selection of relevant market 
factors; and (3) VaR calculation. 
 
For step (l) in this research the relevant parameters are defined according to goals and 
resources. The next step, (2) involves the assumption of some kind of model, either just a set 
of relevant factors or a detailed pricing model. In any case the relatively small set of relevant 
parameters should be defined, and some method for portfolio valuation based on this set 
should be established. Step (3) includes the calculation itself. This step can be very time 
consuming, especially when Monte Carlo methods are used. There are numerous techniques 
for speeding up the calculation. The following are the different types of techniques to 
calculate VaR. 
 
3.3.1: Historical Simulation method 
 
Historical simulation is the most transparent method of calculation. This involves running the 
current portfolio across a set of historical price changes to yield a distribution of changes in 













simple to implement, and does not assume a normal distribution of stock returns. Drawbacks 
are the requirement for a large market database and the computationally intensive calculation.  
 
Historical simulation to perform analysis on a single instrument portfolio can be described in 
five steps: 
1. Identification of the basic risk factors. 
2. Obtaining of historical values of the risk factors for the last N periods. 
3. Taking into account the current stock price to the changes in market rates and prices 
experienced on each of the most recent 250 or 500 business days; calculation of the 
daily profits and losses that would occur if comparable daily changes in the risk 
factors are experienced. 
4. Ordering of the profits and losses from the largest profit to the largest loss. 
5. Selection of the loss which is equalled or exceeded five percent of the time. This loss 
is the value at risk at 95% confidence level (assuming that a 95% confidence interval 
is being used). 
 
3.3.2: Monte Carlo Simulation method 
 
The Monte Carlo simulation m thod has a number of similarities to historical simulation. The 
main difference is that rather than carrying out the simulation using observed changes in the 
market factors over the last N  periods to generate N  hypothetical portfolio profits and 
losses, a statistical distribution is chosen that is believed to adequately capture or approximate 
possible changes in the market factors. Then, a pseudo-random number generator is used to 
generate thousands or tens of thousands of hypothetical changes in the market factors. These 
are then used to construct thousands of hypothetical portfolio profits and losses on the current 
portfolio, and the distribution of possible portfolio profits or losses. Finally, the value at risk 
is determined from the distribution. 
 













1. Identification of the basic risk factors. 
2. Determination or assumption of a specific distribution for changes in the basic market 
factors, and estimation of the parameters of that distribution. The ability to choose the 
distribution is the feature that distinguishes the Monte Carlo simulation from other 
approaches, as in the other methods the distribution of changes in the market factors is 
specified as part of the method. The designers of the risk management system are free 
to choose any distribution that they think reasonably describes possible future changes 
in the market factors.  
3. Use of a pseudo-random generator to generate N hypothetical values of changes in the 
risk factors based on the selected distribution, where N is almost certainly greater than 
1,000 and perhaps greater than 10,000. These hypothetical market factors are then 
used to calculate N hypothetical market-to-market portfolio values. From each of the 
hypothetical portfolio values it is necessary to subtract the actual market-to-market 
portfolio value to obtain N hypothetical daily profits and losses. 
 Steps 4 and 5 are the same as in historical simulation. The distribution of profits and losses 
are ordered from the largest loss to the largest profit, and the value at risk is defined as the 
loss which is equalled or exceeded five percent of the time. 
 
3.3.3: Expected Shortfall method 
 
Another VaR metric is expected shortfall (ES), which is sometimes also known as, amongst 
other names, expected tail loss (ETL), conditional VaR (C-VaR), and worst conditional 
expectation. 
 
The ETL is the expected value of losses, L , if the loss exceeds VaR: ETL = ]/[ VaRLLE  . 
The VaR indicates the most that can be lost if a bad (that is, tail) event does not occur, and 
the ETL indicates what can be lost if a tail event does occur. For example, a 90% ETL VaR 
















The Basel standard requirement of backtesting is a procedure whereby one checks (a 
posteriori) how often the actual losses have exceeded the level predicted by VaR. As soon as 
a 99% confidence interval and a 10 day time horizon are used, there should not be too many 
cases in which the actual losses are greater than the predicted ones. 
 
Results are in three zones. If during the last year (approximately 250 business days) there are 
four or fewer exceptions (losses that exceed the VaR level), the model is said to be in a green 
zone, and it is acceptable. If there are five to nine exceptions the model is in the yellow zone 
and certain actions (such as an increase of the safety multiplier from 3 to 3.65) are 
recommended (Gerhard, 1997). When there are l0 or more exceptions the whole model 
should be revised. This mechanism prevents banks from setting the VaR too low (Hull, 
1997). 
 
3.4: Data Description 
 
Stock options make up the largest portion of options listed on the JSE and these are the 
options that will be the focus of this study. These options are usually issued over the shares of 
a single company listed on the JSE. They are currently the most popular type of options 
traded. The options can be American or European in style. The data used in this study 
consists of fourteen companies’ stock, listed on the JSE and fifty-nine Call and Put options 
with different styles, exercise prices and times of expiration, all traded on the JSE. An outline 
of this data is presented in Table 3.1 in appendix A.1. The dataset for my empirical analysis 
contains an options expiration date, the exercise price, cover ratios, the risk-free rate, the 
daily closing premium, and finally, the dividend yield. The daily closing share price of the 
underlying stock is also needed. All of these data were obtained from the Inet-Bridge and the 














The time-to-maturity of an option is measured by the number of calendar days between the 
valuation and the expiration dates. South African 91-day T-Bill rates were used for the risk-
free interest rate determination.  
 
The following are the criteria the data needs to satisfy in order to be applied in the Black-
Scholes formula: (1) One of the fundamental assumptions underlying the theory of option 
pricing, as set out in the Black-Scholes pricing formula, is that the natural logarithms of the 
spot price of the underlying stock are normally distributed, that is, they follow a log-normal 
distribution. Hence, the natural logarithms of the underlying stocks were tested for normality 
using the Jarque-Bera normality test (1987) 15. Some underlying stocks were eliminated from 
the analysis as they were rejected by the Jarque-Bera normality test.  
 
(2) The Black-Scholes formula in Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973) is based on 
the assumption that stocks pay no dividends during an option’s life. Some of the researcher’s 
sample stocks paid dividends to their shareholders, so this might seem a serious limitation to 
the model, considering the observation that higher dividend yields elicit lower call premiums. 
In this case the common method of adjusting the model for this situation was followed, which 
involved  subtracting the discounted value of a futures dividend from the stock price using 
the risk-free rate (Gua and Su, 2006). 
 
For the purpose of this analysis, 365 days of the year were assumed and a continuous risk-
free rate was used throughout the analysis. However, for VaR analysis three parameters had 
to be identified: (1) the time horizon (period); that is, the length of time over which one plans 
to hold the stock in the portfolio, also called the “holding period”. In this work a 1-day 
holding period has been considered. (2) The confidence level at which one plans to make the 
                                                             
15
The Jarque-Bera test is a goodness-of-fit, measure of departure from normality, based on the sample Kurtosis and 
Skewness. The test stayistic JB is defined as 








   
Where S is the skewness, K is the Kurtosis, and n is the number of observations. Given a level of significance 0.05 (χ20.95 = 
5.99 from χ2(2)), if BJ > 5.99, then the Null hypothesis of asymptotic normality is rejected. On the other hand, if BJ  5.99, 














estimate. This work attempts to use the popular confidence levels of  99% and 95%. (3) The 
unit of the currency which will be used to denominate the Value at Risk. In this work the 
South African Rand was used.  
 
 
3.5: Empirical results 
 
3.5.1: Sensitivity of Price Error to the Implied Volatility Estimation 
 
The Black-Scholes model states that the price of an option is a function of the stock price, the 
exercise price, a risk-free rate, the time to expiration, the volatility, and any dividends on the 
stock over the life of the option. Of these six variables, the stock price, the exercise price, and 
the time to expiration are easily observable and can be measured without any appreciable 
error.  
 
The risk-free rate is largely observable, and its impact is small16. The dividends are not 
observable, but they are not too difficult to measure accurately17. The volatility, is almost 
completely unobservable. Even so, all options on the same underlying stock should be priced 
using the same volatility. It is, after all, the volatility of the underlying stock with which one 
is concerned. The stock cannot have more than one volatility.  Suppose the Black-Scholes 
model is employed to infer the volatility used by option traders to price an option. The 
volatility is identified that makes the model provide an option price that corresponds to the 
market price. The model can then be said to imply a volatility that gives rise to the concept of 
the implied volatility. But again, would each option on the same underlying stock not imply 
the same volatility? This is considering option quote prices are available and the only 
                                                             
16Each option on the same underlying stock would have a risk-free rate derived from a risk-free investment maturing at the 
time of the option expiration. Therefore, an option which expires in March and an option that expires in February could have 
different prices because of different risk-free rates. But it is well known that the risk-free rate has only a minor effect on the 
price of an option.   
  
17Dividends affect option prices on the same underlying stock, but do so by effectively lowering the stock price by the 
present value of the dividends. Since none of the options differ by the dividends on the underlying stock, dividends cannot 













unknown parameter is the volatility. If the Black-Scholes assumptions were true and reliable, 
one could find the volatility of the stock by simply inverting the Black-Scholes formula. A 
volatility thus obtained is called the implied volatility. Therefore the implied volatility for all 
underlying stocks and options in the dataset has been calculated. These results are shown 
graphically in figure 3.1 in appendix A.2. 
The empirical findings show that the implied Black-Scholes volatilities vary systematically 
with strikes, showing the volatility smile. In the equity market the implied volatilities for 
options with the same maturity usually decrease as the strikes increase. In other words, the 
Black-Scholes model underprices deep out-of-the-money put options and overprices deep 
out-of-the-money call options. This volatility pattern is particularly noticeable since the 1987 
market crash (Rubinstein, 1994). 
 
 When first observed, the implied volatilities were u-shaped, giving the appearance of a 
smile18. Hence this relation was named the volatility smile. In more recent years, the smile 
has mostly disappeared, and the relationship has sometimes been referred to as a skew or 
even a smirk, which might well describe some of our graphs. Also different implied 
volatilities are obtained depending on whether calls or puts are being examined. There is no 
reason why puts and calls should have different implied volatilities. However, it is clear that 
they do. 
 
The existence of multiple implied volatilities, regardless of whether they arrange themselves 
in a smile-like pattern, should be somewhat disconcerting. How can the market tell one that 
there is more than one volatility for a stock. Clearly, there is something wrong with the 
Black-Scholes model. This is that it fails to consider all of the factors that enter into the 
pricing of an option. It accounts for the stock price, the exercise price, the time to expiration, 
the dividends, and the risk-free rate, but there must be some factors that it overlooks. The 
                                                             
18
Breeden and Litzenberger (1978) were the first to show that the implied risk-neutral distribution function could be derived from 
option prices: the probabilities are equal to the second order derivatives of option prices with respect  to the strike price. Shimko 
(1993) offers a practical application of this general idea. He proposes to model the volatility smile as a quadratic function of 
moneyness, and then to calculate the second order derivative numerically.  Other methods construct implied binomial 
(Rubinstein,1994) or  trinomial trees (Nagot and Trommsdorff ,1999), or estimate the end -of-term distribution non-parametrically 













implied volatility is more or less a catch-all term, capturing whatever variables are missing, 
as well as the possibility that the model is improperly specified or blatantly wrong. 
 
When the volatility smile was first observed19, some researchers believed that the explanation 
was the liquidity of underlying items. The true “smile appearance” meant that out-of-the-
money options had the highest implied volatilities. These options were also the least liquid. 
Hence, it was argued that the prices observed for these options of low liquidity reflected the 
thinness of their markets. But this explanation would suggest that highly liquid options, 
typically those trading nearly at-the-money, would have the same implied volatilities. In fact, 
they do not and never did have, as is shown in Figure 3.1, the results of the analysis. 
Moreover, when the smile turned into a skew, the moneyness (in the money) argument fell by 
the wayside.  
 Other researchers, like Hull and White (1987), Heston (1993), Scott (1987), Stein and Stein 
(1991) and Wiggins (1987), believed that the smile reflects stochastic volatility. Volatility is 
surely not a constant, therefore as is assumed in the Black-Scholes model. If volatility were 
stochastic, these researchers argue, the smile would reflect the failure of the Black-Scholes 
model to capture the random nature of volatility. Others argue that the Black-Scholes model, 
which assumes that stock prices fluctuate in a smooth and continuous manner, fails to capture 
the true nature of stock price movements, which are observed to have discrete jumps (Merton, 
1979).  
 
The arguments of stochastic volatility and jumps have a great deal of appeal, because they 
preserve many of the essential features of the Black-Scholes model. These arguments do not 
require the model to motivate the holding of options and the preference for some investors for 
certain options over others. They essentially argue that if the Black-Scholes model were re-
derived under looser assumptions, the smile would go away. Unfortunately, once these looser 
assumptions are introduced, the mathematical tractability of the model is lost, and the process 
of pricing an option becomes one of making other fearless assumptions or imposing severe 
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computational demands on the model20. It is fair to say that mathematicians have devoted 
excessive hours of human and mechanical time in researching the smile, with little if any 
explanation for why the smile still exists21.  
 
In the conclusion of this section, the whole notion of implied volatility and the existence of 
the volatility smile are suggested to be the result of using a model that does not capture 
everything that affects the price of options. Practitioners and academics largely accept the 
limitations of the model and consider the smile a means of forcing the model to reveal 
information it is not designed to reveal. However flawed the model may be, the advantages of 
the Black-Scholes model, even with its attendant defects, may outweigh the disadvantages of 
other more complex models. 
 
3.5.2: VaR Estimation and Backtesting Results 
 
The Table below summarises all the VaRs’ results as a percentage of the actual changes in 
the underlying stocks. First, we start with the Historical simulation to predict the underlying 
stocks prices’ VaR at 99% and 95% levels of confidence. In the first step a database is 
created of the daily movements in the stock prices over 250 and 500 days. The first 
simulation trial assumes that the percentage change in the market variable (stock price) was 
the same as it was on the first day covered by the database. The second simulation trial 
assumes that the percentage change was the same as that on the second day; and so on, to 
build up a probability distribution of the percentage changes in the market variable (stock 
price). The VaR is calculated as the appropriate percentile of the probability distribution of 
the percentage change in the stock prices. The results of these VaRs’ quantification, together 
with the actual price changes are shown in Figure 3.2 in appendix A.3. As can be seen in 
these Figures, which are summarised in Table 3.2 below, a 99%VaR that is obtained using 
                                                             
20For example, one assumption is that the risk arising from stochastic volatility is a non-priced risk. That is, the risk 
associated with uncertain volatility is a risk that does not concern investors. They are either neutral towards that risk or the 
risk is uncorrelated with their other holdings, meaning that the risk is diversifiable. Once these assumptions are invoked, the 
financial economics are lost and what remains is simply an exercise in computational finance.  
 













500 simulations, is greater than the actual price changes obtained when using 100% for the 
forecasted period (see Table 3.2). 
 
Table 3.2 reporting a summary of our empirical results, each percentage shows the degree to 
which the VaR is greater than the actual price changes. 
 
VaR methodology Historical simulation Monte Carlo Simulation 



































BHP Billiton 100% 100% 100% 97% 100% 97% 100% 97% 
Firstrand 100% 97% 100% 97% 97% 87% 97% 83% 
 Gold Fieids 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 97% 100% 97% 
Harmony Gold 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 97% 100% 97% 
Impala Platinum 100% 97% 100% 100% 100% 97% 100% 97% 
Mittal Steel 100% 93% 93% 90% 90% 83% 90% 87% 
MTN Group 100% 97% 100% 97% 97% 93% 97% 93% 
Pick’n Pay 100% 100% 100% 100% 97% 83% 93% 83% 
Sappi 100% 93% 100% 93% 100% 90% 100% 90% 
Sasol 100% 93% 100% 93% 93% 87% 97% 93% 
Standard Bank 100% 97% 100% 100% 97% 93% 97% 90% 
Steinhoff 100% 100% 100% 100% 97% 97% 97% 97% 
Telkom 100% 97% 100% 97% 97% 93% 97% 93% 
 
Average 100% 97% 100% 97% 97% 91% 97% 91% 
 
As shown, a 1-day 99%VaR using 500 simulations is more efficient when historical 
simulation is used. Historical simulation puts the same weight on all the observations in the 
chosen window, including old data points, which may be an undesirable feature. The measure 
of risk may change abruptly once an old observation is dropped from the window. The choice 
of the window size is open to debate. In the case of a short window size, the VaR estimates 
will be very sensitive to accidental outcomes from the recent past. A long window size, on 
the other hand, has the disadvantage of including past data which might no longer be relevant 
to the current situation. Hence to be on the safe side, a short window size of 250 and a long 














Secondly, the Monte Carlo Simulation method was used to predict the underlying stocks 
prices’ VaR at 99% and 95% levels of confidence, and the windows sizes were chosen to be  
5 000 and 10 000. In this section, the Geometric Brownian Motion (GBM) was used. This 
means that the stock price follows a random walk and is consistent with the weak form of the 
efficient market hypothesis (EMH): past price information is already incorporated and the 
next price movement is conditionally independent of past price movements22.  
 
The formula for GBM is found below, where   is the current stock price,    is the change in 
the stock price,   is the continuously compounded risk-free rate,   is the volatility of the 
stock23 and     is the length of time over which the stock price change occurs. The variable   
is a random number generated from a standard normal probability distribution. Recall that the 
standard normal random variable has a mean of zero, a standard deviation of 1.0 and occurs 
with a frequency corresponding to that associated with the famous bell-shaped curve.  
 
                                                            √                                                     (3.3)                      
 
The first term is a drift and the second term is a shock. For each time period, our model 
assumed the price would drift up by the expected return. But the drift will be shocked (added 
or subtracted) by a random shock. Random simulations were then run. To illustrate this, 
Microsoft Excel has been used to run the simulations24.  
 
A standard normal random variable is generated and then, inserted into the right-hand side of 
the above formula for   . This procedure is repeated 5 000 and 10 000 times to build up a 
probability distribution for the stock price changes. Then VaR is calculated as the appropriate 
percentile of the probability distribution of the stock price change. The 1-day 99%VaR is the 
                                                             
 
22For more details about efficient markets and the Markov, refer to: Brealey  (1983) and  Cootner  (1964). 
 
23
The volatility of a stock was estimated historically using closing prices from daily data over the most recent 90 days (Hull,  2000). 
 
24Excel’s Rand() function. The Rand() function produces a uniform random number between 0 and 1, meaning that it 
generates numbers between 0 and 1 with equal probability. A good approximation for a standard normal variable is obtained 
by the Excel formula “= Rand() + Rand() + Rand() + Rand() + Rand() + Rand() + Rand() + Rand() + Rand() + Rand() + 













value of the stock price change for the 50
th
 worst outcome when one uses 5000 different 
sample values of the stock price change. The results of this VaR’ quantification together with 
the actual price changes are shown in Figure 3.3 in appendix A.3. As can be seen in the 
figures that are summarised in Table 3.2 above, the 1-day 99%VaRs that are obtained using  
5 000 and 10 000 simulations are greater than the actual price changes for 97% of the 
forecasted period (see Table 3.2). Thus, the 1-day 99%VaR using 5 000 and 10 000 
simulations is more efficient when Monte Carlo Simulation is used.  
 
Backtesting, performed on historical simulation VaR and the Monte Carlo simulation VaR, 
involves testing how well the VaR estimates would have performed in the past. In the case of 
a 1-day 99% VaR, backtesting would involve looking at how often the loss in a day exceeded 
the 1-day 99% VaR. If this happened on about one percent of the days, one can feel 
reasonably comfortable with this methodology for calculating VaR. “If it happened on, say 
10% of days, then the methodology would definitely be suspect” (Hull, 2000:357). According 
to the analysis carried out, all VaRs that are obtained via historical simulation were accepted 
by backtesting. However 16% of the VaRs obtained via the Monte Carlo method were 
rejected. On the other hand, conditional VaRs (“C-VaRs”) significantly reduced the 
backtesting rejection from the Monte Carlo simulation to 50%. Thus, it is accurate to say that 
conditional VaR measures losses in “extreme” market conditions, while VaR measures losses 




In this chapter, underlying stocks listed on the JSE were used for the VaR calculations, as 
shown in Table 3.2. The VaR is calculated in this work using the historical simulation based 
on 250 and 500 simulations and the Monte Carlo method based on 5 000 and 10 000 
simulations. Results show that if the level of confidence is 99%, then the VaR calculated 
using the historical methodology is greater than the actual price changes in 100% of the 













the Monte Carlo simulation approach is greater than the actual price changes in 97% of the 
cases in the forecasted period, it is not as efficient as that calculated using the historical 
methodology. However, high option prices imply higher stock volatility, which means a wide 
possible range of movement in the underlying stock prices. Our results demonstrated a good 
measure of actual volatility of the underlying stock via 99% historical simulation VaR. 
Consequently, VaR is assumed to be a good indicator for option prices. 
 
Finally, the conclusion is that Value-at-Risk Volatility, calculated by any method, is a reliable 
measure of option pricing for whoever is concerned with the actual volatility of the 































3.7:  Appendix A  
3.7.1: A.1 Data Outline   
                        Table 3.1 Data Outline: fourteen stocks listed on JSE Limited and fifty-nine options 
1: 14 companies stock listed on JSE 
Underlying Stock African Bank BHPBILL FIRSTRAND GOLD FIELDS HARMONY GOLD IMPALA PLATINUM MITTAL  
JSE Code ABL BIL FSR GFI HAR IMP MLA 
Frequency 200 Days 200  D 200  D 200  D 200  D 200  D 200  D 
Start 27/04/2006 25/05/2006 27/03/2006 24/02/2006 12/01/2006 18/05/2006 03/04/2002 
End 31/01/2007 28/02/2007 29/12/2006 30/11/2006 18/10/2006 21/02/2007 03/04/2007 
Jarque-Bera 2.1 2.9 3.3 4.7 1.8 1.2 4.9 
ex-dividend NO No discounted discounted discounted discounted discounted 
Underlying Stock MTN GROUP PICKN PAY S SAPPI SASOL Standard Bank STEINHOFF TELKOM 
JSE Code MTN PIK SAP SOL SBK SHF TKG 
Frequency 200  D 200  D 200  D 200  D 200  D 200  D 200  D 
Start 09/02/2006 26/04/2006 02/02/2006 27/04/2006 27/03/2006 16/03/2006 17/04/2006 
End 03/04/2007 30/01/2007 8/11/2008 31/01/2007 29/12/2006 20/12/2006 19/01/2007 
Jarque-Bera 3.3 2.3 1.6 1.4 3.3 5.4 4.7 
ex-dividend discounted No discounted discounted discounted No No 
2:    59 Call and Put options with different style, exercise price and time of expiration, all traded on JSE 
Call/Put warrant ABLABE ABLDBA ABLIBE ABLNBB ABLSBK TKGIBI TKGNBL 
Underlying Stock ABL ABL ABL ABL ABL TKG TKG 
Issuer ABSA Bank Deutsche Bank Investec NedBank Standard Bank Investec NedBank 
Exercise Price 31.00 26.50 33.00 31.00 32.00 160.00 160.00 
Expiry Date 6/6/2007 7/6/2007 2/7/2007 23/5/2007 3/7/2007 2/7/2007 24/5/2007 
Style American/call American/call American/call American/call American/call American/call American/call 
Conv. Ratio 5 5 8 8 8 35 25 
PIKDBA BILABI BILDBJ BILIBJ BILNBL BILSBB BILSBC FSRABG 
PIK BIL BIL BIL BIL BIL BIL FSR 
Deutsche Bank ABSA Bank  Deutsche Bank Investec NedBank Standard Bank Standard Bank ABSA Bank  
38.00 155.00 145.00 140.00 155.00 140.00 165 21.50 
16/8/2007 6/8/2007 26/7/2007 2/7/2007 31/7/2007 3/7/2007 2/8/2007 6/6/2007 
American/call American/call American/call American/call American/call American/call American/call American/call 
8 25 20 35 32 35 40 4 
FSRSBB GFIABI GFIDBM GFISBN HARDBI IMPABI IMPDBI SBKSBH 
FSR GFI GFI GFI HAR IMP IMP SBK 
Standard Bank ABSA Bank Deutsche Bank Standard Bank Deutsche Bank  ABSA Bank Deutsche Bank Standard Bank 
24.00 140.00 140.00 140.00 105.00 210.00 168.75 100.00 
7/3/2007 6/6/2007 6/7/2007 5/8/2007 6/7/2007 6/6/2007 6/7/2007 7/03/2007 
American/call American/call American/call American/call American/call American/call American/call American/call 
6 45 30 50 40 50 62 30 
IMPIBI MLAABE SBKDBC MLADBC TKGSBC BILSBC IMPABJ MLASBI 
IMP MLA SBK MLA TKG BIL IMP MLA 
Investec ABSA Bank  Deutsche Bank  Deutsche Bank  Standard Bank Standard Bank ABSA Bank Standard Bank 
220.00 130.00 90 112 150.00 165 245.00 105 
7/2/2007 8/6/2007 6/7/2007 8/16/2007 3/7/2007 8/2/2007 8/6/2007 7/3/2007 
American/call American/call American/call American/call American/call American/call American/call American/call 
65 15 14 25 35 40 50 25 
IMPIBI MLAABE SBKDBC MLADBC TKGSBC BILSBC IMPABJ MLASBI 
MTNABH SOLABI SOLABJ SOLDBO SOLIBJ SOLIBK SOLNBM SBKABH 
MTN SOL SOL SOL SOL SOL SOL SBK 
ABSA Bank ABSA Bank ABSA Bank  Deutsche Bank  Investec Investec NedBank ABSA Bank  
80.00 285.00 270.00 270.00 270.00 250.00 275.00 98 
6/6/2007 6/6/2007 8/6/2007 6/7/2007 4/5/2007 7/2/2007 7/31/2007 6/6/2007 
American/call American/call American/call American/call American/call American/call American/call American/call 
14 59 50 50 60 55 60 14 
SHFDBB GFIDBW SBKDBU TKGSBX SAPIBS ABLDBP BILNBT BILSBP 
SHF GFI SBK TKG SAD ABL BIL BIL 
Deutsche Bank Deutsche Bank  Deutsche Bank Standard Bank Investec Deutsche Bank NedBank Standard Bank 
24 115.00 78 130.00 95.00 23.50 125.00 140.00 
2007/ 6/7 6/7/2007 6/7/2007 8/5/2007 9/4/2007 6/7/2007 4/11/2007 8/2/2007 
American/call European Put European Put European Put European Put European Put European Put European Put 
10 30 14 25 20 20 30 27 
FSRSBY IMPDBT IMPIBT IMPNBW IMPSBV MLADBQ MLADBR MLAIBG 
FSR IMP IMP IMP IMP MLA MLA MLA 
Standard Bank Deutsche Bank  Investec NedBank Standard Bank  Deutsche Bank Deutsche Bank  Investec 
18.00 182.00 170.00 185.00 170.00 83 98 110 
5/8/2007 7/26/2007 7/2/2007 7/31/2007 7/3/2007 7/6/2007 16/8/2007 7/2/2007 
European Put European Put European Put European Put European Put European Put European Put American/call 
60 50 50 50 14 25 60 25 
SBKABH  SBKDBL  ABLDBP  IMPSBD  
SBK 2007/06/06 SBK 2007/06/07 ABL 2007/06/07 IMP 2007/07/03 
ABSA Bank American Call Deutsche Bank American Call Deutsche Bank European Put Standard Bank American Call 



















    
 
   
 
    






























































































202 204 206 208 210 212 214 216 218
IMPLATS 
A single option (ABLABE) written on African Bank’s stock A group of options (ABLABE, ABLDBA, ABLIBE, ABLNBB, 
ABLSBK and ABLDBP) written on African Bank’s stock 
 
A single option (BILABI) written on BHP BILLION’s stock 
strike  
A group of options (BILABI, BILDBJ, BILIBJ, BILNBL, BILSBB and 
BILSBC) written on BHP BILLION’s stock 
strike  
A single option (FSRABG) written on FIRSTRAND’s stock. A group of options (GFIABI, GFIDBM and GFISBN) written on 
Gold Fields stock 
A single option (HARDBI) written on Harmony Gold’s stock. 
 
A group of options (IMPNBM, IMPABI, IMPABJ, IMPDBI, IMPIBI, 















          
 
         
 
        
 
 




Figure 3.1 reports the slops and the curves resulted from plotting different strike prices and implied volatilities. 




















































































142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149
TELKOM 
A single option (MLAABE) written on Mittal Steel’s stock 
strike  
A group of options (MLAABE, MLADBC, MLAIBG, MLASBI, 
MLADBR and MLADBQ) written on Mittal Steel’s stock 
strike  
A single option (MTNABH) written on MTN’s stock. A single option (PIKDBA) written on Pick’n Pay’s stock. 
strike  
A single Put option (SAPIBS) written on SAPPI’s stock. 
strike  
A group of options (SBKSBH, SBKABH and SBKDBL) written 
on Standard Bank’s stock 
 
A single Put option (SHFDBB) written on SAPPI’s stock. 
strike  
A group of options (SOLABI, SOLABJ, SOLDBO, SOLIBJ, SOLIBK 
and SOLNBM) written on SASOL’s stock 
s  
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07/01/23 07/01/31 07/02/08 07/02/16 07/02/24 07/03/04
Telkom: 95%VaR 
Figure 3.2 The actual stock price changes and 1 day 
95% and 99% VaRs obtained though Historical 
Simulation method using 500 and 250 simulations. 
 
Figure 3.3 The actual stock price changes and 1 day 
95% and 99% VaRs obtained though Monte Carlo 
















Market segmentation, relative supply of shares and share 







Some equity markets, including both developed and emerging ones, allow listed companies to 
issue different types of stocks. It is common for these stocks, which are issued by the same 
company, to share the same firm-specific risk, and in most cases also to enjoy the same 
dividend and voting policies. The only difference between these shares is their restrictions 
with regard to investors, that is, who can own the stocks. 
 
One typical strategy is to segment investors by their citizenship; that is, a company can issue 
two types of stocks, one which is available to domestic investors and the other which is 
otherwise identical, but is only available to foreign investors. Such a segmented issuance 
strategy has been well researched; examples include the papers by Stulz and Wasserfallen 
(1995) on Switzerland,  Beiley and Jagtiani (1994) on Thailand, Domowitz et al. (1997) on 
Mexico, Hietala (1989) on Finland, and Bergstorm et al. (1993) on Sweden.  
 
The common phenomenon among these countries is the low price of the shares that are 
restricted to domestic investors relative to that of the corresponding shares accessible to 
foreign investors. In China, however, the price differential is the other way around: the shares 
restricted to domestic investors have a higher price level than the corresponding shares 














In 1990 the Chinese government established two stock exchanges: the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange (SSE) in Shanghai, and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) in Shenzhen. These 
two exchanges have expanded rapidly over the past decade and are now both open to foreign 
investors, with the classes of shares owned by domestic and foreign investors having been 
separated. 
 
Domestic shares are known as A shares, whilst foreign shares are referred to as B shares. A 
third category, H shares, comprises foreign shares which can be traded in both the Hong 
Kong and Shanghai exchanges. However, these shares account for only a very small 
proportion of the total market. 
 
A shares are traded in the Chinese Renminbi25 currency, whilst B shares are traded in foreign 
currencies (the US dollar in the Shanghai exchange and the Hong Kong dollar in the 
Shenzhen exchange). At the time of the inception of the market, foreigners could not legally 
buy A shares, and domestic residents could not legally buy either B or H shares. Apart from 
the quoted currency and the citizenship of the holders, A and B shares are otherwise identical 
in all related rights; however B share prices are much lower than those of A shares. 
 
In June 2001 the Chinese government opened up the B share market to domestic residents 
and the A share market was opened to overseas investors in December 2002. The only 
difference now between A and B shares is the quoted and trading currency; nevertheless, B 
share prices remain lower than those of A shares. This obviously violates the law of one price.  
 
The significant price difference between domestic A shares and foreign B shares of the same 
company is an important issue in the Chinese equity market that calls for a rational 
explanation. Financial literature has suggested an array of possible explanations, including 
differences in required returns, liquidity disparity, and relative information available. But do 
foreign and domestic investors price assets in these markets the same way? In such an 
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 Chinese money is called Renminbi (RMB) which means “The People’s Currency”. Yuan is the base unit for RMB - like 














environment with more instability and unique institutional constraints, can we still expect the 
same risk and return relationships predicted by standard CAPM models? These are mainly 
the questions addressed in this chapter, focusing on the companies listed on the SSE. 
However, the establishing of a formal asset pricing model is difficult, if not impossible. 
Given the controversy around factors that should be included in the model, this chapter will 
use only the standard Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). This is a one-factor model to 
directly estimate the betas of A and B shares. The estimated betas should provide insight into 
the risk and expected return relationship of A and B shares. 
 
Furthermore, in the Chinese stock markets, the information system is not transparent; very 
limited information is provided to investors and the general public. Against such a 
background, it is useful to test whether market efficiency exists in the Chinese stock market. 
The outcome might explain the differential between A and B share prices. 
 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: section 4.2 will provide an overview of the 
Chinese equity markets, in which the institutional structure and major market characteristics 
will be outlined and summarized. Section 4.3 provides a brief literature review of Chinese 
stock market research concerning the price difference between A and B shares. Section 4.4 
will deal with asset pricing and risk and return relation for A and B shares. Section 4.5, 4.6 
and 4.7 will present the methodology adopted and data used and report on the empirical 
results of the research. Readers will find the conclusion in the last Section (section 4.8). 
 
4.2: Institutional Facts about the Chinese Stock Industry 
 
4.2.1: Stock market structure 
 
The Chinese stock market consists of one regulator, two exchanges, one clearing company, 
and numerous securities exchange companies. The China Securities Regulatory Commission 













consolidated in 1998, and the China Securities Regulatory Commission is now the regulator 
of the securities industry. SSE and the SZSE were established in December 1990. By the end 
of 2003, there were 746 A shares and 54 B shares listed on the SSE and 489 A shares and 57 B 
shares listed on SZSE. By the end of 2003, SSE had 2980.5 billion (70.2%) total market 
capitalization, while the SZSE had Yuan 1265.3 billion (29.8%) total market capitalization. 
In March 2000, the China Securities Depository and Clearing Company (CSDCC) was 
established as the central securities clearing company.  
As of February 2008, 861 companies were listed on the SSE and the total market 
capitalization of SSE reached RMB 23,340.9 billion (US$3,241.8 billion; US$1 = RMB 6.82) 
see Table 4.1.  
                    Table 4.1: SSE Trading Summary for 2007 (Shanghai Stock Exchange26). 
Data updated on 18 February 2008 
 Stock listings Market value 
(billion yuan) 
Annual turnover value 
(billion yuan) 
A shares 850 26,849.7 30,196.0 
B shares 54 134.2 347.4 
Total 904 26,983.9 30,543.4 
 
By late November 2009, the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, based in China’s fast-growing south-
east region, had grown to a total of 801 listed companies and traded 1,126 different listed 
securities. It is now the second-biggest exchange in China with a current market 
capitalization of US$732 billion, up 113% on the 2008 figure, while the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange has a current market cap of US$2.43 trillion. According to data from the World 
Federation of Exchanges27, the SZSE is the seventh-largest stock exchange in the Asia-Pacific 
region by market cap.  
4.2.2: Share Structure 
 
To attract foreign investment, the government allows the coexistence of A and B shares for 
listed companies. A shares were restricted to domestic investors before December 2002 (the 
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 “SSE indices”. Shanghai Stock Exchange. 15 November. 2009 < http://www.sse.com.cn/sseportal/en_us/ps/home.shtml> 
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restriction was lifted after December 2002). A shares are RMB denominated28. B shares were 
restricted to foreign investors before February 2001 (the restriction was lifted after February 
2001). They are U.S dollar denominated on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and Hong Kong-
dollar denominated on the Shenzhen Exchange.   
 
In terms of the number of shares issued, capital raised, and market capitalization, the B share 
market is much smaller than the A share market. Until December 31, 2003, 87 companies 
were dual listed in A and B shares. These 87 paired A and B share companies have similar or 
even identical business and operating performance. They represent the same voting rights, 
trade simultaneously on the Shanghai or Shenzhen stock exchanges, and cannot cross-list on 
the above two exchanges (Bailey, 1994).  
 
It is widely reported in the literature that there is a large A to B share price premium. The 
relevant arguments will be presented in more detail in a later section. 
 
With reference to state-owned enterprises (SOEs), 37% and 27% of the shares of the listed 
companies are held by the state (government) and legal persons (enterprises and institutions), 
respectively, and are non-tradable. Tradable public shares comprise only 35% of the market. 




Insurance funds and social security funds cannot participate in the stock market and mutual 
funds are very limited. By 2000, according to the CSRC, individual investors 
overwhelmingly dominated the A share market, holding over 99.5% of the accounts, with less 
than 0.5% held by institutional investors. In the B share market, institutional investors 
dominated. 
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 Besides A, B shares issued by domestic stock exchanges, there are H shares, Red Chip, and N shares related to Chinese 
companies. H shares are Chinese companies listed in Hong Kong. Red Chips are Chinese companies incorporated in Hong 














4.3: The Puzzle of China’s A-Share and B-Share Price Disparities 
 
This section provides a brief literature review of Chinese stock market research that is 
concerned with the price difference between A and B shares.  
 
4.3.1: The price gap between   and   shares narrows rapidly 
 
The academic literature is growing on Chinese stock markets, especially on price differences 
between A and B shares. For example, Bailey (1994) initiated the research by analyzing eight 
Chinese stocks from March 1992 to March 1993. He found a substantial discount in B share 
prices relative to the A share prices. A follow-up study by Su (1998) investigated 47 stocks 
from 1993 through 1996 and discovered that the average daily discount on B shares relative 
to A shares was about 62.2 percent. 
 
By examining a sample consisting of 68 firms issuing both A and B share stocks, Chen, Lee, 
and Rui (2001) also found that the average B share discount on the SSE was about 66.2%, 
while that on the SZSE was about 52.4% from 1992 to 1997. The existence of persistent price 
differentials between A and B shares has led to various testable theories. One such theory is 
the Differential risk theory. Su (1998) presents evidence that the cross-sectional spread 
between A and B share returns is correlated with the difference in the risk factors. 
 
Another theory is the Differential liquidity theory. Chen, Lee, and Rui (2001) reported that 
the price difference is primarily due to illiquid B share markets. Their findings also suggest 
that B share prices are more related to market fundamentals, while A share prices are more 
likely to be influenced by non-fundamental factors. Another theory is the Asymmetric 
information theory was developed by Chakravarty, Sarkar, and Wu (1998) who used a media-
coverage variable to reflect foreign investors’ language and other barriers and concluded that 
foreign investors require a discount to hold   shares. Another theory is the Differential 













alternatives for domestic investors, and the returns on other alternatives were too low to be 
attractive. The demand for A shares is very high compared to that for B shares, which are one 
of the many investment substitutes for foreign investors. So there is a huge A to B share price 
premium. 
 
All of the above-mentioned studies were carried out before February 2001, when the Chinese 
Securities Regulatory Commission allowed Chinese investors to own B shares. Karolyi and 
Li (2003) compared the changes in the   share discount relative to the A share before and 
after February 11, 2001. They found that the   share discount declined from 75% to 8%, and 
their findings do not support differential demand or liquidity theories but support differential 
risk and asymmetric information theories (Tan, 2005). 
 
This chapter will continue with an investigation based on the work of Karolyi and Li (2003) 
comparing the performance of A and B shares’ before and after permission was given to 
Chinese investors to own B shares; and before and after permission was granted to overseas 
investors to own A shares.  
 
4.3.2:  The relationship between   and   shares prices 
 
Several studies have been undertaken on the relationship between A and B share prices. These 
studies focused on the lead-lag or cross-autocorrelation between the prices and returns of A 
and B shares (Kim and Shin, 2000, Chui and Kwok, 1998). While these studies provide some 
insight into the A and B share pricing relationship, most do not utilize a standard asset-pricing 
model. Studies that included asset-pricing models and present value models (and 
modifications of present value models) have been selected here to examine A and B share-
pricing issues. 
  
For example, Fernald and Rodgers (2002) utilized the standard present value model to 













to differences in the discount rates applied by foreign and Chinese investors. In their 
argument, the expected rate of return   for Chinese and foreign investors in the model: 
 
 
   
  
    
  
  






   
  
    
  
  






is the key that determines the difference between A and B share prices. Where: PA  is the price 
of an A share, PB  is the price of the corresponding B  share, Dt  is the dividend paid at time t, 
rA is the constant expected rate of return of Chinese investors for A shares. Similarly, rB  is the 
expected rate of return of foreign investors for B shares, K  is the ratio of dividends to 
earnings Et, and g is the constant growth rate of dividends. 
 
 Since A and B shares are issued by the same company in China, the earnings are the same for 





    










   
 
  therefore, it follows that: 
 











However, this argument is not fully convincing. Since we had wide variations in the gap 
between prices of A and B shares, the fixed effect of the difference in r  for Chinese and 













paid by foreign and Chinese investors for the same asset claims29. For example, on average, 
the A share prices of “SVA Electron” (SSE’s listed company in our dataset) are about three 
and a half times more than the B share prices. But the difference between the price of A and B 
shares of the company “Shanghai Potevio” (also listed on the SSE) in our dataset is as large 
as seven times. It seems that the price difference of A and B shares cannot be explained 
theoretically by a simple present value model. 
 
Starting with a present value model, Fernald and Rodgers concluded their analysis by using a 
modified version of the P/E ratio analysis based on equation (4.3)30. They formed a panel of 
Chinese companies to “identify variables associated with cross-company differences in the 
relative price paid by foreigners and the earnings-price ratio”. These variables include “a 
dummy variable for whether the firm exports a high share of its output; the percentage of 
total shares owned by the state; sales (lagged one period) as a proxy for size; turnover, 
defined as the average ratio of daily trading volume to shares outstanding; and observed sales 
growth from 1993-1998” (Fernald and Rodgers, 1999). In their analysis, betas
 31 were 
included as one variable to explain the relative prices of A and B shares. But this study is not 
a direct test of the CAPM model. In the results shown in their paper, the domestic and foreign 
betas failed to explain the difference in the relative prices of A and B shares. In addition, the 
A domestic share beta and B share beta yield opposite signs when they are included as 
independent variables to explain the earnings to price ratio of A and B shares respectively in 
their model. 
 
This study makes use of the CAPM one-factor model to explain the asset pricing of A and B 
shares. The study differs from that of the Fernald and Rodgers’ present value-model analysis 
in 1999. Instead of inducing the conjecture from the present value model that the expected 
rate of return   is the key to explaining A and B  share prices, this examination will use the 
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 If    and    is the only factor that leads to the difference of A and B share prices, as predicted by the present value model, 
then the price difference should be same for all the companies that issue both A and B shares according to equation (3). 
 
30
 In their regression, the dependent variable is E/P. 
 
31













CAPM one-factor model to directly estimate the betas of A and B shares. The estimated betas 
should provide insight into the risk and the expected return relationship of A and B shares. 
 
4.3.3:  The Information Efficiency of China’s Stock Market 
 
Since it is an emerging market that has been established in less than twenty years, China’s 
stock market exhibits many characteristics revealed as inefficient in previous research. It is 
recapitulated as a “high return, high risk” market by many investors. While fundamental 
firm-specific factors, that is, the earnings-to-price ratio, dividend yield and liquidity, lack the 
power to explain stock returns (Wang and Di, 2007). 
 
Market segmentation with evidence of information diffusion between   shares and   shares 
is also mentioned in Sjoo and Zhang (2000). Moreover, government intervention, the 
dominant position taken by individual investors, information asymmetry, and the prohibition 
of short sales are generally considered as the main characteristics preventing China’s stock 
market from being efficient. 
 
In this case, prices in China’s stock market are assumed to be predictable and a constant 
excess return should be available for investors. For example, Kang, Liu and Ni (2002) 
document significant abnormal returns from short-horizon contrarian and intermediate-
horizon momentum strategies using data from 1993 to 2000. This chapter includes a test to 
ascertain whether market efficiency exists in the Chinese stock market. The result might 
explain the price different between   and   shares.   
 
The present value (PV) model of stock prices has become a fashionable tool in testing for 
market efficiency. For example, Shiller (1981) referred to the PV model as an “efficient 
market model” and viewed volatility tests as a method of evaluating market efficiency in a 














This study uses the PV model which is known as “first variance bounds” tests by Shiller 
(1981) and LeRoy and Parter (1981) to test the efficiency of the SSE. This test has sparked 
much criticism (e.g. Flavin, 1983 and Kleidon, 1986) and further inquiry (Camerer, 1987 and 
West, 1988a). Under this test of efficient markets, actual stock prices are determined by 
rational agents as the present discounted value of future dividends. If the model holds, any 
movements in stock prices are due to new information concerning future dividends and stock 
prices that reflect all the available information. The validity of the model can be examined by 
testing the restrictions that are implied by the model. A violation of the restrictions would 
suggest that prices do not completely reflect all the available information and the efficient 
market model would then be rejected.  
 
4.4: Asset Pricing: A and B shares 
 
The difference in price levels of A and B shares reveals that these two groups of investors 
actually value the A and B shares quite differently. Fundamental optimal portfolio theories 
predict that although A and B shares represent the same dividend flow (especially if we ignore 
the exchange rate risk32), in equilibrium, A and B shares need not have the same price levels.  
 
Optimal portfolio theory implies that the price of any one share depends not only upon its 
own dividend flow but also upon the characteristics of the dividend flows of other assets that 
individuals may purchase. Since foreign investors and domestic investors have distinct sets of 
assets from which they can compose their portfolios, optimal portfolio theory provides a basis 
for accounting for differences in the prices for A shares and B shares. This explains that just 
because A shares and B shares are issued by the same company, and therefore represent the 
same dividend flow, this condition is not sufficient to guarantee the same equilibrium price 
levels for these two types of shares. The investment opportunities and market portfolios are 
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 Although lately there have been many discussions about the pressure for Chinese RMB to be revalued (mainly to 
appreciate), the exchange rates between Chinese Yuan and U.S. dollars have been relatively stable in the period of our study. 
The Chinese government adopts a pegged exchange rate policy, which means that the exchange rate is not determined by 













different for Chinese and foreign investors. Hence, A and B shares will be valued differently 
by these two segmented groups of investors. 
 
If optimal portfolio theories successfully predict the divergence of A and B share price levels, 
can we expect to utilize standard asset pricing theories based on the notion of market 
portfolios to predict the same risk and return relationships for these two types of shares? This 
study focuses mainly on examining whether A and B shares’ returns can be explained by 
systematic risks in China and the US as well as idiosyncratic risks of the listed companies.  
 
4.5: Methodology and Tests 
 
This section describes the scientific methods chosen for this analysis. This section starts by 
describing a simple examination of historical A and B share prices. After which the section 
will present a standard CAPM one-factor model, as well as variance bounds tests. 
 
4.5.1 Historical analysis Test  
 
This is a simple examination of historical A and B share prices which confirms that two 
groups of investors actually alue the A and B shares quite differently. The difference in the 
price levels of A and B shares would normally induce arbitrage incentives, but legal 
restrictions on cross-trading between A and B shares prevent such activities.  
 
Furthermore, this section investigates the impact of allowing domestic residents to invest in 
the B share stock market, as well as the permission granted to foreigners to invest in the A 
share stock market. A simple examination of historical A and B share prices is also used for 
three different time periods: period one, from May 1
st
 1998 until February, 16
th
 2001, just 
before the lifting of the restrictions on share B; period two, from February, 20th 2001 until 
November, 29
th















 2002 until May, 1
st
 2008 in which there were no restrictions at all (see 













4.5.2: The Capital-asset pricing model (CAPM) 
 
In my analysis, the CAPM one-factor model is adopted to study the asset pricing issues of A 
and B shares. 
 
As Cochrane indicated in his book, Asset Pricing (2001), all CAPM factor models are special 
cases of consumption-based asset pricing models. Suppose we have a basic asset pricing 
equation: 
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            (4.4) 
Where   represents individual’s utility function,     and      represents consumption,    is 
the current asset price and      is the payoff of the asset. Define the discount factor  as:  
19.02.2001. Chinese government opened 
up B share to domestic residents 






1.12.2002. The Chinese government 
opened up A share to foreigner 
Class B, foreigners only 
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             (4.5) 
Then we can rewrite the basic asset-pricing equation (4.4) as 
 
                                                                                   (4.6) 
 
Most empirical work testing this equation has shown that the discount factor using 
consumption data, as specified in (4.5), does not fit the data very well. Obtaining asset price 
   and asset payoff      is a fairly easy job. All the empirical tests of asset-pricing models 
encounter difficulties associated with the task of obtaining good measures of the discount 
factor     and linking them to the data. 
 
This has inspired scholars to search for alternative models like CAPM as a proxy to the 
discount factor. The essence of the CAPM models lies in this equation: 
 
                                              
                                                             (4.7) 
 
    
  is the wealth portfolio return, which is normally replaced by the return on a broad-based 
stock portfolio in practice. Equation (4.7) linearises the discount factor specification (4.5) and 
expresses     in terms of “factors.” 
 
The key connection between the CAPM single beta model and the traditional consumption 
based asset-pricing model is the assumption that the agents’ utility function takes a quadratic 
form. This utility form will ensure that the discount factor can be transformed into a linear 
representation, as specified in 4.7. 
 
I will follow Cochrane’s notations to derive the CAPM model (Cochrane, 2001:155-160). 
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With the budget constraint: 
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The problem facing each investor is to choose consumption in two periods   ,       and 
portfolio weights    to maximize the utility, as specified in (4.8). Each agent starts with the 
endowment wealth   and lives for two periods.     
  is asset  ’s return in the second period 
and,      
  is the portfolio return to the investor in the second period.    is the peak of the 
parabolic curve. 
 
A standard first order condition solution will give: 
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Substitute the budget co straint to (4.9) yields the following form: 
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which can be written as: 
            
  
 
Where      
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The CAPM model is often stated in equivalent beta terms: 33 
 
                                (  )          ( 
 )                                                             (4.11) 
 
In the above equation,    is an individual asset  ’s return;    is the wealth portfolio return; 
     is the so called Beta which is closely related to the covariance of the individual asset’s 
return and the wealth portfolio’s return. The one-year Treasury bill rate for the US market 
and the one-year deposit rate for the Chinese market is a proxy for  , the risk-free interest 
rate in my analysis34.  
 
Moving   to the left, equation (4.11) states that an individual asset’s excess return is simply 
this particular asset’s beta multiplied by the market excess return35 and that the intercept of 
this regression should be zero. The beta of each asset captures the systematic risk facing the 
whole market which cannot be avoided through portfolio diversification. 
 
Since the available assets to form portfolios for Chinese and foreign investors are different, 
the wealth portfolios to Chinese and foreign investors are different too. Therefore, according 
to equation (4.11), A shares’ excess return should be regressed on the Chinese market excess 
return. The corresponding B shares’ excess return should be regressed on the US market 
excess return.36 
 
4.5.3: Tests of Information Efficiency of China’s Stock Market 
 
According to Shiller (1981), the efficient market model can be stated as asserting that the 
price     of a share or portfolio of shares representing an index equals the mathematical 
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 For detailed proof of the equivalence of equation (4.11) and (4.7), see Qi (2004) as well as Cochrane (2001), Chapter 6, 
“Asset Pricing,” 2001. William Sharpe also showed the derivation of equation (4.11) in his paper “Capital Asset Prices: A 
Theory of Market Equilibrium under Conditions of risk,” The Journal of Finance 19(3): 425-442. 
 
34
 “One-year deposit rate issued by the People’s Bank of China’s is a risk-free investment is identical to the 1 year U.S. yield 




An asset’s excess return is defined as the difference of an asset’s return and the risk free interest rate. The market excess 
return is defined as the difference of the composite stock index return and the risk free interest rate. 
 
36
 In reality, of course not all the foreign investors who hold B shares are American investors. But if the B shares are traded 
in U.S. dollars and the dividends are also paid in U.S. dollars, the average opportunity cost of investing in Chinese B shares 













expectation, conditional on all information available at the time, of the present value    of 
actual subsequent dividends accruing to that share.   
 
 
is an unknown at time   and has to be 
forecasted. Efficient markets maintain that price is equal to optimal forecast. Different forms 
of the efficient market model differ in the choice of the discount rate in the present value, but 
the general efficient market model can be written as: 
 
       
             (4.12) 
 
where    refers to the mathematical expectation conditional on public information available 
at time  . This equation asserts that any surprising movements in the stock market must have 
at their origin some new information about the fundamental value   
 . It follows therefore 
from the efficient markets model that  
 
  
                   (4.13) 
 
where    is a forecast error.  
 
The forecast    has to be uncorrelated to any information variable available at time  , 
otherwise the forecast would not be optimal; it would not take into account all the 
information. Since the price    itself, is the information at time  .    and    must be 
uncorrelated to each other. Since the variance of the sum of two uncorrelated variables is the 
sum of their variances, it follows that the variance of   
  must equal the variance of    plus 
the variance of   , and since the variance of    cannot be negative, the variance of   
  must 

























Figure 4.2: Real S&P Composite Stock Price Index (solid line p) and ex-post rational price (dotted 
line p*), 1871-1979, both de-trended by dividing a long-run exponential growth factor. The variable 
p* is the present value of actual subsequent real de-trended dividends, subject to an assumption about 
the present value in 1979 of dividends thereafter (Shiller, 1981).  
 
Shiller (1981, 2000) and others obtained the time series data on actual dividends and (using 
some additional assumptions) calculated values for   . Comparing   and   ,  they claimed 
that the data show that in reality    ( )     (  ). In other words, stock prices exhibit 
excess volatility (Shiller, 1981). This chapter tests the efficiency of the SSE by applying the 
first variance bounds test of Shiller (1981). 
 
4.6: Data, Variables and Sample Characteristics 
 
The individual assets examined here are the A shares and B shares of the companies who 
issue both classes of shares listed on the SSE. In the datasets used, 33 companies listed on 
SSE issue both A and B shares. Daily stock prices from May 1, 1998 to May 1, 2008, that is 
2610 days were obtained from the University of Cape Town DataStream database to examine 
the correlation between A and B share price movements. 
 
Furthermore, the daily individual asset returns were obtained for the same companies for the 































the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), American Stock Exchange (AMEX) and NASDAQ, 
and the Shanghai   share index returns for the same period37.  
The model specified by equation (4.11) also requires the risk-free interest rate. As mentioned 
above, this examination has also included the one-year Treasury bill rate and the one-year 
Chinese deposit rate as a proxy for the risk-free interest rate for US and China respectively. 
 
The SSE A share index minus the one-year Chinese deposit rate is a proxy for the market 
excess return for Chinese investors, while the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ composite index 
minus the US one-year Treasury bill rate is a proxy for the US market excess return. The 
regressions are based on equation (4.11) 
 
Annual dividends paid on the Shanghai A share index during the interval of January 1992 to 
June 2008, have been also collected to examine the efficiency of the SSE. The constant 
discount rate used in the present value calculation is the geometric-average real return on 
stocks over the full sample. That is a measure of rational investors’ required rate of return. 
The use of a variable discount rate does not change the basic conclusions, as shown by Shiller 
(2003). 
 
4.7: Results and Explanations 
 
4.7.1: Results of the Historical Analysis  
 
We can now empirically test the models described in the previous section. The data include 
33 companies listed on the SSE issuing both class A and B shares.  
  Figure 4.3 in appendix B.1 shows the prices of A shares and B shares of 33 companies listed. 
B share prices are converted into Chinese Yuan at official exchange rates. It is clear that 
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 If the B shares are traded in U.S. dollars and the dividends are also paid in U.S. dollars, the average opportunity cost of 
investing in Chinese B shares is the average return forgone if they had invested in the U.S. capital market. However, A 













although there appears to be some degree of co-movement in A and B shares prices, domestic 
and foreign investors price these two types of shares differently. The data is daily A and B 
share price data from May 1, 1998 to May 1, 2008. After converting   shares into Chinese 
Yuan, further calculation shows that, on average,   shares are priced 5.41 times higher than 
their corresponding B shares. 
 
However, after dividing the time period described above into 3 different time periods, as 
explained in section 4.5.1 and illustrated in Figure 4.1, our calculation shows that, on 
average,   shares are priced 7.93 times higher than their corresponding B shares in the first 
period (from May 1
st
 1998 until February, 16
th
 2001, just before the lifting of the restrictions 
on share B) and 6.1 times higher in the second period (from February, 20th 2001 until 
November, 29
th
 2002, just before the lifting of the restrictions on share A) and 3.95 times 
higher in the third period (from December, 2
nd
 2002 until May, 1
st
 2008 where there are no 
restrictions at all).  
 
This is the first finding obtained in this chapter, which indicates that volatility transmissions 
between A and B share markets accelerate when domestic residents start to invest in B  shares, 
and  further accelerate when overseas investors start to invest in A shares. It is therefore 
concluded that permitting domestic residents to invest in B shares shrinks the gap between A 
and B share prices. Further, permitting overseas investors to invest in   shares, can shrink the 
gap even more between A and B share prices.  
 
This finding was followed up by a comparison of the distribution of daily return variance, 
skewness, and kurtosis between A and B share prices in the three periods specified in Figure 
4.1. The major findings of this analysis are as follows: 
 
(1)  In the first period, the average daily return variance is about 11.37 times higher on the A 













share, while average skewness is higher on B than on the A. These results are illustrated in 
Figure 4.4 below. 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Variances of A and B share in the first period from May 1st 1998  
 to February, 16
th
 2001, just before the lifting of the restrictions on B shares 
 
(2)  In the second period, the average daily return variance is about 2.5 times higher on the A 
share than on the B share, while the average skewness and kurtosis is higher on the B than on 
the A, (see figure 4.5). 
 
 
Figure 4.5: Variances of A and B share in the second period from February, 20th 2001 
to November, 29
th
 2002, just before the lifting of the restrictions on A shares 
 
(3) In the third period, the average daily return variance is about 2.40 times higher on the A 
share than on the B, while the average skewness and kurtosis is higher on the B than on the A 

















































Figure 4.6: Variances of A and B share in the third period from December,  
2
nd
 2002 to May, 1
st
 2008 after which there were no restrictions 
 
The higher variance of   share prices means that   share prices are more efficient than those 
of the B shares, as these prices incorporate new information faster.  
 
4.7.2 The Risk and Return Relationship for A and B Shares 
 
The previous empirical finding was not surprising. Fundamental optimal theories predict that 
although A and B shares represent the same dividend flow, in equilibrium, A and B shares 
need not have the same price levels. Optimal portfolio theory states that the price of any one 
share depends not only upon its own dividend flow, but also upon the characteristics of 
dividend flows of other assets that individuals may purchase. 
 
Since foreign investors and domestic investors have distinct sets of assets from which they 
can compose their portfolios, optimal portfolio theory provides a basis for accounting for 
differences in the prices of A and B shares. This explains the fact that although   shares and B 
shares are issued by the same company, and therefore represent the same dividend flow, this 
is not sufficient to guarantee the same equilibrium price levels for the two types of shares. 
Hence A and B shares can be valued differently by these two segmented groups of investors.       
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
Table 4.2 in appendix B.2 shows the regression results for the share prices from 33 






























all A shares in the dataset confirmed the linear and significant relationship between individual 
asset’s excess returns and the market’s excess returns. The estimated beta range is 0.89-1.01.  
 
However, for the regressions related to Chinese B shares on the US market’s excess returns, 
all B shares in the dataset confirmed the linear and significant relationship between individual 
asset’s excess returns and the market’s excess returns. The estimated beta range is 0.86-0.91. 
The t-test shows that all B shares are significantly influenced by the US market.  
 
Thus, price differences between domestic A shares and foreign B shares for the same 
company could be explained by the different systematic risks in China and the US. This is 
valid if all A shares in the dataset show a significant relationship between individual asset’s 
excess returns and the Chinese market’s excess returns and B shares confirm a significant 
relationship between individual asset’s excess returns and the US market’s excess returns. 
 
Moreover, the estimated betas of the B shares are lower than their counterparts in the A 
shares. This shows that A shares issued by Chinese companies present a higher systematic 
market risk to domestic investors. But on the other hand, the higher systematic risk offers a 
higher excess return for A shares and justifies their higher price in comparison to the B share 
price. 
 
4.7.3: Information Efficiency of China’s Stock Market 
 
Figure 4.7 below represents our empirical results using the Shiller (1981) model to test the 
efficient market hypothesis in the Shanghai   share index. We find significant evidence 
against the efficient market hypothesis, as shown in the Figure 4.7 below, although this  
market has become more efficient at a later stage. These findings are consistent with Shiller’s 















Figure 4.7: Shanghai A share index (solid line p) and ex-post rational price (dotted line p*),  





This study examined issues of asset pricing as well as risk and return relationships in a 
special environment in China’s stock market. This market has distinctive features such as a 
large percentage of non-tradable shares and separation of domestic and foreign investors.  
The research finds that domestic and foreign investors do not price A shares (available for 
domestic investors) and B shares (available for foreign investors) differently. Moreover, it 
was discovered that the standard risk and return relationships implied by CAPM models 
comply with A shares and therefore, domestic investors price asset risk as predicted by 
CAPM models in China. However, the study also revealed that the standard risk and return 
relationships implied by CAPM models also comply with B shares and foreign investors price 
asset risk as predicted by CAPM models in the US. Thus, price differences between domestic 
A shares and foreign B shares for the same company could be explained by the different 
systematic risks in China and the US. The investment opportunities and market portfolios are 
different for Chinese and foreign investors. Hence, A and B shares will be valued differently 































The results also suggest that the different pricing can be explained by interventions in the 
stock market by the Chinese government. Figures 4.3  4.4, 4.5, and 4.6 and the analysis of 
skewness and kurtosis show sharp jumps and discontinuities, reflecting the high A share price 
influenced by the high volatility of the Chinese stock market. Interestingly, these jumps and 
discontinuities showed up in the data mostly in the first few years, from (May 1
st
 1998 to 
February, 16
th
 2001, just before the lifting of the restrictions on share B), reflecting the fact 
that government interventions and policy changes are major sources of volatility in the 
Chinese stock market, and for the A share price in particular, as was discussed in section 4.2.  
 
Such government interventions and policy changes preclude foreigners from buying A shares, 
and domestic residents from buying B shares. These include changes of interest rate, control 
of the growing supply of new shares traded in the exchanges, and changes of stock 
transaction regulations, such as the imposition and removal of daily price change limits. 
Other political events also disturbed the Chinese stock markets.  
 
However, we can also see continuous volatility decreases from February, 20
th
 2001 to 
November, 29
th
 2002, just after the lifting of the restrictions on B shares, and from December, 
2
nd
, 2002 to May, 1
st
 2008 when there were no restrictions at all, as shown by the variance of 
the returns. This clearly shows that the Chinese government improved its capital market 
management by applying more market-oriented methods and becoming less directly involved 
in the equity markets, leaving them to their own devices.    
 
The increase in efficiency over time, indicated by the continuous shrinkage in the gap 
between daily A and B  share prices in the more recent periods, can be explained by the 
increasing deregulation and liberalization of the Chinese stock markets, which in the early 
1990s were heavily interrupted by unpredictable market interventions by the government.  
This made these markets persistent rather than neutral. Such non-neutral market persistence 
allows for profit-making arbitrage opportunities, making these markets unfair. The Chinese 
markets have become more efficient and neutral in the last few years, and no longer allow 













4.9: Appendix B 
4.9.1: B.1 Examination of historical   and   share prices 
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Figure 4.3 Prices of A and B Shares 
B share prices, which are denoted in U.S. dollars, are converted into Chinese currency, Yuan, with 
official exchange rates. The daily data of A and B shares are obtained from University of Cape Town 
DataStream. The data for the 33 companies included in this figure cover the period of May 1, 1998 to 
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4.9.2: B.2 Regression Result of A and B shares for CAPM Model 
 
Table 4.2: Regression Result of A and B shares for CAPM. Start date 1998/06/01. End date 2008/06/02. 2610. 
                                                                           A Shares                       B Shares 
Company         A-Beta   B-Beta  
1 CHINA FIRST PENCIL 0.97 0.88 
t Stat 68.59 51.53 
2 CHINA TEX.MCH. 0.91 0.88 
t Stat 57.42 46.55 
3 DANHUA CHEMICAL TECH. 0.89 0.88 
t Stat 38.41 44.64 
4 DAZHONG TRSP.(GROUP) 0.97 0.90 
t Stat 75.19 54.48 
5 DOUBLE COIN HOLDINGS 0.98 0.89 
t Stat 63.8 50.81 
6 EASTERN COMMS. 1.00 0.90 
t Stat   65.54   53 
7 HUADIAN ENERGY 0.98 0.91 
t Stat 84.25 58.94 
8 HUANGSHAN TOURISM DEV. 0.94 0.90 
t Stat 73.83 59.52 
9 HUAXIN CEMENT 0.97 0.88 
t Stat 68.62 52.20 
10 JINAN QINGQI MCYCLES. 0.92 0.91 
t Stat 69.15 54.39 
11 SGSB GROUP 0.98 0.88 
t Stat 58.56 44.55 
12 SHAI ATMTN. INSTRUMENTATION 0.95 0.87 
t Stat 58.91 47.39 
13 SHAI.BAOSIGHT SOFTWARE 0.91 0.87 
t Stat 56.47 48.24 
14 SHAI.CHLOR - ALKALI CHM. 0.98 0.86 
t Stat 62.89 34.11 
15 SHANGHAI DAJIANG GROUP STOCK 0.92 0.88 
t Stat 54.51 45.14 
16 SHAI.DIESEL ENGINE 0.96 0.89 
t Stat 66.24 53.81 
17 SHAI.DINGLI TECH.DEV. (GROUP) 0.93 0.87 
t Stat 55.99 49 
18 SHAI.ERFANGJI 1.01 0.88 
t Stat 61.94 45.17 
19 SHAI.FRIENDSHIP GROUP INCO 0.95 0.88 
t Stat 72.50 53.76 
20 SHAI.HAIXIN GP. 0.95 0.90 















21 SHAI.HIGHLY  0.97 0.89 
t Stat 65.84 51.27 
22 SHAI.JINJIANG INTL. INDL. 0.98 0.89 
t Stat 75.61 53.66 
23 SHAI.JIN JIANG INTL. HTLS.DEV 0.99 0.89 
t Stat 76.10 58.04 
24 SHAI.JINQIAO EXPT. PROC.ZONE DEV.  1.00 0.89 
t Stat 75.59 57.49 
25 SHAI. LIAN HUA FIBRE 0.95 0.88 
t Stat 42.12 50.84 
26 SHAI. MRA.TRD 0.98 0.88 
t Stat 65.51 51.70 
27 SHAI. MECH. & ELECT. IND. 0.96 0.89 
t Stat 66.98 51.14 
28 SHAI.POTEVIO  0.97 0.89 
t Stat 62.12 56.41 
29 SHAI.SANMAO ENTER.(GP.)  0.98 0.88 
t Stat 58.64 51.88 
30 SHAI. WAI GAOQIAO FREE TRADE  0.98 0.90 
t Stat 69.44 59.30 
31 SHAI.WINGSUNG DATA TECH. 0.93 0.89 
t Stat 53.59 53.09 
32 SHAI.YAOHUA PILKINGTON GLASS  0.94 0.89 
t Stat 62.07 50.62 
33 SVA ELECTRON  0.98 0.90 
t Stat 65.68 54.06 
34 ZHONGLU  0.89 0.88 




















Incorporating the Sharpe Ratio and the Market Price of 





Finding reliable and accurate measures to assess and compare the performance of portfolios 
and stocks has been a subject commanding the attention of the finance literature for a long 
time. Before the 1960s investors evaluated portfolio performance using the rate of return 
only; risk was not included in the analysis. The development of portfolio theory and the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) by Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965), and Black (1972) 
provided the foundation for risk-adjusted analysis. Risk, measured by either the standard 
deviation or beta, has since then been included in the evaluation process.  
 
In the portfolio theory, it is assumed that investors always prefer higher returns to lower 
returns for a given level of risk; likewise for a given level of return, the assumption is that 
investors prefer a lower risk to a higher risk. As return and risk are two important quantities 
in measuring the performance of an investment, it is crucial to consider both return and risk 
in the selection of assets. 
 
The market price of risk, or the Sharpe Ratio38 is one of the most popular performance 
measures. It is defined as the ratio of the expected return to the standard deviation of the 
                                                             
38  The market price of a risk is the alternative term to the Sharpe ratio. To distinguish between them in this chapter, the 
measurement will be referred to as the “market price of risk” wherever the assumption is made that the stock prices behave 
in accordance with a Geometric Brownian Motion (GBM). However, this measurement will be termed a “Sharpe ratio” 













returns. It captures both return and risk. According to the generalized Sharpe rule, a new asset 
with a higher Sharpe ratio has a higher probability of being selected (Sharpe, 1966, 1975, 
1994; Dowd, 1999, 2000; Hodges, 1998 and Amin and Kat, 2002).  
  
The aim of this chapter is to examine and compare the performance of three methods of 
measuring the trade-off between the risk and the return of trading stocks in both South Africa 
and China. This chapter has two primary objectives: 
 
 The first objective is to compare the performance of the market price of the risk and the 
Sharpe ratio for 13 companies listed on the JSE.  
 
In the market price of the risk test employed in achieving this first objective, it was assumed 
that the stock prices behave according to GBM. Firstly, the constant drift and the volatility is 
estimated, then the drift term is decomposed into a risk-free rate and the market price of risk-
multiplying volatility. The market price of risk is assumed to be constant and independent of 
time. The Maximum Likelihood Method is adopted to estimate the parameters.  
 
In the Sharpe ratio test, the Maximum Likelihood Estimation Method is adopted to estimate 
the parameters in the Sharpe ratio equation, developed by Sharpe in 1966. In this way the 
Sharpe Ratio becomes a forward-looking risk measurement tool instead of a backward-
looking risk measurement tool. t-statistics are provided to show the significance of the 
difference between the market price of risk and the Sharpe ratio.  
 
The Second Objective is to study the risk and return relationships of A and B shares listed on 
the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE). 
 
The first test proposed to achieve this objective is a test to ascertain whether A and B shares 
have a different market price of risk. Both A and B shares are issued by the same company 
and are issued with virtually the same voting rights and dividends. The difference that exists 













other words, the test is to determine whether they have the same market price of risk. The 
procedure in this test is exactly as it is in the first test to achieve the first objective described 
above. However, the data used for this test are the daily closing prices of A and B shares of 
the companies who issue both classes of shares listed on the SSE. The theory behind the 
analysis is straightforward: since the corresponding A and B shares are issued by the same 
company and have identical voting policies and dividend rights, if company-specific 
fundamentals are accepted as given and the prices of the corresponding A shares B shares are 
derived from the fundamentals are assumed, then their market price of risk should be 
identical since they share the same company-specific risk. If investors view the firm-specific 
risk as the only risk they bear, then the shares should have the same market price of risk. 
 
On the other hand, if the market price is different this indicates that, although sharing the 
same firm-specific risk, A and B shares are considered to be at different market-risk levels 
and thus are expected to have different excess returns for investors. Furthermore, besides the 
comparison of the market price of risks for individual A and B shares, we can also stack all A 
shares or B shares’ returns and test the average market price of the risks for the two groups.  
This test is reliable insofar as it relates to the individual results since it uses the average of the 
individual estimators and thus provides more intuitive results for A and B shares as a whole. 
 
 The second and the final test to achieve the second objective concerns estimating and 
comparing the Sharpe ratios of A shares and B shares-based historical-return data.  
   
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: section 5.2 will provide an overview of the 
risk and return relationship. Section 5.3 presents the econometric methodology, Section 5.4 
and 5.5 describe the data and report on the empirical results of the research. Readers will find 
















5.2: Risk and Return in the Equity Markets 
 
5.2.1: The Risk-Return Relationship 
 
The importance of the relationship between risk and return in the field of finance cannot be 
overstated. It is the most basic, yet most important theoretical concept of the discipline. 
Commonly referred to as “no free lunch”, this principle states that in the long term, it is not 
possible to improve returns without incurring a proportionally larger degree of risk. All asset-
pricing models are based on this assumption. For example, Sharpe’s (1964) Capital Asset 
Pricing Model CAPM introduces the beta parameter, defined as the ratio of the covariance of 
the return of an asset with that of the market, divided by the variance of the return on the 
market. Both the numerator and the denominator in the beta calculation are therefore risk 
measures. 
 
Although asset-pricing models state that only systematic risk should affect returns, several 
authors have developed models that take idiosyncratic risk into account. Building on the 
principles of the CAPM, Mao (1971), Levy (1978), Merton (1987), Malkiel and Xu (2002) 
constructed elaborate models of limited diversification. Four main reasons are given to 
explain why individuals may choose to hold such “undiversified” or limited, portfolios, 
namely: transaction costs, taxes, employment compensation, and private information. 
These extensions of the CAPM result in an additional beta with respect to a market wide 
measure of idiosyncratic risk. 
 
Kryzanowski and To (1982) compared and reconciled two main contributions to the literature 
on asset-pricing. Taking into account the imperfect information available, they extracted two 
testable empirical relationships. The first testable relationship was given by Levy (in 1978) 
and stated that an individual investor’s portfolio is mean-variance efficient with regard to the 













linearly related to the intra-portfolio risk of that security. The second testable hypothesis, 
albeit much less easily tested, was a component of Mao’s model (1971). 
 
Mayers (1976) also began with the CAPM framework, but included a non-traded human 
capital factor. Barberis and Huang (2001) have more recently presented a different 
perspective by distinguishing between different levels of loss aversion. They concluded that 
investors exhibit loss aversion to fluctuations of owned individual stocks as opposed to 
fluctuations of their entire portfolio. 
 
Over the last thirty years an enormous amount of empirical literature has attempted to prove 
the positive link established by financial theory between expected market returns and the 
conditional volatility of the aggregate stock market. Pindyck (1984) stated that an increase in 
volatility during the 1970s led to an increase in the expected risk premium. This was defined 
as the difference between the market return and the risk-free rate, which in turn led to a 
decline in stock prices39. However, Pindyck (1984) failed to provide a direct test of the 
relationship between expected returns and volatility. French, Schwert and Stambaugh (1987) 
set out to test this relationship. Using two separate models, they obtained positive but 
insignificant results. However, they did obtain a significantly negative relationship between 
unexpected volatility and excess holding period returns40, which they interpreted as 
supporting the positive relationship between volatility and expected returns41.   
 
Turner, Startz and Nelson (1989) developed a model where the market switches between two 
states: a high-variance state and a low-variance state. Thus, excess return is drawn from two 
normal densities and the state in each period determines which of the two normal densities 
will be used for that period. This model structure is heteroskedastic in construction and has a 
strong time-dependence, which according to the authors improves the forecasting ability for 
                                                             
39 In order to obtain the higher expected risk premium, given a constant cash flow stream generated by the firm, one must be 
able to buy the stock for less, that is, at a lower stock price.  
 
40If the standard deviation increases today, the positive relationship with the risk premium will cause the discount rate for 
future cash flows to increase, thereby effectively decreasing the present value of these future cash flows and the stock price 
also. 
  
41French, Schwert and Stambaugh (1987) also showed that this large negative relationship is too large to be explained solely 













the conditional variance of the market and, in turn, the risk-return model. By using this two-
state model on post World-War II S&P data, Turner, et al. (1989) found a negative 
correlation between risk and return. Bailie and DeGennaro (1990) also examined the 
relationship between stock returns and volatility and concluded that the empirical evidence 
suggests that investors consider another measure of risk to be more important than the 
variance of portfolio returns in predicting returns.  
 
Campbell and Hentschel (1992) revisited the “volatility feedback” concept first discussed by 
Pindyck (1984) and French, Schwert and Stambaugh (1987). They developed a complete 
formal model which accounts for the asymmetric properties of volatility. This is the notion 
that large negative stock returns are more common than large positive stock returns, and that 
volatility is typically higher after stock market declines than after st ck market increases42. 
 
The Campbell and Hentschel (1992) model accounted for the excess kurtosis of stock 
markets and the persistence of volatility43. Campbell and Hentschel concluded that volatility 
feedback has little effect on returns and contributes little to the unconditional variance of 
stocks. 
 
Glosten, Jagannathan and Runkle (1993) examined the possibility that the GARCH-M 
methodology used by most of the previous research was misspecified and led to the 
inconclusive results found in the literature. They applied three modifications to the 
methodology; specifically, they allowed seasonal patterns in volatility; they allowed positive 
and negative innovations to returns with differing impacts; and they allowed nominal interest 
rates to help predict conditional variances. Their results support the negative correlation 
between volatility and expected returns found by Fama and French (1977), Campbell (1987), 
Breen, Glosten and Jagannathan (1989) and Harvey (1991). Whitelaw (1994) also found a 
negative contemporaneous correlation between risk and return.  
                                                             
42This was first discussed by Black (1976).  
 
43Excess kurtosis refers to the fact that extreme stock price movements are more frequent than is expected if the changes are 













Because of the risk-return tradeoff, investors must be aware of their personal risk tolerance 
when choosing investments for their portfolios. Taking on some risk is the price of achieving 
returns; therefore, if you want to make money, you can’t cut out all risk. The goal instead is 
to find an appropriate balance between risk and return.  
 
5.2.2: Composite Risk and Returns  
 
This chapter focuses on the trade-off between return and risk. One way of representing this 
trade-off is to combine return and risk by taking the expected return and dividing it by the 
risk measured. This single quantity is called the risk-adjusted performance ratio. There are 
several risk-adjusted measures, based on different notions of risk. An example of this is the 
Sharpe Ratio (the focus of this chapter) developed by Sharpe (1966). Sharpe examined the 
return of thirty four mutual funds in the period 1954-1963. He concluded that the differences 
in returns were due to the expenses of the mutual funds. He also found that a large proportion 
of the sample mutual funds failed to outperform the Dow Jones Index.  
 
Treynor (1965) introduced the first formal technique to combine both risk and return in a 
single performance measure, known as the Treynor Measure. Jensen (1968) developed the 
Jensen alpha and examined the return of 115 mutual funds in the period 1945-1964 to 
estimate how much a manager’s forecasting ability contributes to a fund’s returns. He 
concluded that funds were on average not able to predict security prices well enough to 
outperform a buy-the-market-and-hold policy, and also that there was very little evidence that 
any individual fund was able to do significantly better than expected with mere random 
chance.   
 
The Sharpe Ratio (SR) takes the mean of the excess return and divides it by the standard 
deviation of the excess return (e.g. Sharpe, 1970 and Sharpe, 1994). One important 













returns and negative returns are treated identically; large positive and negative returns of the 
same magnitude have the same effect on the risk measure. 
 
Dowd (2000) analysed the Sharpe ratio using the Value at Risk (VaR) approach. He proposed 
a new generalised rule for risk adjustment and performance evaluation. Also, he proposed to 
use the VaR rather than the standard deviation. The theoretical methodology helped Dowd to 
conclude that the generalized Sharpe rule is straightforward to implement and can be easily 
programmed into software for decision makers to use. He declared in his paper that the 
Sharpe ratio structure is better than other ratios used to measure return over risk. However, 
correlations between portfolios can be a problem for the Sharpe ratio. 
 
Asgharian and Hanson (2005) extended the work of MacKinlay and Pastor (2000) on the 
evaluation of missing risk factors when using the optimal orthogonal portfolio approach. 
They modified the Sharpe ratio squared that Mackinlay et al. (2000) had used. They used 
monthly returns for ten US portfolios. In their methodology, they used one exact factor model 
with an orthogonal portfolio, and two orthogonal models. They also used an out-of-sample 
Sharpe ratio to compare orthogonal portfolios. They confirmed the general importance of 
exploiting the relationship between return and risk. 
 
Sharpe (1994) undertook a survey and summary of the different applications of the Sharpe 
ratio. He re-established this ratio as a measure of the expected return per unit of risk for a 
zero investment strategy. He pointed out that the Sharpe ratio was designed to measure the 
return adjusted by risk, and, when properly used, could improve the management of 
investments. 
 
This study differs from the extant literature in several unique ways. Firstly, this examination 
makes the Sharpe Ratio a more powerful measurement of the trade-off between risk and 
return when the Maximum Likelihood Estimation Method is adopted to forecast this measure.  














Another example of risk-adjusted measures based on different notions of risk is the market 
price of risk, which is also the focus of this chapter. The market price of risk is defined as the 
total return above the risk-free rate per unit of risk. For analytical purposes we can define the 
risk-free rate as the short-term money rates. The market price of risk captures the degree to 
which investors require a higher return for bearing the risk associated with an asset.  
 
Under a risk-neutral valuation, which considers the market price of risk, the relevant 
Brownian motion for a traded asset, security or future contract can be specified as: 
            , which is a natural stochastic process where the   represents natural 
growth rates, the   represents the standard deviation of the percentage change of the 
stochastic variables,   represents the stock price and    represents a Wiener Process of the 
form   , where the   values are standard normal deviates (i.e.,    (   ))  
 
In terms of arbitrage pricing under the Black-Scholes-Merton argument the natural stochastic 
process and the derivation of the Black-Scholes model are given by: 
            , where   is the rate of return on default-free government bonds. Under 
the arbitrage model only the risk-free rate is relevant and not the natural rate, since it can be 
hedged. 
 
In a general equilibrium framework the risk neutral valuation is given by: 
   (    )        , which applies to both traded and non-traded assets, where   is 
the natural growth rate and    is the risk premium. In equilibrium, with arbitrage 
opportunities, we can now state the following conditions: 
       
       
     (    ), where  (    ) is the risk premium. 
 
An estimation of the above relationship would provide an insight into the consistency of the 













5.3: Methodology  
 
5.3.1: The Sharpe Ratio 
 
One of the many risk/return trade-off measures to arise from the CAPM theory is the Sharpe 
Ratio (Sharpe, 1963). The formula for the Sharpe ratio is exceedingly simple: 
  












Where,             ,  
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Where    is the rate of return on a risk-free asset,     denotes the price of an asset at time   
and     denotes some profit at time  . The time subscript   in the formula for the standard 
deviation is the number of lag values needed to compute the variance for the firm’s profits. 
Thus far this is all standard fare. The decision rule then for investors is to maximize the level 
of profits (or returns) for a given level of risk. It would be irrational for a profit maximizer 
who is risk averse to invest in an asset with a higher risk level and a lower level of profits.  
 
The Sharpe ratio is invariant to the      ratio, so that as both the numerator and 
denominator increase the index remains the same. This invariance is a result of appealing to 
the mean-variance assumption which underlies the CAPM (for example, Szego, 1980 or 
Sharpe, 1964). For a model explicitly taking into account the Arrow-Pratt measure of risk 
aversion in the form of skewness (see Jaro and Na, 2001), this assumption for portfolio 
decision-making identifies the mean return as the first moment of a possible distribution of 














All the relevant information concerning the portfolio of investments is present in these two 
moments, the mean and the variance. Since no other moments of the profit/return distribution 
enter the computation, the Sharpe index is unable to cope with the skewness or the kurtosis in 
the probability density function for an asset or portfolio’s return. The above, though 
unintended, assumption in the Sharpe index is that when viewed from an activity-analysis 
perspective the only input necessary to produce a return   is  . Obviously, then the inclusive 
nature of   in (5.1) requires that   be an adequate proxy for risk.   
 
From equation (5.1) and (5.2) we can establish the following relationship:  
 
 
                    (     )           or            (     )                               (5.3) 
 
 
where SR is the Sharpe ratio. In order to estimate the parameters    and  , in (5.3) the 
Maximum Likelihood Estimation Method is proposed. Under these circumstances the Sharpe 
Ratio will be a forward-looking risk-measurement tool instead of a backward-looking risk-
measurement tool. To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, no one so far has derived 
equation (5.3) and obtained the Sharpe ratio by this method.   
 
5.3.2: The Sharpe Ratio for Chinese A and B shares 
 
This section compares the performance of the Sharpe ratios of A and B shares based on 
equation 5.1. The Sharpe ratio analyses are based on historical data for both A and B shares. 
The comparison follows the common rule to annualize the Sharpe ratios. This allows for a 
fair comparison of the different trading strategies even if the time scales of the strategies are 














However, since A shares are traded in the domestic currency and B shares are traded in a 
foreign currency, the risk-free rate applied to estimate the Sharpe ratios should also be 
different. For A shares, the domestic risk-free rate will be applied, and, for B shares, the 
corresponding US risk-free rate. Since A-share investors trade in Chinese currency, they can 
also invest in domestic risk-free assets. Thus they will face a risk-free rate in Chinese Yuan. 
Alternatively, since B-share investors in the Shanghai stock exchange trade in US Dollars, 
they can instead earn a risk-free rate in US Dollars for the same reason; see Ma (1996) for 
discussion of market segmentation. 
 
5.3.3: The Market Price of Risk 
 
Consider the dynamics of the stock satisfy the following Stochastic Differential Equation 
(SDE): 
 
                                          (    )    (    )                                              (5.4) 
 
   is the stock price,  (    ) and  (    ) denote the drift and volatility of the stock price 
process and both are a deterministic function of   and   is the corresponding Wiener 
process for the stock44.  
 
Generally speaking it is hard to solve the SDE analytically. However, in some cases this can 
be done if we assume some specific form for  (    ) and  (    ). The most widely-used 
model is based on the assumption that stock prices follow Geometric Brownian Motion 
(GBM), in that case, the SDE (5.4) can be expressed as 
 
                                                                                              (5.5) 
 
                                                             













The underlying assumption of GBM is that instead of having constant drift and constant 
variance, as for the Wiener process, the expected return is constant and the variability of the 
percentage return in an infinitesimal interval    is constant.  
 
Now we consider decomposing the expected return into two parts: the risk-free rate and the 
market price of risk. Now the dynamics of stock price can be written as follows:  
 
                                          (     )                                 (5.6) 
 
   is the risk-free rate at time   and   is the corresponding market price of risk. However the 
volatility term remains constant, now the parameters need to be estimated are 
  (   ). The Maximum Likelihood Estimation Method is adopted to estimate these 
parameters.  
 
5.3.4: The Market Price of Risk for Chinese A and B shares 
 
Consider that a company issues A and B shares, as shown in equation 5.5 above, assume that 
stock prices follow GBM, in this case the dynamics of both shares can be expressed as  
 
 
                                                                                                (5.7) 
 
                                                                                                (5.8) 
 
                                                                
 
    and     are the prices of A and B shares respectively;   ,   ,    and    denote the drift 













    and    are the corresponding Wiener process values for A and B shares, while   is the 
correlation coefficient between them.  
 
Now we consider decomposing the expected return into two parts: the risk-free rate and the 
market price of risk. Now the dynamics of stock prices can be written as follows: 
 
 
                  (          )                                                 (5.9) 
 
                   (          )                                               (5.10) 
 
 
     and      are the domestic and foreign risk-free rates at time   and    and    are the 
corresponding domestic and foreign market prices of risk. We will still adopt the maximum 
likelihood method to estimate the parameters, as in the previous section. The probability 
density function is the same as that described in appendix C.1, but we need to substitute the 
constants    and    with time-varying drift terms, as in (5.9) and (5.10). However, the 
volatility term remains constant (Zhu, 2008). 
 
5.4: Data Description 
 
The data used in this chapter are from two different markets: the JSE and the SSE. 
 
5.4.1. The JSE 
 
In this market, we will compare the Share ratio specified in equation (5.3) with the market 
price of risk in (5.6) for companies listed on the JSE. Our interest is to test the difference in 
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) and variance rate    (Hull, 2006). Thus, 
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It is therefore necessary to test whether the natural logarithms of the stock prices in our data 
set follow a log-normal distribution. The natural logarithms of the stock prices were therefore 
tested for normality, using the Jarque-Bera normality test45. Only thirteen companies listed on 
the JSE for 200 daily closing prices satisfied Jarque-Bera normality test as shown in Table 
5.1 below.  
                               Table 5.1: Thirteen companies listed on JSE used in our analysis 
Company Observations Starting Date Ending Date Jarque-Bera 
AFRICAN BANK 200 2006/04/27 2007/01/31 2.108 
BHP BILLITON 200 2006/05/25 2007/02/28 2.927 
FIRSTRAND 200 2006/03/27 2006/12/29 3.252 
GOLD FIELDS 200 2006/02/24 2006/11/30 4.719 
HARMONY GOLD 200 2006/01/12 2006/10/18 1.795 
IMPALA PLATIN M 200 2006/05/18 2007/02/21 1.247 
MITTAL SA 200 2006/05/18 2007/02/21 4.899 
MTN GROUP 200 2006/02/09 2006/11/15 3.287 
PICK N PAY STORES 200 2006/04/26 2007/01/30 2.321 
SASOL 200 2006/05/18 2007/02/21 1.429 
STANDARD BK 200 2006/03/27 2006/12/29 4.056 
STEINHOFF INTL 200 2006/03/16 2006/12/20 5.436 
TELKOM 200 2006/04/17 2007/01/19 4.699 
 
                                                             













These findings indicate that GBM properties exist in this data set and should therefore, using 
GBM, produce accurate results. Nevertheless, short term money rate was used as a proxy for 
determining the risk-free rate. 
 
5.4.2. The SSE 
 
The segmentation of A and B share markets has been regarded as a stylized fact, and most 
previous studies used data prior to February 11, 2001, when   shares were available only to 
Foreign investors. Since February 2001, the   share market has been conditionally46 available 
to domestic investors also. With a more liberal investment environment, it becomes more 
meaningful to reinvestigate the dynamic relationship between A and B share markets by 
incorporating the impact of policy changes and other exogenous shocks. 
 
Firstly, this study investigates whether A and B shares have the same market price of risk 
where the GBM is adopted as a benchmark. This is to test the difference in expected returns  
      and the volatilities      , and furthermore, to ascertain whether they are 
significant, and whether this difference is caused by the different market prices of risk for A 
and B shares.  
 
Secondly, the study examines whether A and B shares have the same Sharpe ratio based on 
the historical data. Both investigations are undertaken using companies’ issue A and B shares 
listed on the SSE. 
 
In February 2001, the Chinese capital market regulator announced a policy to lift restrictions 
on domestic investors trading in B shares. The policy was announced on February 19, 2001 
and as a consequence, the price of B shares increased dramatically in the week after the 
                                                             
46Chinese currency RMB is not freely tradable, but foreign currencies are freely tradable among themselves. So, only 













announcement. The policy change led to a price discount of less than - 40% immediately after 
its announcement. To exclude this period the analysis would only be applied from 200847.  
 
Firstly, A and B share prices were collected; the B share prices were converted into Chinese 
Yuan using official exchange rates. Secondly, the natural logarithms of the stock prices were 
tested for normality using the Jarque-Bera normality test, as suggested by the GBM 
properties. Only thirteen companies listed on the SSE satisfied Jarque-Bera normality test as 
shown in Table 5.2 below.  
 
 













Dazhong Transportation Group 60 2008/03/10 2008/05/30 0.255 2.955 
Double Coin Holdings 60 2008/03/10 2008/05/30 1.374 5.763 
Eastern Communications 50 2008/03/10 2008/05/16 2.979 2.333 
Huaxin Cement 60 2008/03/10 2008/05/30 1.586 4.244 
Jinan Qingqi Motorcycle 50 2008/03/10 2008/05/16 2.871 5.347 
SGSB Group 50 2008/03/24 2008/05/30 4.442 0.660 
Shanghai Automation Instrumentation 60 2008/03/10 2008/05/30 4.867 2.958 
Shanghai Dajiang Group 60 2008/03/10 2008/05/30 3.834 0.052 
Shanghai Dingli Tech Dev (Group)  50 2008/03/24 2008/05/30 1.331 0.914 
Shanghai Friendship Group 60 2008/03/10 2008/05/30 1.889 0.055 
Shanghai Highly Group 60 2008/03/10 2008/05/30 5.848 0.664 
Shanghai Jinjiang Intl Hotels Dev  60 2008/03/10 2008/05/30 2.641 5.999 
Shanghai Jinqiao Export Process  60 2008/03/10 2008/05/30 4.995 1.620 
Shanghai Yaohua Pilkington Glass 50 2008/03/10 2008/05/16 2.432 5.230 
Zhonglu Co 60 2008/03/10 2008/05/30 2.136 3.062 
 
The model specified by the market price of the risk equation in (5.9) and (5.10) also requires 
the use of a risk-free interest rate. As mentioned above, the 3-month US Treasury bill rate and 
the 3-months Chinese deposit rate have been used as proxies for the risk-free interest rate for 
the US and China respectively. 
 
 
                                                             













5.5:  Study Results 
 
5.5.1: The JSE Results and Analysis 
 
The study tested the null hypothesis for the equality of the Sharpe ratio as specified in 
equation (5.3) with the market price of risk in (5.6) for several companies listed on the JSE.  
 
Table 5.3 in appendix C.2 presents the estimation results of the Sharpe ratio and the market 
price of risk, as well as the drift and volatility for each measurement. Table 5.3 illustrates 
several features of these estimated parameters. Firstly, almost all the drift terms obtained via 
equation (5.3) of the Sharpe ratio are identical to those obtained via equation (5.6) of the 
market price of risk, as shown, in Figure 5.1. 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Drift terms obtained by Sharpe ration equation (Slid line) and 
drift terms obtained by market price of risk equation (dotted line) 
 
 
Secondly, the annual volatilities obtained in (5.3) are very closely related to those obtained 
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Figure 5.2: Volatility terms obtained by Sharpe ration equation (Slid line)  
and volatility terms obtained by market price of risk equation (dotted line) 
 
 
Thirdly, let us focus on the estimation of the    (Sharpe ratio) and    the (market price of 
risk). We have shown that    , the drift terms obtained via equation (5.3) of the Sharpe ratio 
are almost identical to      , the drift terms obtained via equation (5.6) of the market price 
of risk. Table 5.3 shows that it is also the same for the Sharpe ratio and the market price of 
risk.    
 
        Figure 5.3: Sharpe ration (Slid line) and market price of risk (dotted line) 
 
Almost all the Sharpe ratio terms are larger than the market price of the risk terms, but the t-
value is not significant for the difference. The results confirm that the Sharpe ratio    
obtained via (5.3) is as efficient as the market price of risk   obtained in (5.6). To the best of 
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Maximum Likelihood Estimation Method to estimate the Sharpe ratio    from (5.3), and 
compared these results with the market price of risk   and obtained this interesting result.  
 
5.5.2: The SSE Results and Analysis 
 
5.5.2.1: Constant Expected Return and Volatility 
 
Table 5.4 in appendix C.3 presents the estimation results of the drift and the volatility values. 
Table 5.4 shows several features of these estimated parameters. Firstly 53% of the drift terms 
of   shares are larger than those of the corresponding   shares and 46% are lower. However, 
the t-values are not significant for these differences, as shown in Figure 5.4.  
 
 
                           Figure 5.4: The drift terms of   shares (Solid line) and the corresponding 
                                                                      shares (dotted line) 
 
 
From this result it can be established that the expected returns of the   shares are on average 
closely related to those of the   shares.   
 
Secondly, the annual volatility values for all A and B shares are higher than those found in 
more mature markets. For example, Campbell, Lo and Mackinlay (1997) provide the 
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However, in this study’s estimation, the SSE shows much higher volatilities for all the shares. 
None of the estimates is below 40% and the largest value is above 70%. This kind of high 
volatility is a feature of an emerging market, as pointed out by many researchers. Taking the 
short development period of the Chinese stock market into consideration, the high volatility 
can be taken as a reflection of more fluctuation and speculation in investors’ performance. 
 
 The interesting thing is that most of the volatility terms of   shares are also higher than those 
of the corresponding   shares, as shown in figure 5.5.  
 
 
                   Figure 5.5: The Volatility terms of   shares (Solid line)  
                                       and the corresponding   shares (dotted line) 
 
This result seems to be consistent with those found in previous studies. For example, some 
researchers argue that the B share market is less liquid than the A share market and thus 
investors require a liquidity premium in order to compensate for B shares. This partly 
contributes to the B share-pricing puzzle. Since B shares are less liquid than A shares, it is 
reasonable to assume that the volatility of B shares is also less than that of the corresponding 
A shares. 
 
B shares have a lower trading volume than corresponding A shares. This leads to B shares 
exhibiting a lower volatility than A shares. Another factor that can be seen to contribute to 
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residents in June 2001 and the A share market to overseas investors in December 2002. A 
share prices fluctuated more frequently than B share prices around that time. This also 
increased the volatility of these shares.  
 
The last row of Table 5.4 (in appendix C.3) presents the average differences for drifts and 
volatilities.  -statistics show only the average differences in volatilities as positive and 
significant. Thus, it is safe to say that as a whole the volatility of A shares is higher than that 
of B shares. 
 
5.5.2.2: Market Price of Risk with Constant Volatility 
 
Table 5.4 in appendix C.3 presents the estimation results of the market price of risk and 
volatility terms. It has been shown that A and B shares have different expected returns    but 
those differences are not significant. Table 5.4 shows that this is also the same for the market 
price of risk, that is, the difference between the market price of risk for the two types of 
shares       is positive for most pairs, but the difference is not significant. However, the 
level is not the same as the difference between the expected returns       dealt with in the 
previous subsection. 
 
The t-values are bigger than those of the expected returns. This means that as a whole the 
market price of risk for A shares is higher but not significantly so than that for B shares, as 















            Figure 5.6: The Market price of risk terms of   shares (Solid line)  
                                       and the corresponding   shares (dotted line) 
 
This makes sense because both A and B shares are issued by the same company and have 
virtually the same voting rights and dividends. Thus, A and B shares should have the same 
market price of risk and the same return, as this study has shown. However, the difference in 
prices is caused by different risk-free rates and different volatilities. 
 
All in all, the empirical results confirm that the price discount is closely related to different 
volatilities. However, there is no significant difference between the market prices of risk for 
these twin shares.  
 
5.5.2.3: The Sharpe Ratio 
 
Table 5.5 in appendix C.4 presents the estimation results of the Sharpe ratio, as well as the 
drift and the volatility values using historical data related to the A and B shares.  
 
Table 5.5 illustrates several features of these estimated parameters. First, all of the drift and 
90% of the volatility terms of the A shares are larger than those of the corresponding B 
shares. In the last row in Table 5.5, an averaged difference for drifts and volatilities is 
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to say that both the expected returns and the volatility values for   shares are higher than 
those for B shares.    
 
This study has shown that A shares have a higher expected return   and volatility   than 
corresponding B shares. Table 5.5 illustrates the finding that this is also the same for the 
Sharpe ratio, that is, the difference between the Sharpe ratio          is positive for all 




                     Figure 5.7: The Sharpe ratio terms of   shares (Solid line)  
                                             and the corresponding   shares (dotted line) 
 
From the last row, in which the averaged differences are presented, it is clear that the three 
(return, volatility and Sharpe ratio) are all positive and significant at a level of 10%. This 




This chapter first investigated the difference between the market price of risk and the Sharpe 
ratio for several companies listed on the JSE. In obtaining the market price of risk, the stock 
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free rate and the market price of risk-multiplying volatility. The market price of risk was 
assumed to be constant and time-independent. The Maximum Likelihood Method was 
adopted to estimate the market price of risk. 
 
The Maximum Likelihood Estimation Method was adopted to estimate the Sharpe ratio. By 
this method was the basis from which to compare the two risk measurements, as both of them 
are forward-looking risk-measurement tools.  
 
The result shows that all Sharpe ratio terms were larger than the market price of risk terms, 
but the t-value was not significant for the difference, at the level of 1%.  From the results we 
can demonstrate that the Sharpe ratio    obtained via (5.3) is as efficient as the market price 
of risk    obtained in (5.6) 
 
Secondly, this chapter investigated the behaviour of the corresponding stock prices in 
segmented markets: the stock prices of A and B shares for domestic and foreign investors. 
Both the A and B shares were issued by the same company, with the same voting rights and 
the same dividends, yet they are held by different investors and priced differently. The   
shares are priced at a significant discount compared to the corresponding A shares. The GBM 
model was adopted to describe the dynamics of the stock prices. Firstly, the price discount 
can be explained by the higher volatility of the A shares. Furthermore, the market price of risk 
for A shares B shares is almost identical and the difference between them is not significant at 
a level of 1% for all companies. It was concluded that the difference in prices is caused by 
different risk-free rates and different volatilities. However, the historical estimation of the 
Sharpe ratio for A shares B shares suggests that the different price level between A shares B 
shares has resulted in a difference in the Sharpe ratio between them. The return, volatility and 
Sharpe ratio for A shares are all significantly larger than those of the corresponding B shares. 
This result suggests holding A shares is less risky than holding B shares. Thus, the different 















5.7: Appendix C 
 
5.7.1: C.1 The probability density function 
 
In the following procedure, we assume that the time to liquidation     is a constant 
number, our interest is to test the difference in expected returns      , and furthermore if it 
is significant, whether this difference is caused by different market price of risk for   and   
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The log likelihood function of the whole data series is  
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     5.7.2: C.2 Sharpe ratio and Market price of risk estimation for JSE 
  
       Table 5.3: Sharpe ratio and Market price of risk estimation for JSE (totally 13) 
 
Sharpe Ratio Market Price of Risk The Significant Different 
 
                                         
     






AFRICAN BANK  0.347 0.366 0.550 0.281 0.364 0.192 0.066 0.003 0.358 












BHP BILLITON  0.384 0.285 0.827 0.318 0.261 0.766 0.066 0.024 0.061 












FIRSTRAND 0.954 0.213 3.682 0.908 0.284 2.641 0.046 -0.071 1.041 












GOLD FIELDS -0.294 0.380 -1.836 -0.261 0.507 -1.045 -0.033 -0.128 -0.791 












HARMONY GOLD  0.395 0.485 0.380 0.200 0.496 0.227 0.195 -0.011 0.153 












IMPALA PLATINUM 0.476 0.304 1.043 0.331 0.377 0.541 0.145 -0.073 0.502 












MITTAL SA  1.120 0.202 5.362 1.001 0.233 3.882 0.119 -0.031 1.480 












MTN GROUP 1.187 0.282 4.048 1.191 0.379 2.684 -0.004 -0.096 1.364 












PICK N PAY STORE 0.354 0.147 1.725 0.309 0.204 0.808 0.045 -0.057 0.917 












STANDARD BK 0.041 0.218 -0.798 -0.067 0.303 -0.633 0.108 -0.085 -0.165 












SASOL 0.736 0.241 2.881 0.764 0.303 1.700 -0.029 -0.062 1.181 












STEINHOFF  -0.348 0.169 -3.354 -0.217 0.264 -1.842 -0.130 -0.095 -1.512 












TELKOM 0.270 0.150 1.091 0.217 0.216 0.418 0.054 -0.067 0.673 










     0.061      -0.053   0.336 






       :           the value in parentheses are the t-statistics * Significance level of 10%, ** Significance level of       














    
   5.7.3: C.3 Market price of risk estimation for SSE  
     Table 5.4: Market price of risk estimation for fifteen companies listed in SSE (March. 10, 2008 – May. 30, 2008) 
 
                The Significant Different 
                                      
                 





 (0.072) (15.799) (0.273) 











 (-0.084) (16.957) (0.136) 











 (0.091) (14.644) (0.256) 






Huaxin Cement -1.116 0.628 -1.908 0.088 0.639 -0.005 -1.204 -0.012 -1.903 
   
 
  
 (-0.351) (-0.985) (-0.356) 











 (0.061) (2.305) (0.049) 






SGSB Group -1.609 0.636 -2.380 -1.728 0.463 -4.069 0.119 0.174*** 1.689 
   
 
  
 (0.043) (14.481) (0.341) 











 (-0.177) (14.992) (-0.020) 











 (0.409) (6.157) (0.422) 






Shanghai Dingli  -1.884 0.682 -2.899 -2.053 0.638 -3.491 0.169 0.044*** 0.593 




 (0.053) (3.762) (0.121) 











 (-0.022) (11.483) (0.048) 











 (-0.261) (15.691) (-0.051) 






Shanghai Jinjiang  -1.812 0.550 -3.492 -1.100 0.401 -2.949 -0.711 0.148*** -0.543 




 (-0.311) (21.485) (-0.113) 






Shanghai Jinqiao  -2.293 0.614 -3.984 -2.094 0.449 -5.054 -0.200 0.165*** 1.070 




 (-0.077) (12.425) (0.220) 











 (-0.135) (15.365) (0.092) 
















 -0.125 0.127*** 0.552 
   
 
  
 (-0.037) (12.069) (0.118) 
        :           ,         and        , the value in parentheses are the t-statistics.                             














     5.7.4: C.4  Sharpe Ratio Estimation for SSE  
    Table 5.5: Sharpe ratio estimation for fifteen companies listed on SSE (March. 10, 2008 – May. 30, 2008) 
 
                The Significant Different 
                                  
        
                 





 (3.126) (15.843) (7.174) 











 (7.014) (17.169) (13.220) 











 (5.194) (14.609) (8.004) 






Huaxin Cement -0.862 0.635 -1.390 -1.154 0.644 -1.845 0.292*** -0.009 0.455*** 
   
 
  
 (5.437) (-0.782) (5.353) 











 (2.722) (2.454) (3.073) 






SGSB Group -0.395 0.642 -0.589 -1.308 0.466 -2.839 0.914*** 0.176*** 2.250*** 
   
 
  
 (11.737) (14.630) (17.555) 











 (1.918) (15.145) (4.715) 











 (5.830) (6.191) (6.688) 






Shanghai Dingli  -0.297 0.687 -0.414 -1.011 0.644 -1.549 0.714*** 0.044*** 1.135*** 




 (6.826) (3.736) (7.660) 











 (2.406) (11.464) (4.669) 











 (5.025) (15.745) (9.326) 






Shanghai Jinjiang  -0.661 0.552 -1.218 -0.802 0.404 -2.017 0.141** 0.149*** 0.799*** 




 (2.025) (21.424) (6.386) 






Shanghai Jinqiao  -1.045 0.618 -1.696 -1.341 0.453 -3.016 0.296*** 0.165*** 1.320*** 




 (4.244) (12.408) (13.627) 











 (1.325) (15.458) (5.657) 






Zhonglu Co -0.054 0.711 -0.072 -0.942 0.528 -1.757 0.888*** 0.184*** 1.685*** 
   
 
  





 0.400*** 0.128*** 1.070*** 
   
 
  
 (4.935) (12.129) (8.292) 
        :            ,         and          , the value in parentheses are the t-statistics.                             



















6.1.1: The 1990s US Stock Market Bubble 
 
On August 9, 1995, Netscape Communications, a 15-month-old company with no profits and 
whose primary product was distributed for free, held its initial public offering. The stock, 
initially valued at $28 a share, closed the day at $581/4. At that price, the company was valued 
at $2.2 billion. Four months later, Netscape stock was trading at around $170 a share, valuing 
the company at close to $6.5 billion. 
 
Approximately five years later, on March 9, 2000, the technology stock that dominated the 
NASDAQ stock exchange closed for the first time above 5,000. It had risen almost 500% 
since August of 1995. A little over one month later, the NASDAQ had lost 1,727 points and 
in the process eviscerated over $2 trillion in “paper” wealth. An additional $1.5 trillion would 
be lost on the NASDAQ over the next year, much of it extracted from dot-com companies48. 
Once considered among the foundation companies of the new economy, Amazon.com lost 
77% of its stock market value, Yahoo lost 86%, and Priceline.Com lost a shocking 97%. 
 
What caused the dot-com era? Why were massive amounts of capital suddenly invested in a 
completely new (and unproven) industry? Why did millions of investors suddenly value small 
start-up companies more than many industrial stalwarts? Why did hundreds of seasoned, 
                                                             
48
 A dot-com company, or simply a dot-com (alternatively rendered dot.com or dot com), is a company that does most of its business on the 
Internet, usually through a website that uses the popular top-level domain, ".com" (in turn derived from the word "commercial"). “dot com 














experienced managers quit comfortable, safe, and lucrative jobs with Fortune 500 companies 
for the chance at working in a dot-com? And why did all of this suddenly collapse? 
 
Conventional wisdom holds that the answer to these questions is that the dot-com era 
represents a classic “speculative bubble”49.
 
The dot-com era was much like the stock market 
prior to the crash of 1929, England’s experience with the South Sea Company, and the 
famous Dutch example of Tulipmania. It was, they allege, a period of mass hysteria in which 
investors foolishly bid up the price of speculative assets to a ridiculous degree, only to see  
prices collapse when the supply of additional investors eventually ran out. 
 
6.1.2: Measuring Stock Market Bubbles  
 
“Bubble” is not a word specific to the stock market. The initial opinions about so-called price 
bubbles refer to various kinds of assets, such as foreign exchange, gold, real estate, and stock. 
Bubbles have been concerned with driving up all these asset prices. Following Blanchard and 
Watson (1982) who stated that bubbles are more likely to exist in the price of an asset with 
difficult to understand fundamental values, it is expected that bubbles hardly exist if the 
fundamental value of an asset is easily identified. With this idea in mind, it is expected that 
research concerning bubbles is best conducted in stock markets where the fundamental values 
of stocks are unclear.  
 
When discussing stock market bubbles, three questions are often considered. The first is a 
question of whether stock market bubbles exist at all and how to verify them. If the answer to 
the first question is that bubbles do in fact exist, then two valid follow-up questions to ask 
are: what causes stock market bubbles and how can these causes be measured?  
Research concerning rational bubbles has focused on verifying the existence of bubbles, and 
the research field of behavioural finance enriched quantitative price models with the 
introduction of categorised trader behaviours. In other words, behavioural finance studies 
                                                             
49An economic bubble (sometimes referred to as a speculative bubble, a market bubble, a price bubble, a financial bubble, or 













market bubbles by examining the cause of investor behaviour rather than seeking to verify its 
existence, which is the aim of rational bubbles studies. 
 
These two research areas are closely related. For example, a rational bubble is defined as the 
outcome of self-fulfilling behaviours, that is, investors buy stocks and drive the price up, with 
a belief that the price will increase. This scenario includes investor behaviour defined in 
behavioural theories, such as positive feedback trading and arbitrageurs’ anticipatory 
trading50, which are referred to as noise trading or irrationality in behavioural finance.  
 
Two of the three questions pertaining to stock market bubbles described above are topics of 
concern in rational bubbles studies and the field of behavioural finance. The third question is 
not covered by these studies and is therefore examined here. 
 
This chapter employs different Value at Risk (VaR) approaches to measure and detect stock 
market bubbles. VaR was developed in response to the financial disasters of the early 1990s 
that engulfed Orange County, Barings, Daiwa, and many others. The common lesson of these 
crises is that billions of dollars can be lost because of poor supervision and management of 
financial risks. Spurred into action, financial institutions and regulators turned to VaR, an 
easy-to-understand method for quantifying market risk.   
 
The structure of this chapter is as follows: section 6.2 is devoted to a review of current bubble 
theories; section 6.3 is an overview of the analysis framework; section 6.4 examines bubble 
estimations for two countries, US (the NASDAQ) and South Africa (the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange JSE). This section describes the methodology, data and results of this study.  
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6.2: Asset-Price Bubbles: Theoretical Background    
 
This section reviews the literature related to bubble research from the 1980s when the 
financial theory of the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) was challenged by studies of the 
excess volatility of stock prices. The review is also extended to rational bubbles studies and 
behavioural research, which attempt to formulate a framework for the examination of stock 
bubbles to explain the real-world phenomena in recent years.     
 
6.2.1: Review of Research on Stock Market Bubbles 
 
Bubble research is needed to understand the cause of the volatility of stock prices. In order to 
find out the reason for excessive price volatility, two schools of research are utilised. One  
looks for an explanation for stock price volatility from the movement of dividends and 
discount rates respectively. The other analyses stock price fluctuation as a result of bubbles. 
The latter defines a stock price as consisting of two basic components: market fundamentals 
and bubbles. 
 
The bubble corresponding to noise trading and irrationality has been mentioned in the 
literature on superior asset price movements. However, the bubble phenomena shouldn’t be 
confined to studies of irrational investor behaviour. Since the 1980s, rational bubbles have 
been viewed as a reason for capricious behaviours in stock markets, while financial 
economists are vexed about explanations for all financial market behaviours under the EMH. 
For example, Blanchard and Watson (1982) portrayed rational bubbles as the deviation of the 
price from its fundamental value. The market fundamental value of an asset as an intractable 
issue with regard to bubble research and is defined as the present expected discounted value 
of dividends (Flood and Garber, 1980). Diba and Grossman (1988b) developed a more 
theoretical definition which stated that “a rational bubble reflects a self-confirming belief that 













irrelevant, i.e. not part of market fundamentals or of truly relevant variables in a way that 
involves parameters that are not part of market fundamentals.”       
 
6.2.2: Rational Bubbles: Theoretical Perspective and Empirical Studies 
 
The fundamental price model assumes that stock prices equal the present discounted value of 
future cash flows (Lucas, 1978). However, this model has been challenged by many 
theoretical and empirical findings (Shiller, 1981; Leroy and Porter, 1981; Blanchard and 
Watson, 1982). These challenges to the fundamental price model have often been taken as 
evidence for the existence of rational bubbles. The rational bubbles theoretical model is based 
on an expectation formula and is illustrated clearly by West, 1987: 
 
 
                                         (         )                   with                           (6.1) 
 
 
Where    is the observed price at  ,  (         ) is the expected sum of price and 
dividends of the next period with the present information    and   
 
   
 . With the 
assumption of constant discount rate  , the equation (6.1) can be resolved recursively forward 
to get: 
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If the transversality condition                                        is achieved, the observed price equals 
the fundamental value   : 
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Similar to solutions documented in the literature before West (1987), such as Blanchard and 
Watson (1982) and Shiller (1978), the failure of the transversality condition means the 
observed stock price is not equal to the fundamental value   
 
. Thus the price    can be 
thought of as the sum of the fundamental value   
 
 and a bubble   : 
 
                                                       
 
                                                                               (6.4) 
 
 
                                                                   
                                                                              (6.5) 
 
Equation (6.5) implies that an investor who pays for an asset today is expected to be 
rewarded by an even higher value than the fundamental-expected value of the next period.  
 
Therefore, although investors know rationally that the current market price exceeds the 
present value of future dividend payments they still invest in the market (Donaldson and 
Kamstra, 1996). This bubble is considered to be the result of self-fulfilling behaviour which 
is referred to as a rational or speculative bubble.   
 
Researchers raise two issues regarding the non-negative bubble path in the theoretical 
assumption above. First, negative bubbles are impossible if    is a negative value today then 
(6.5) implies that there is a positive probability that at some point    ,      will be negative 
enough to make the price negative. Second, if bubbles exist, they must start on the first day, 
and will not restart after bursts (Diba and Grossman, 1988b). However, these implications 
derived from (6.5) are obviously inconsistent with evidence in the real world.  
 
The evidence of bubbles is based on the rejection of the transversality condition. The 
representative investor model pictures an equilibrium price at which the transversality 
condition is achieved, that is, a competitive agent will always buy undervalued stocks and sell 













equilibrium point (fundamental value). However, this theory is little more than an 
oversimplified conception which pays no attention to the special property of stock markets 
which is that in these markets fundamental values are uncertain. Fundamental values depend 
on future dividends which don’t appear in the present and cannot be forecasted accurately by 
statistical modelling techniques.    
 
As many researchers realised, the above theory is fragile due to the naturally weak 
assumption of equation (6.5). In order to overcome this problem in the initial theory of 
rational bubbles, some new bubble paths are specified. 
 
Blanchard and Watson (1982) as well as West (1987) illustrated two bubble paths. The first 
one is called a deterministic bubble: 
 
                                       
                                                           (6.6) 
 
Another one with an explosive property is accordingly called a stochastic bubble: 
   
 
                     State 1: 
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with probability  ,    
 
(6.7) 
                    State  2:      
     with probability    ,  
    
 
 Where   
  denotes the stochastic bubbles at period  . It is easy to verify that stochastic 
bubbles satisfy equation (6.5). In each period, stochastic bubbles will remain with probability 
  or crash with probability    . Stock prices including these bubbles diverge from the 
fundamental price level, as long as they last. However, when stochastic bubbles crash, the 
stock prices heavily decline to the fundamental price level.  
 
Diba and Grossman (1988b) show that once rational bubbles have crashed, they never restart. 
Stock prices remain at the fundamental price level after the crash of stochastic bubbles. In 














Norden and Schaller (1993) generalized the Blanchard and Watson (1982) bubble paths in 
two ways: first, the probability of collapse is enlarged with the bubble growth; second, the 
model allows the collapsed bubbles to be above zero (partially collapsed).  
 
Afterwards, Diba and Grossman (1988a) mentioned that bubbles periodically shrink. This 
periodically collapsed bubble is illustrated by Evan (1991): 
 
                                                             (   )                                 if         
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                                 (   )                                           (6.8) 
 
  and   are positive parameters, and changes in these can alter the frequency with which 
bubbles erupt and the average length of time before collapse;     
51
  is an exogenous 
independently and identically distributed positive random variable with a mean of 1, and 
    
52 is an exogenous independently and identically distributed Bernoulli process which 
takes the value 1 with a probability of   and 0 with a probability of    .  
 
The characteristics of bubbles can be adjusted by varying the parameters  ,   and  . In (6.8), 
only if     , bubbles grow at a rate of (   ). As long as     ,  bubbles move into an 
eruption pattern until collapse. When bubbles collapse, they fall to a mean value of   , that is, 
bubbles can restart after a collapse.  
 
Periodically collapsing bubbles can be regarded as a combination of stochastic bubbles and 
log-normally distributed bubbles. Periodically collapsing bubbles are more realistic than 
stochastic bubbles since they periodically burst. However, as equation (6.8) shows, 
                                                             
51This follows an exogenous identically and independently log-normal distribution whose mean is 1.  













periodically collapsing bubbles are much more complicated than deterministic bubbles and 
stochastic bubbles. 
 
In order to integrate the foregoing descriptions of bubbles, Fukuta (1998) devised a three-
state bubble model in an incompletely bursting bubble environment. 
 
State 1: the state of large bubbles 
 
     (   ) (
  
  
)   
With probability     
 
State 2: the state of small bubbles 
 
     (   ) (
  
  
)   
With probability     
  
 
State 3: the state of incomplete bursts 
 
     (   ) (
       
       
)   
With probability          (6.9) 
 
Where    and    are arbitrary with assumption of       ,         and  
             this assumption implies that the bubbles never completely crash.   , 
   and         are the probability of each state and they are strictly positive. We can 
easily verify that the bubbles defined by equation (6.9) satisfy equation (6.5) and can thus be 
included in the class of rational bubbles. The condition of (       ) (       )  
            is also assumed. Based on this and some assumptions, we can show that 
      in state 1 is larger than     
     in state 3 is smaller than     
Hence, state 1, state 2 and state 3 can be referred to as a large bubble state, a small bubble 














With various assumptions of   and  , (6.9) can be transformed into the same category of 
other bubble models described before (Deterministic bubbles, Stochastic bubbles and 
Periodically bubbles). This work follows Fukuta (1998) in assuming bubbles can have three 
states; a large bubble state, a small bubble state an incomplete burst state. Only incomplete 
burst state       is smaller than   , thus we can detect this bubble stage using VaR as long as 
VaR can be interpreted as a worst case scenario which involves an extreme event with a small 
chance of occurring within a time horizon. This belief leads us to an innovative work on 
measuring bubbles.  
 
As a parsimonious alternative to the theory of rational bubbles, Froot and Obstfeld (1991) 
defined an intrinsic bubble which is the function of only dividends. The idea stems from a   
belief that bubbles are generated from an overreaction regarding dividend news, and the 
model appears to fit the data in the US stock market during both the 1960s and 1970s. 
However, at the same time, this model with the newly defined bubble is inconsistent with the 
conventional description of fundamental values which is defined as inconsistent with the 
bubble as a concept.  
 
However, overreaction-driven bubbles should in fact generally be free dividends, although 
they are the result of news about dividends. For example, investors push up the price by 
buying stocks because they believe the fundamental value of stocks will increase due to the 
good news about dividends. Since investors are heterogeneous, and no two can ever react 
identically, different levels of overreaction are not due to dividends but to the heterogeneity 
of investors’ decisions. Therefore, the intrinsic bubble seems to lack a sound theoretical 
foundation. 
 
Improvements in the bubble assumption have further developed the rational bubble theory. 
However, one problem remains; it is still quite difficult to mimic a bubble path, since bubbles 














6.2.3: Bubbles in Behavioural Studies       
 
While rational bubble theorists struggle to extend the efficient market theory to a more 
realistic model of rational bubbles, with the accumulation of theoretical challenges and 
empirical deviations, the substance of EMH has been eroded. Instead, a new set of 
explanations of empirical regularities, as well as a new set of predictions, has generated 
behavioural finance, as a study of human fallibility in competitive markets. The behavioural 
economists contend that “financial markets are not expected to be efficient and the market 
efficiency only emerges as an extreme special case unlikely to hold under plausible 
circumstances” (Shleifer, 2000). Shiller (2002) similarly asserted that the efficient market 
theory is only “a half-truth”. While irrational traders are often depicted as “noise traders” and 
rational traders are as “arbitrageurs” who cultivate riskless and costless profit in their 
investment, behavioural finance theorists argue that the strategies adopted by rational 
investors are not necessarily arbitrages since they are often risky and costly. As a result, 
mispricing can remain unchallenged (Thaler, 2005).     
   
Shleifer (2000) summarises three areas in which investors deviate from the standard decision 
making model: attitudes toward risk, non-Bayesian expectation formation, and sensitivity of 
decision. In addition, Black (1986) indicates that many investors trade on noise rather than 
information, namely “noise traders” or “unsophisticated traders”. When investors’ beliefs 
conform to the psychological evidence rather than the economic model, this is referred to as 
“investor sentiment”. 
 
Two major foundations of behavioural finance theory are “limited arbitrage” and “investor 
sentiment”, which are in direct contradiction of the principal assumption of EMH – the 
irrelevance of irrationality. Under EMH, markets are viewed as fully rational, since irrational 
trading strategies are uncorrelated and offset each other. Rational arbitrageurs, who 
“simultaneous purchase and sale the same or essentially similar security in two different 













fundamental values and squeeze the irrational traders out of the market. As the alternative 
approach to the study of the financial markets, behavioural finance aims to theoretically and 
empirically model the real world, in which “arbitrage is risky and therefore limited” and 
investors form their beliefs by sentiment. Although the initial aim of those models is to 
display a price forming process with a consideration of investors’ psychological factors, there 
are some strong resemblances to notions on bubble theories in the models. Four models, 
namely the noise trader risk model, the model of relative returns of noise traders and 
arbitrageurs, the model of investor sentiment and the positive feedback model, are reviewed 
below with the intention of identifying some pioneering ideas about bubbles in the 
behavioural finance field. 
 
With regard to research on arbitrage, DeLong et al (1990) defined two kinds of risks that 
arbitrageurs may face. The first is the risk caused by imperfect substitutes of securities, and 
the second is called “noise trader risk”53. The latter is the ossibility that mispricing becomes 
worse due to noise trading. Furthermore, Shleifer (2000) introduces two models which are 
against the assumption of rational markets. One is a pricing function which describes how 
noise traders affect the price (for more details refer to Shleifer (2000)).  
 
The central point of the noise trader risk model described by Shleifer (2000) is to identify the 
impact of noise traders on the stock price, which implies a self-evident extrapolation that the 
price deviation can be traced to the irrational behaviours of noise traders. In other words, 
from the standpoint of bubble research, noise trading behaviours contribute to the bubble by 
keeping arbitrageurs from driving prices back to their fundamental value. This calls for 
another model which is concerned with the misperception of EMH about the noise trader, that 
is, it is not always the case that noise traders are weeded out of markets since they can earn a 
higher return than the arbitrageurs. The view is obtained by analysing the expected difference 
between noise traders’ and arbitrageurs’ total return (Shleifer, 2000). 
                                                             
53This is the risk that noise traders’ beliefs become even more extreme before they revert to the mean. “An arbitrageur 
selling an asset short when bullish noise traders have driven its price up must remember that noise traders might become 
even more bullish tomorrow, and so must take a position that accounts for the risk of a further price rise when he has to buy 














The implication of the behavioural models discussed above for the study of bubbles is clear. 
First, financial markets are not efficient due to the persistent presence of irrationality. Second, 
the deviation of prices from fundamental values, the so-called bubble, is the outcome of noise 
trading. 
 
The model of investor sentiment is devoted to the simulation of belief formation using 
psychological theories. There are two important psychological phenomena involved: 
representativeness and conservatism. As a result of representativeness, “people see patterns in 
truly random sequences” (Shleifer, 2000). The slow updating of models in the face of new 
evidence is the result of conservatism (Edwards, 1968). The two psychological phenomena 
are responsible for investors’ overreaction and the underreaction of prices. A model of 
investor sentiment introduced by Shleifer (2000) illustrates the deviation of the price from its 
“correct value” as a result of investors’ ignorance of randomly walking earnings. Instead, the 
price is modelled as an expectation formula, not as a set of random true numbers.  
 
The term “bubble” appeared in behavioural research in the positive feedback trading theory 
and bubbles are considered to occur in a situation of price soaring without news. Three kinds 
of investors, namely noise traders, passive investors and arbitrageurs, are identified in the 
model. Since noise traders are positive feedback traders who buy securities after prices rise 
and sell after prices fall, they play the role of trend chasing. In contrast, passive investors, 
who do not play an active role in the business, will purchase investments with the intention of 
long-term appreciation and limited maintenance. Meanwhile, the stabilising power of 
arbitrage is challenged, because arbitrageurs amplify positive feedback trading, that is, 
arbitrageurs who buy more today based on superior information will stimulate buying more 
tomorrow, and drive prices above fundamental values. The model of positive feedback 
trading explains the bubble as a result of price-chasing-up behaviours after arbitrageurs’ 
anticipatory pumping up of the price, for more details see Scheinkman and Xiong (2003), 














6.3: Defining a Bubble: Empirical Framework 
 
Concerning bubble research, two opposite arguments are presented: the notion of the 
existence of bubbles and the view that there are no bubbles. Theorists arguing against bubbles 
try to construct a fundamental estimation model which matches the observed price through 
analyses of historical data. For example, Donaldson and Kamstra (1996) used the neural 
network technique to generate a satisfactory result. However, their simulated fundamental 
path still fails to overlap with the observed actual price movement, although their bubble-
dismissing result is verified on the basis of the unit root test, their method is questionable. 
 
The argument for the existence of bubbles is supported by the belief that a stock price 
consists of two parts: the fundamental value and the excess value over the fundamental value. 
However, all existing bubble testing methods enable us to test the existence of bubbles over a 
time period, but not to estimate bubbles at a particular point in time. This problem imposes a 
serious discrepancy in studying bubbles and, in particular, in studying what determines 
bubbles, due to the failure of the method to estimate bubble changes over time. This problem 
calls for rethinking of current methods in estimating bubbles. Can we really estimate the 
magnitude of bubbles at a point in time (a crash, for instance)? Bearing this question in mind, 
this study takes a new approach to investigate bubbles, which is fundamentally different from 
existing approaches in terms of its theoretical framework and statistical estimation method. 
 
The fundamental notion of our work is that bubbles persist in the stock market. This opinion 
can be traced to the work of Binswanger (1999), in which persistent bubbles are considered to 
be sustainable if bubbles move with the development of a real economy. His empirical work 
in 2000 further verified and highlighted the persistence of bubbles since the early 1980s.  
 
Summers (1986) documented the finding that both theoretical and empirical considerations 
suggest the existence of continuous and substantial deviations from fundamental values. In 
fact, many researchers, such as West (1988), Shiller (1984), and Debondt and Thaler (1985), 













fad. Furthermore, Lee (1998) and Chung and Lee (1998) empirically identified fads in several 
stock markets. However, there is no general agreement concerning the distinction between 
fads and bubbles. For example, following Cochrane (1991), Lee (1998) and Chung and Lee 
(1998) considered price deviations which slowly return to fundamental values as fads, 
whereas bubbles are expected to continue until bursts occur. Conversely, Shiller (1988) 
defined a bubble as a fad if the influence of the fad occurs through prices. Faced with this 
confusion, Bingswanger (2004) did not distinguish between bubbles and fads. Instead, he 
interpreted persistent deviations of stock prices from fundamental values as bubbles. This 
work follows Bingswanger’s view that any non-fundamental components in stock prices, 
except for statistical noises, will be recognised as bubbles which are persistent in a stock 
market and these assumptions exclude exceptional shocks at a point in time. This belief leads 
to an innovative method of measuring bubbles.  
 
Our work will follow rational bubbles studies and will stem from two basic opinions: firstly, 
bubbles persist in stock markets since they result from optimistic beliefs and speculative 
behaviours which dominate the market always. Accordingly, our work follows Fukuta (1998) 
in which he presents a class of rational bubbles called “incompletely bursting bubbles”. He 
determined these bubbles have three states: a large bubble state, a small bubble state and an 
incomplete burst state. Only in the incomplete burst state is       smaller than    as 
explained in section 6.2.2 and described in figure 6.1, that is, the expected bubble tomorrow 
is less than the bubble today. Secondly, the incomplete burst bubble state where only        is 
smaller than    can be detected using VaR as long as VaR can be used to estimate the 






































             
 Figure 6.1 The figure suggests the asset price consists of two parts: the fundamental value and bubble term. The fundamental value grows at risk free interest 
rate. The bubble term is always persistent in the price and has only 3 possible states; a large state, a small state and incomplete burst state. The figure 
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The standard model of stock prices: 
 
Let us assume that the stock price is 
composed of the fundamental price 
level,   , which is represented by the 
expected discount value of future 
dividends and rational bubbles,    
 
         
 








   
     
     













VaR is a worst case scenario with regard to loss, when an unlikely extreme event occurs 
within a time horizon under normal market conditions, whereas a stock bubble is an abnormal 
potential profit which is usually followed by an abnormal loss of a stock of financial 
instruments under abnormal market conditions. A bubble burst must violate the value of VaR, 
and therefore, we can use VaR to detect the downside (burst) of the bubble. In this work VaR 
is used as a benchmark for a bubble. Any violation of this benchmark will be recognised as 
the result of a bubble burst.  
 
6.4: Empirical Method for Testing Bubbles in two Countries 
 
This study concerns the status of market efficiency in the NASDAQ and JSE as a starting 
point of an investigation of stock market bubbles. The variance bound test presented by 
Shiller and Leroy and Porter (1981) will be employed for this purpose for each market. The 
methodology as far as VaR is concerned is presented next. 
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where   is the price of a stock,    is the change of price of the stock,   is the expected return, 
   is a period of time, and     is the white noise for the path of the stock price. 
 
Assuming that the percentage return of the stock price in a short period of time is normally 
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where    is a small time interval,      is the mean of the normal distribution and  √    is the 
standard deviation. By Ito’s Lemma, the following lognormal property can be derived for 
stock price.   , at a future time  , where     is the stock price at time zero. 
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A continuously compounded annual rate of return for stock price is defined as  , and 
therefore it follows that 
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Therefore, 
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Alone with equation (6.12), we can see that    has the following normal distribution property 
with mean as   
  
 
 and standard deviation of  
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                 (6.15) 
 
The volatility of a stock is now defined as a measure of the uncertainty about the returns of 




, where    , so the annual volatility of the stock is  . It also can be understood 
that the daily volatility of the stock would be  
 
√   
, when using 252 trading days per year.  
 
When we discuss the daily returns of stock, it is reasonable to assume that the expected return 
would be zero, because in such a short time horizon, the expected return is relatively small. 
Therefore, based on the normality property in equation (6.15), it can be easily estimated that 













rates of returns will be greater than -2.33 times the daily volatility. If the VaR indicates how 
much actual amount of money might be lost for a portfolio at 1% of chance in 1 day, the VaR 
is equal to       
 
√   
  , where the   is the current value in dollars (Rand) of the portfolio. 
Thus, the general formula of VaR would be  
 
                                     (      )       √                                              (6.16) 
 
Where 
                                                    (      √  )                                                (6.17) 
 
Here,   is the left tail percentage of the distribution,    is the absolute value of a negative 
return and  ,   is the number of standard deviations according to   and Pr(.) is the 
probability based on the distribution. When   is set as 1% or 5%, then   would be 2.33 and 
1.645 respectively for a normal distribution. In practice,   needs to be selected as small as 
possible to catch external events, and 1% has been pretty much a standard setting in the 
financial sector. One key point is that no matter how small   is, as long as it is finite, there 
will always be some probability that extreme events may occur far away from the VaR 
estimation.   
 
The basic concept of VaR is appealing because it is not difficult to estimate compared to 
other market risk measure instruments. Most methods use prior data of returns of financial 
assets to estimate the VaR. However, when using historical data for estimation of current 
behaviours, there is one key question to be clarified: are the patterns of past analysis 
sufficient to predict current patterns? In VaR practice, it is necessary to understand the 
behaviour of distributions for returns of financial assets and be able to make proper 
assumptions when needed. It needs to be confirmed that such distributions are constant over 














Existing models need to have a general framework in order to calculate VaR. The first step is 
to estimate the distribution of portfolio returns. Then it is necessary to select the basic 
parameters (time horizon, confidence level, time of measurement), and VaR calculation. 
These models differ with regard to how the estimation is distributed. As mentioned 
previously, the existing models can be organised into three categories: parametric, 
nonparametric and semiparametric models. The focus on this chapter will be on the non- 
parametric model, simply because the non- parametric model includes historical simulation 
and the Monte Carlo approach, drop any assumption about the distribution shape of the risk 
factors. Chapter three provides a full description of the Historical simulation approach as well 
as Monte Carlo simulation testing procedures.  
 
6.4.1: Data Description 
 
The published empirical research on the study of bubbles is based on time-series data related 
to stock prices and dividends (Shiller, 1981; West, 1984; Campbell and Shiller, 1987; Evans, 
1991; and McQueen and Thorley, 1994). The stock price of a market is represented by stock 
price indices, including Standard & Poor’s Index, the modified Dow-Jones Index, the Hang 
Seng Index and the Shanghai Stock Index54. Real monthly returns for both equally and value-
weighted portfolios of all New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) stocks have also been used in 
this type of research (McQueen and Thorley, 1994).  
 
Similarly, the main dataset employed by this chapter is from two different stock price indices: 
the JSE All Share Index and the NASDAQ-100 Index55. 
 
                                                             
54The observed prices and dividends from Standard & Poor’s index are frequently used by researchers, such as Shiller 
(1981), West (1987), Froot and Obstfeld (1991), and Donaldson and Kamstra (1996). Flood and Hodrick (1986) developed a 
new empirical analysis using S&P and the modified Dow Jones Index respectively.  
 
55The reason of choosing these 2 different markets is to test the capability of my proposed test to detect bubbles in a big 
market like NASDAQ during the Dot.com Bubble (1995-2000) and its capability to detect bubbles in a relatively smaller 













 The data employed for efficient market estimation include the JSE All Share Price Index, 
dividends on the Index and the South African (SA) T-bill 91 days (as a proxy for the risk-free 
interest rate for SA) from 10.07.1995 to 10.03.2009.  
 
The NASDAQ-100 Price Index, dividends on the Index and the United States (US) T-bill 91 
days (as a proxy for the risk-free interest rate for US) from 10.07.1994 to 10.07.2009 will 
also be employed for testing the efficiency of the NASDAQ-100.  
 
 The data employed for VaR calculation via historical simulation include the JSE All Share 
Price Index from 10.07.1995 to 10.03.2009, as well as the NASDAQ-100 Price Index from 
10.07.1994 to 10.07.2009. A 90% and 95% confidence level, 100 time horizon and a one 
month holding period are specified for VaR parameters.  
 
For obtaining VaR via the Monte Carlo Simulation method, the stock prices (represented by 
stock price indices) were assumed to follow GBM. The JSE All Share Price index from 
10.12.2003 to 10.03.2009 as well as the NASDAQ-100 Price Index from 10.07.1994 to 
10.07.2009 was employed. A 90% and 95% confidence level, 5,000 simulations and a one 
month holding period are specified for VaR parameters (for more details about the Monte 
Carlo Simulation method when stock prices are assumed to follow GBM refer to equation 3.3 
in chapter three) 56.  
 
6.4.2: Empirical Estimation and Results 
 
6.4.2.1: Efficiency in the NASDAQ and JSE  
 
In order to test excessive price volatility, Shiller (1981) first employed Standard and Poor’s 
series data that have been used by most of the subsequent researchers. He defined separately 
                                                             
56All the data was obtained from the Inet-Bridge and DataStream databases in the University of Cape Town Library. The 
date for the data collection was the 2nd of October 2009. However, monthly data were used throughout the analysis and for 













“perfect foresight rational price”  , which is the present discounted value of actual 
dividends, and its optimal forecast value-actual price  . He proposed that if markets are 
efficient, the actual price  , which is the expected discounted value of future dividends, 
should have less variance than   , since the expected value of a set of numbers must be more 
stable than the numbers themselves, from which the variance bound inequality  ( )   (  ) 
is deduced. The results of his statistical tests and the plot analysis give a positive answer to 
the question of whether stock prices move too much to be justified by changes in dividends.  
 
Meanwhile, LeRoy and Porter (1981) undertook a similar test by incorporating the earnings 
variable in the model. They reach the same conclusion as Shiller (1981) which is that stock 
prices are too volatile to be explained by the efficient capital market model. However, this 
study concerns the status of market efficiency in the NASDAQ and JSE as a starting point for 
the main investigation of stock market bubbles. The Shiller (1981) test was applied to data 
from the NASDA-100 Index and the JSE All Share Index to test the efficiency of these 
markets. Interesting results were obtained, as shown in Figures 6.2 and 6.3 below:  
    
 
Figure 6.2: The NASDAQ 100 Stock Price Index (solid line p) and ex-post rational price (dotted line p*), 





























The findings on the NASDAQ (Figure 6.2) are consistent with Shiller’s findings which 
provide evidence of stock market inefficiency; because the ability to predict prices would 
indicate that all available information was not already reflected in stock prices. This result 
showed that the actual stock price movement from 1998 to 2000 is too large to be explained 
by changes in fundamentals. Therefore, the efficient market hypothesis, the notion that stocks 
already reflect all available information, may not be correct or stock market bubbles would be 
likely to exist in this market.  
 
However, the findings on the JSE stock market, as illustrated in Figure 6.3, are also 
consistent with Shiller’s findings which provide evidence of stock market inefficiency, where 
the actual stock price movement is too large to be explained by changes in the fundamentals 
from 2006 to 2008, suggesting evidence of bubbles during this peri d. 
 
 
Figure 6.3: The JSE All Stock Price Index (solid line p) and ex-post rational price (dotted line p*), 
10.07.1994-10.07.2009, the variable p* is the present value of actual subsequent real detrended dividends. 
 
Accordingly, this shows, as Blanched and Watson (1982) indicated, that fundamentals are 
only part of what determines the price of assets, and there can be rational deviations of the 


























Many assumptions with regard to bubble movements have been documented in the 
literatures, as discussed in section 6.2. Unfortunately, these efforts do not dramatically 
improve the authenticity of the theory; in fact they make work around bubble research 
ambiguous due to their unrealistic assumptions on bubble paths. In particular, in the 
conventional theory of Blanchard’s bubbles57, bubbles are assumed to crash completely and 
never restart thereafter; in other words bubbles are assumed to crash only once, which is 
apparently an unrealistic assumption. In order to overcome shortcomings in former research, 
improvements in bubble modelling were made by Fukuta (1998). A new three-state bubble 
model, namely incompletely bursting bubbles, was designed by him. In this new model, 
bubble paths are classified into three states: a large bubble state, a small bubble state and an 
incomplete burst state, which integrates and enhances previous bubble models by exhibiting a 
more reasonable picture of rational bubbles, in which bubbles are allowed to occur again after 
incomplete crashes. This work follows Fukuta’s view that bubbles persist in the stock market 
and incomplete crashes follow the bubble state. Next VaR will be employed to detect and 
measure the incomplete crashes stage in the selected data, as suggested by Fukuta (1998). If 
the worst loss suggested by VaR was violated by the actual stock price fluctuation, then this 
will be considered to be the result of incomplete crashes which follow a bubble state. To the 
best of the researcher’s knowledge, no one has previously used VaR as a measurement of 
stock market bubbles.   
 
6.4.2.2: VaR and Bubble Detection  
 
The VaR analysis results on the NASDAQ-100 Index are reported in figure 6.5 and 6.7 in 
appendix D.1 and D.2 respectively. The VaR results on the JSE All Share Index are reported 
in figure 6.9 and 6.11, also in appendix D.1 and D.2 respectively. The VaR return estimates 
for each method are compared with the realized returns each month. The numbers of 
violations of the VaR estimates were counted, and the ratio of violations to the length of the 
                                                             













testing period was compared with the critical value. This was done for several critical values. 
This is perhaps the simplest possible testing procedure.  
 
Starting with the NASDAQ, the historical simulation VaR were shown to have been violated 
from May 2000 until early 2001 and in the last quarter of 2008, as figure 6.5 in appendix D.1 
illustrates. VaR via Monte Carlo simulation were also violated in the same periods as shown 
in figure 6.6 in appendix D.2. The violations of VaR obtained via historical simulation were 
larger than the violations of VaR obtained via Monte Carlo simulation. These results are very 
much correlated with this study’s EMH test on the NASDAQ-100 Index, shown in figure 6.2, 
which provided evidence of stock market inefficiency and showed that actual stock price 
movement from 1998 to 2000 is too large to be explained by changes in fundamentals which 
correspond to the “dot-com bubble” during the period 1998 to March 2000. The VaR results 
show that VaR was first violated on May 2000 through to early 2001which corresponds to the 
dot-com bubble burst on March 10, 2000 and thereafter.  
 
The same story was documented in the 2008 NASDAQ stock market crash. The market was 
inefficient by deviating from the market fundamental as suggested by EMH and rational 
bubble theory, and then the market crashed, as our VaR results demonstrated.    
 
The case was very similar with regard to the JSE, where the historical simulation VaR were 
violated from 2006 until early 2009, as figure 6.9 in appendix D.1 illustrates. VaR via Monte 
Carlo simulation were also violated during the same period, as shown in figure 6.11 in 
appendix D.2. The violations of VaR obtained via historical simulation were also larger than 
the violations of VaR obtained via Monte Carlo simulation. These results show that the JSE 
All Share Index experienced market bubbles six times followed by six occurrences of 
incomplete bursting bubbles, as figure 6.9 and 5.11 show (appendix D.1 and D.2 respectively). 
This result confirms that bubbles persist in the stock market, as we assumed and these 















Our VaR results show that VaR has successfully detected all crashes occurring in the 
NASDAQ and JSE markets during our data period. Accordingly, EMH and rational bubbles 
estimations are good measures to verify the existence of bubble states in general and VaR is a 
good indicator for the presence of bubbles in the market, where any violation of VaR are 
considered as bubble crashes. 
 
6.5:  Conclusion  
 
Ongoing research on stock bubbles can be divided into two fields: the study of rational 
bubbles and behavioural finance. Rational bubbles studies attempt to verify the existence of 
bubbles based on diversified assumptions of bubble paths and advanced econometrics 
techniques. As opposed to EMH, behavioural finance argues that deviations in asset prices 
are brought about by the presence of traders who are not fully rational (Thaler, 2005). 
However, neither of these approaches has studied bubbles through detecting them at a certain 
point of time. This limitation calls for alternative research on bubbles which is the aim of this 
chapter of our study.  
 
This chapter investigates the presence of rational speculative bubbles in the NASDAQ and 
JSE stock markets by employing different VaR techniques to detect and measure a stock 
market bubble. In this study, the Monte Carlo simulation model, as well as the historical 
simulation method were employed to compute VaR.  
 
Using monthly data, we report the existence of rational speculative bubbles in the NASDAQ-
100 stock market during 1998-2000 and a bubble burst in 2000-2001 related to the dot-com 
bubble and the crisis thereafter. We also report the existence of rational speculative bubbles 
















6.6: Appendix D  
 6.6.1: D.1 Indexes Performances and VaR Historical Simulation Approach 
 
Figure 6.4: A fifteen year graph of the Nasdaq 100 tells the story. From early 1994 to the late summer 
of two-thousand and nine the tech-heavy index skyrocketed from 1,000 points to 5,000. Investors felt 
the profit potential for some technology companies was so great they bid up the price of their stocks 
to hundreds of times earnings. 
 
Figure 6.5: Reports a comparison of NASDAQ-100 price index fluctuations with 90% and 95% 111                        




























NASDAQ 100 Real Change of Price Index & Historical Simulation VaR  




















Figure 6.8: A six years graph of JSE All Share Index Performance, from early 2003 to early of two-
thousand and nine.  
 
 
Figure 6.9: JSE All Share price index fluctuations with 90% and 95% VaR obtained 1111                    
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JSE Real Change of All Price Index & Historical Simulation VaR  



















6.6.2: D.2 Indexes Performances and VaR Monte Carlo Simulation Approach 
 
 
Figure 6.6: A fifteen year graph of the Nasdaq 100 tells the story. From early 1994 to the late summer 
of two-thousand and nine the tech-heavy index skyrocketed from 1,000 points to 5,000. Investors felt 
the profit potential for some technology companies was so great they bid up the price of their stocks 
to hundreds of times earnings. 
 
 
Figure 6.7: Reports a comparison of NASDAQ 100 price index fluctuations with 90% and95% 111                       



























NASDAQ Real change of Price Index & 95% and 90% Monte Carlo Simulation  




















Figure 6.10: Six years graph of JSE All Share Index Performance, from early 2003 to early of 
two-thousand and nine. 
 
 
Figure 6.11  Reports a comparison of JSE All Share price fluctuation with 90% and 95% VaR, 111                       
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Chapter 7  
  
Conclusions and Future Work 
 
 
7.1: Conclusions  
 
Volatilities play an important role in financial economics and especially in the valuation of 
various types of options. Volatility is not directly observable in the market. Volatility can 
only be estimated in the context of a model. Black-Scholes pricing models have been widely 
used among pricing models. A prediction of the Black-Scholes formula is that all option 
prices on the same underlying security with the same expiration date but with different 
exercise prices should have the same implied volatility. The primary focus of the first paper 
in this thesis was to test the accuracy of the implied volatility derived from the Black-Scholes 
model. The study also investigates the volatility smile in a South African context.  
 
The empirical findings show that the implied Black-Scholes volatilities vary systematically 
with strikes, a phenomenon usually referred to as the volatility smile. In the equity market the 
implied volatilities for options with the same maturity usually decrease as the strikes increase. 
In other words, the Black-Scholes model underprices deep out-of-the-money put options and 
overprices deep out-of-the-money call options.  
 
The existence of multiple implied volatilities, regardless of whether they arrange themselves 
in a smile-like pattern, is somewhat confusing. How can the market show that there is more 
than one volatility for a stock? Clearly, there is something wrong with the Black-Scholes 
model. This is that it fails to consider all of the factors that enter into the pricing of an option. 
It accounts for the stock price, the exercise price, the time to expiration, the dividends, and 













is more or less a catch-all term, capturing whatever variables are missing, as well as the 
possibility that the model is improperly specified or blatantly wrong. 
 
In the conclusion of this section, the implied volatility and the existence of the volatility smile 
are suggested to be the result of using a model that does not capture everything that affects 
the price of options. Practitioners and academics largely accept the limitations of the model 
and consider the smile a means of forcing the model to reveal information it is not designed 
to reveal. The strengths of the Black-Scholes model even with its attendant defects may 
outweigh the disadvantages of other more complex models. The Black-Scholes model is 
easily employed to compute the option price by using the no-arbitrage argument or risk-
neutral method.  
 
 The Value at Risk (VaR) method was proposed to examine underlying stock volatilities and 
their forecasts. The VaR is calculated in this work using historical simulation based on 250 
and 500 simulations and the Monte Carlo method based on 5 000 and 10 000 simulations. 
Results show that if the level of confidence is 99%, then the VaR calculated using the 
historical method is greater than the actual price changes in 100% of the forecasted cases in 
the time period under review. It was also concluded that although the estimated VaR via the 
Monte Carlo simulation approach is greater than the actual price changes in 97% of the cases 
in the forecasted period, this method is not as efficient as the historical method. However, 
high option prices imply higher stock volatility, which means a wide possible range of 
movement in the underlying stock prices. Our results demonstrated a good measure of actual 
volatility of the underlying stock via 99% historical simulation VaR. Consequently, VaR is 
assumed to be a good indicator for option prices. 
 
The conclusion is that Value-at-Risk Volatility, calculated by any method, is a reliable 
measure of option pricing for concerning the actual volatility of the underlying stock.   
 
A trader ideally would like to have very high profit (return on investment) with very low risk 













the higher the expected profit, the greater the risk and, similarly, the lower the expected 
profit, the lower the risk. Papers two and three focus on the trade-off between profit and risk, 
as opposed to profit or risk alone, as in VaR. One way of representing this trade-off is to 
combine profit and risk by taking the expected profit and dividing it by the risk measure. This 
single quantity is called the reward-to-risk or risk-adjusted performance. There are several 
risk-adjusting measures based on different notations of risk. Examples are the beta coefficient 
(the focus of the second paper), the Sharpe Ratio and the market price of risk (the focus of the 
third paper). 
 
In paper two we examined issues of asset pricing as well as risk and return relationships in a 
special environment in China’s stock market. This market bears distinctive features such as a 
large percentage of non-tradeable shares and separation of domestic and foreign investors. 
We find that domestic and foreign investors do not price A shares (available for domestic 
investors) and B shares (available for foreign investors) differently. Moreover, we discover 
that the standard risk and return relationships implied by CAPM models comply with A 
shares. Therefore, domestic investors price asset risk as predicted by CAPM models in China. 
A shares’ excess return was regressed on the Chinese market excess return. 
 
We also discovered that the standard risk and return relationships implied by CAPM models 
comply with B shares. Therefore, foreign investors price asset risk as predicted by CAPM 
models in US. B shares’ excess return was regressed on the US market excess return. B shares 
are traded in US dollars and the dividends are also paid in US dollars, and the average 
opportunity cost of investing in Chinese B shares is the average return forgone by investing in 
the US capital market. 
 
Thus, the price differences between domestic A shares and foreign B shares for the same 
company could be explained by the different systematic risks in China and the US. The 
investment opportunities and assets to form portfolios are different for Chinese and foreign 













investors. It is conjectured in this study that the A share price premium is determined by the 
limited alternative investment opportunities available to retail investors in China.   
 
The results also suggest that the different pricing can be explained by interventions in the 
stock market by the Chinese government. Government interventions and policy changes 
precluded foreigners from buying A shares, and domestic residents from buying B shares. 
Other government inventions includes changes of interest rate, control of the growing supply 
of new shares traded in the exchanges, and changes of stock transaction regulations, such as 
the imposition and removal of daily price change limits. Political events also disturbed the 
Chinese stock markets during the period under examination.  
 
The results also show the continuous volatility decreases from February, 20
th
 2001 to 
November, 29
th
 2002, just after the lifting of the restrictions on B shares, and from December, 
2
nd
, 2002 to May, 1
st
 2008, when there were no restrictions at all. This clearly shows that the 
Chinese government improved its capital market management skills by applying more 
market-oriented methods and thereby becoming less directly involved in the equity markets, 
leaving them to their own devices.    
 
The increase in efficiency over time, indicated by the continuous shrinkage in the gap 
between daily A and B  share prices in the more recent periods, can be explained by the 
sequential deregulation and liberalization of the Chinese stock markets, which in the early 
1990s were heavily interrupted by unpredictable market interventions by the government.  
This made these markets persistent rather than neutral. Such non-neutral market persistence 
allows for profit-making arbitrage opportunities, making these markets thereby unfair. The 
Chinese markets have become more efficient and neutral in the last few years, and no longer 
allow abnormal profits, and have become much fairer for all traders.   
 
Paper three investigated the difference between three methods of measuring the trade-off 
between the risk and return of trading stocks in South Africa and China. This work was 













and the Sharpe ratio of trading stocks on the JSE, and the second investigated whether 
Chinese A and B shares listed on the SSE have a different market price of risk to explain 
continued pricing disparities in the two types of shares.  
 
In obtain the market price of risk, the stock price was assumed to behave as GBM, and the 
drift term was decomposed into a risk-free rate and the market price of risk-multiplying 
volatility. The Maximum Likelihood Method was adopted to estimate the market price of 
risk. In the Sharpe ratio test, the Maximum Likelihood Estimation Method was adopted to 
estimate the parameters in the Sharpe ratio equation developed by Sharpe in 1966.  By this 
method we found a basis from which to compare the two risk measurements, as both of them 
are forward-looking risk-measurement tools. In South Africa we found the Sharpe ratio is as 
efficient a measure as the market price of risk. However, with regard to the Chinese shares 
we found the A and B share price premium can be explained by the higher volatility of the A 
shares.  
 
Findings were that the Chinese B share market is less liquid than the A share market and thus 
investors require a liquidity premium in order to compensate for B shares. This partly 
contributes to the B share-pricing discrepancy. Since B shares are less liquid than A shares, it 
is reasonable to assume that the volatility of B shares is also less than that of corresponding A 
shares. B shares have a lower trading volume than corresponding A shares and therefore a 
lower volatility. The market price of risk for A shares and B shares is almost identical. This 
makes sense because both A and B shares are issued by the same company and have virtually 
the same voting rights and dividends. Thus, A and B shares should have the same market 
price of risk and the same return, as this study has shown. 
 
Paper four investigates the presence of rational speculative bubbles in the NASDAQ and JSE 
stock markets. This study suggests an empirical framework on a possible mechanism to 
describe asset-price bubbles. The relationship between stock market value based on market 













bubble theory. The theory of speculative bubbles predicts that stock market prices fluctuate 
around a fundamental value path and price bubbles develop as a series of small persistent 
steps away from this path. Any sudden movement back to the fundamental path is the 
bursting of the bubble. This study tests this theory by attempting to capture these 
characteristics using different VaR techniques.  
 
In this study, a bubble burst is identified as a violation of VaR. Using monthly data, this study 
reports the existence of rational speculative bubbles in the NASDAQ-100 stock market 
during 1998-2000 and the bubble burst in 2000-2001 relating to the dot-com bubble and the 
crisis thereafter. We also report the existence of rational speculative bubbles on the JSE stock 
market during 2006-2008 and the bubble burst in 2009. Success in estimating the bubble 
burst could open a new path for academic research in finance. VaR captures extreme events 
and helps us learn about fat-tailed distributions of risk factors which might be caused by 
rational bubbles. 
 
Although there are theoretical and empirical problems with regard to the measurement of 
rational bubbles, there is much to be learnt from studying them. At the very least research 
into bubbles can demonstrate how it is possible to obtain large and persistent swings in prices 
with only small effects on expected returns in any one period.  
 
In the extreme case of rational bubbles, price movements are so persistent that they have no 
effect on expected returns at all. These large swings may not be due only to ‘irrational’ 
behaviour, as is commonly implied and therefore merit further study. Part of the reason for 
the failure to exploit bubbles seems to stem from greed. Investors who believe that assets are 
over- priced want to generate profits from stock market bubbles, but are hampered by the 
difficulty of determining when a bubble will burst. The price of overvalued assets may then 
become even more exorbitant. These overvaluations can stretch over years. This study 
contends that the impact of psychological behaviour on modern finance theory can no longer 














7.2: Future Study  
 
An extension of this research could include: 
 
 Answering the question: which implied volatility provides the best measure of future 
volatility? The volatility smile/skew phenomenon makes it unclear which implied 
volatility provides the best measure of market volatility expectation over the 
remaining life of the options. 
 
 Further investigation into the unique nature of Chinese stock markets. Chinese listed 
companies raise foreign capital through issuing domestically listed B shares, overseas 
listed H shares in Hong Kong and ADRs in the US. Though companies view cross-
listing as value enhancing, future research could examine how the change in liquidity 
and volatility, and the cost of trading following cross-listing may adversely affect the 
quality of the domestic equity.   
 
 Related to the above research, comparing the value at risk VaR of the domestic A 
shares and the foreign B shares. This comparison will show which share is more risky 
to hold. 
 
 Examining whether there was any real economic gain from overinvestment following 
the US stock price bubble in the late 1990s and investigating why stock return 
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